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INTRODUCTION 
 
Statement of the Problem and Research Questions 
 Determination of nationals is regarded as a matter for each state, and this principle is 
enshrined in international law. In the Tunis and Morocco Nationality Decree case of 1923, 
the PCIJ stated that “in the present [i.e., 1923] state of international law, questions of 
nationality are, [...] in principle within this [each state’s] reserved domain”.1 Article 1 of the 
1930 Convention also provided that “[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law 
who are its nationals”.2 Since each state has the primary right to determine who its nationals 
are, it is inevitable that some people become stateless as a result of the lack of coordination 
between the nationality laws of states. In fact, it is estimated that there are 10 million stateless 
persons around the world.3 Since statelessness is regarded as a problem from both theoretical 
and practical perspectives,4 some treaties contain the norm of preventing statelessness. For 
instance, some articles in the 1930 Convention provide for the prevention of statelessness, 
and the prevention of statelessness was intended during the drafting process of the ICCPR 
and CRC, both of which provide for children’s right to acquire a nationality.5 
 
1 Nationality Decrees in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ, File F. c. V. Docket II. 1. 
24 (Feb. 7). 
2 Emphasis added. 
3 UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2016 2 (2017), at 
http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf. 
4 For traditional reasons why statelessness was regarded as an issue, see 1.3.1., “Awareness of the Issue 
of Statelessness as a Challenge to the International Order”. 
5 Note that the 1930 Convention and human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and CRC provide for the 
prevention of statelessness from different backgrounds. See Chapter One “The Norm of Preventing 
Statelessness in International Law”. 
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The norm of preventing statelessness in international law offers an interesting insight 
to analysing the current norms in international society.6 On the one hand, there is a traditional 
norm that determination of nationals, i.e., members of the state, is regarded as a matter for 
each state. On the other hand, some treaties were concluded to prevent statelessness. In other 
words, each state’s right to determine its nationals is limited by international treaties to some 
extent. Thus, the impact of the norm of preventing statelessness upon state behaviour needs 
to be examined to understand the extent to which states follow the norm, which has a 
potential to conflict with the norm that determination of nationals is within a state’s domestic 
jurisdiction.7 
However, such impact upon Japanese nationality laws has not been examined in any 
detail. Existing literature covered that the CEDAW resulted in the amendment of the 
nationality act in 1984,8 but the impact of other treaties to which Japan is a contracting party, 
 
6 International society is observable when “a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set 
of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions”. HEDLEY 
BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 13 (1977). For English 
School scholars who claims that states compose society, international law is one instrument in 
international society, so states may find it necessary to follow international law. For the role of 
international law in international society, see the following. BULL, supra note 6, at 122-155. 
7 The “impact” of the norm of preventing statelessness is observable when the norm triggered the 
amendment of municipal law or discussion to consider the necessity or desirability to prevent 
statelessness in the government. Regarding the definition of “follow” in this dissertation, see “Scope 
and Terminology of the Dissertation” in the Introduction. 
8 A woman’s equal rights with man with respect to her children’s nationality in the CEDAW triggered 
enactment of the 1984 Nationality Act. SHOICHI KIDANA, CHIKUJOU CHUUKAI KOKUSEKI HOU 
[COMMENTARY ON THE NATIONALITY ACT] 40 (2003). Since it is commonly understood that Japan 
incorporates international law, treaties that Japan has concluded become a part of the Japanese legal 
order without specific domestic legislation. YUJI IWASAWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW, HUMAN RIGHTS, 
AND JAPANESE LAW: THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON JAPANESE LAW 29 (1998). Makoto 
Matsuda, Jitsumu toshiteno Jouyaku Teiketsu Tetsuzuki [Practice of Concluding Process of Treaties], 
10 HOKKAIDO J. OF NEW GLOBAL L. AND POLICY 301, 311 (2011). OSAMU ARAKAKI, STATELESSNESS 
CONVENTIONS AND JAPANESE LAWS: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE (translated by Hajime 
Akiyama) 28 (2016). However, in Japan, international law is not typically directly applied to cases. The 
Japanese government legislates “collateral law” that is compatible with the treaties. When there are 
already relevant municipal laws, such laws are amended, and if not, a new law is legislated. Matsuda, 
supra note 8, at 313. This indicates the significance of municipal law in implementing international law 
in Japan. 
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such as the ICCPR and CRC, has not been well examined.9 In addition, the impact of treaties 
containing a norm of preventing statelessness, wherein Japan is not a contracting party to, 
on Japanese laws is not examined in any detail. For the traditional legal scholars, treaties 
which Japan is not a contracting party to are not necessarily a matter of concern because the 
treaties do not legally bind the state.10 However, international law has a feature to be a 
standard in international society. As a result, there is a possibility for states to follow 
international law even if the state is not a contracting party to the treaty. This indicates the 
necessity to examine the role of treaties to which Japan is not a contracting party. For 
instance, Abe and Arakaki pointed out that Japan participated in the Codification Conference 
and signed the 1930 Convention, to which Japan is not a contracting party, but they did not 
examine the compatibility between the 1930 Convention and Japanese laws and the Japanese 
stance on the 1930 Convention.11 
 
9 One possible reason is that the norm of preventing statelessness in international law did not trigger an 
amendment to the nationality laws. For the previous amendments of the nationality act, see the 
following. KIDANA, supra note 8, at 40. 
10 For traditional international legal scholars’ division of “law” and “non-law” and emphasis on legally 
binding law, see the following. ANDREA BIANCHI, INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORIES: AN INQUIRY INTO 
DIFFERENT WAYS OF THINKING 24-25 (2016). 
11 KOHKI ABE, OVERVIEW OF STATELESSNESS: INTERNATIONAL AND JAPANESE CONTEXT (2010). 
ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 17, 28. It must be noted that under Article 18 of the VCLT, states which 
signed the treaty have the obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of the treaty if the state does 
not indicate a clear intention not to be a party to the treaty. From this perspective, it can be argued that 
Japan was legally required to follow the object and purpose of the 1930 Convention after it signed the 
convention. However, this legal requirement may not be present to Japan regarding the 1930 
Convention in the 1930s for the following reasons. First, the VCLT was signed in 1969, and it entered 
into force in 1980. Therefore, the VCLT cannot be applied to the situation right after the adoption of the 
1930 Convention. Second, it is debatable whether Article 18 of the VCLT constituted a customary 
international law around 1930. On the one hand, the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties prepared 
by the Harvard Law School in 1935 included a similar provision with Article 18 of the VCLT. This may 
imply that the idea similar to Article 18 of the VCLT was shared by international legal scholars, and 
such idea possibly constituted customary international law. For the provision of the draft, see the 
following. Anonymous, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties 29, Supplement AJIL 657-665 (1935). 
On the other hand, James L. Brierly, who contributed to the drafting of the VCLT stated that whether or 
not such customary law exists is not clear in 1953. MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 246 (2009). This indicates that it was not clear 
whether or not there was customary law that determined a state was expected to follow object and 
purpose of a treaty which the state signed while it is not a party to the treaty when Japan signed the 
1930 Convention. 
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On the basis of this background, this dissertation asks two research questions. The 
first research question is: To what extent has the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law influenced Japanese nationality law? In order to find the implications of 
the answers to the first research question, the second research question is: What determined 
whether the norm of preventing statelessness in international law influenced Japanese 
nationality law? 
 
Methodology and Sources 
This dissertation adopts the historical method to answer the research questions,12 
which is different from the traditional method in legal studies such as interpretation of 
treaties and analysis of authoritative texts and case law. Japan began to be a member of 
international society since the end of the eighteenth century, and international law was 
important standard for Japan since then. The historical method allows to examine how the 
Japanese government’s stance towards international law, which prevents statelessness, has 
changed. Since the status of Japan in international society has changed, the Japanese attitude 
towards the norm of preventing statelessness in international law may have changed during 
the concerned eras. 
This dissertation mainly explores first-hand administrative sources to examine the 
Japanese government’s position on the norm of preventing statelessness.13 For the most part, 
laws, minutes of international conferences and Japanese parliament such as the Imperial Diet 
 
12 For a historical method in legal studies, see the following. Philip Langbroek, Kees van den Bos, Marc 
Simon Thomas, Michael Milo & Wibo van Rosseum, Methodology of Legal Research: Challenges and 
Opportunities 13(3) UTRECHT LAW REVIEW 1, 5 (2017). Historical approach to international law has 
clarified the role of international law to socialise states. For instance, see the following. MARTTI 
KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1870-1960 (2009). Ian Brownlie, The Expansion of International Society: The Consequences for the 
Law of Nations, in THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 357 (Hedley Bull & Adam Watson 
eds., 1984). See also 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society” of this dissertation. 
13 For the reason why this dissertation focuses on the governmental view, see note 34 and 
accompanying text.  
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and Diet, 14  and administrative documents from the MOJ and MOFA are analysed to 
understand the Japanese government’s interpretation of international law and its view on the 
compatibility of international law and Japanese laws.15 
 
The Significance and Limits of This Dissertation 
There are two categories of significance in this dissertation. The first category, an 
international one, is composed of the analysis of the role of treaties to which the state is not 
a contracting party and the historical perspective. The examination of the role of treaties to 
which the state is not a contracting party is significant to determine the impact of 
international law on states. A hypothesis is that states follow treaties to which they are not a 
contracting party if these treaties are regarded as a standard in international society. 
Traditional international legal scholars have not paid much attention to treaties to which the 
state is not a contracting party because a state is bound by treaties to which it agrees to be 
bound.16 However, in reality, states follow treaties that do not legally bind them if a state 
perceives such a treaty as a rule or standard in international society which states are required 
 
14 The Imperial Diet existed from 1889 to 1947, and the Diet existed from 1947 to present. 
15 The minutes and documents relating to the 1961 Convention are available online from the UN 
website at http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/1959_statelessness/. Other minutes and documents 
are obtained from the Library of the UN University in Tokyo and the UN Library and Archives in 
Geneva. The minutes of the Imperial Diet are available online at http://teikokugikai-i.ndl.go.jp. The 
minutes of the Diet are available online at http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp. The MOJ is the primary ministry 
dealing with nationality. Article 4 of the Act for Establishment of the MOJ reads, “Ministry of Justice 
[…] is responsible for […] matters concerning nationality […]” (Article 4(xx)). Translated by the 
author. The MOFA is a relevant ministry when nationality is covered by international law. According to 
Article 4 of the Act for the Establishment of the MOFA, the MOFA is responsible for “matters 
concerning the conclusion of treaties and other international agreements” and “matters concerning 
interpretation and implementation of treaties, other international agreements and established laws of 
nations” (Articles 4(iv) and (v)). Translated by the author. Administrative documents from these 
ministries are obtained using the procedure of the request to disclose administrative documents, and 
historical administrative documents are obtained online or by visiting the archives and library in Japan. 
Archives and library include the National Archives of Japan, Diplomatic Archives of the MOFA and 
NDL. Some historical administrative documents are available online from the websites of the National 
Archives of Japan and the Japan Center for Asian Historical Records at 
https://www.jacar.go.jp/english/index.html and https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/index_e.html, 
respectively. 
16 For the concern of traditional legal scholars, see note 10. For the current status of treaties which the 
state signed, see note 11. 
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to follow. Thus, this dissertation clarifies the extent of influence of treaties on prevention of 
statelessness to which the state is not a contracting party.17 
In order to examine the impact of treaties upon states, this dissertation conducts the 
historical analysis of a state’s reaction to the norm of preventing statelessness in international 
law, and this is also a part of significance of this dissertation. Based on the understanding 
that international law becomes a standard in international society, one hypothesis is that the 
state’s attitude towards the norm of preventing statelessness in international law depends on 
the status of the state in international society. This indicates the necessity of introducing 
historical perspectives in order to understand the features of the norm of preventing 
statelessness in international law and examine how the state responds to the norm depending 
on the era. Although this dissertation examines the Japanese case, this method can be used 
to analyse other states’ reaction to the norm of preventing statelessness in international law. 
The second category of significance is relevant to the region which this dissertation 
focuses on. The selection of the Japanese case study has a significance. There are a few 
works on statelessness from the legal perspective in Japan. For instance, UNHCR has 
published several reports on statelessness in Japan. In 2010, Abe grasped the laws related to 
statelessness and the situation of stateless persons in Japan.18 In 2014, Arakaki analysed the 
Japanese law from the perspectives of the 1954 and 1961 Conventions.19 In 2017, Study 
Group on Statelessness in Japan categorised cases of stateless persons in Japan and made 
 
17 It must be noted that there are works to analyse the role of documents which do not legally bind the 
state according to the traditional understanding of international law. For instance, Brunnée and Toope 
approached international law not from the legally-binding nature based on the traditional “law” and 
“non-law” distinction, but from the perspective of the state’s perception of the norm. See the following. 
Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Interactional International Law: An Introduction, 3(2) INT’L 
THEORY 307 (2011). JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT (2010). Note that this dissertation focuses on the 
role of treaties on prevention of statelessness which a state is or is not contracting party, and its purpose 
is not to theorise the role of treaties which the state is not a contracting party in general. 
18 ABE, supra note 11. 
19 ARAKAKI, supra note 8.  
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proposals to improve the situation of stateless persons. 20  However, many works on 
statelessness from the international and municipal legal perspectives focus on European 
states, and the number of works on statelessness in Japan is limited compared to that of the 
European states. 21  For instance, in the website of UNHCR, there are 21 reports and 
documents related to statelessness in Europe while the number of other regions’ reports and 
documents are limited.22 In addition, there are many reports on laws on nationality and 
statelessness in Europe and there exists much information on laws related to statelessness in 
Europe in the Global Nationality Laws Database while information on laws related to 
statelessness in non-European states is limited. 23  Given this context, this dissertation 
analyses the Japanese stance on the norm of preventing statelessness and contributes to 
global statelessness studies. 
It must also be noted that the Japanese case clarifies the role of international law on 
the prevention of statelessness from the non-Western perspective. Japan has adopted the 
isolationist policy since the 1630s, meaning that it did not have much official contact with 
other states.24 However, it officially opened its doors to other states after the “black ships” 
of the US arrived in 1853. After that, oitsuke oikose (catch up and overtake) became the 
Japanese slogan with regard to the West. Japan had the chance to learn international law, 
 
20 STUDY GROUP ON STATELESSNESS IN JAPAN, TYPOLOGY OF STATELESS PERSONS IN JAPAN (2017). 
21 UNHCR reports are not the only works on statelessness in Japan, and there are more books and 
articles on statelessness written in Japanese from variety of disciplines. For the list of books and articles 
on statelessness written in Japanese, see the following. Information Centre on Statelessness in Japan, 
Bunken Jouhou [Relevant Literature], at https://mukokuseki-
centre.jimdo.com/%E6%96%87%E7%8C%AE%E6%83%85%E5%A0%B1-1/ (visited Feb. 25, 2019). 
22 UNHCR runs the “refworld” website, and many documents including report commissioned by 
UNHCR are made public by this website. There are 11 reports and documents concerning Africa and 
Asia and four reports and documents concerning Americas and Middle East and North Africa. This 
number is the analysis of “Country and Region Specific Situations” in the following link. UNHCR, 
Statelessness, at https://www.refworld.org/statelessness.html (visited Feb. 4, 2019). Note that there are 
more books and articles on statelessness from legal perspectives. However, this dissertation refers to the 
reports and documents in the website of UNHCR to compare work on statelessness by region. 
23 Global Nationality Laws Database is available online at http://globalcit.eu/national-citizenship-laws/. 
Country reports of Europe and other regions are available online at http://globalcit.eu/country-profiles/.  
24 However, Japan communicated with some states as exceptions. See note 612. 
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which emerged and developed in Europe,25 to improve its status in international society. As 
explained later, the need to prevent statelessness was mainly discussed in Europe, and 
international law covered prevention of statelessness.26 The Japanese case study will indicate 
how non-Western states attempted to become members of international society by following 
– or not following – the norm of preventing statelessness in international law. There are 
works which indicate that Japan learnt and followed international law to become a member 
of international society, 27  and this dissertation examines the relationship between the 
Japanese status in international society and the Japanese stance on international law related 
to nationality and statelessness. 
In order to explore the Japanese position on the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law, this dissertation mainly uses administrative documents,28 and such an 
approach constitutes the uniqueness of this dissertation too. Abe and Arakaki referred to the 
deliberation in the Diet and Memorandum on Questions in the Diet (Shitsumon Shuisho) to 
examine the Japanese stance towards statelessness,29 but no literature on statelessness in 
Japan examined administrative documents in detail. It is necessary to do so because Japan 
takes the parliamentary system, and bills are submitted to the Diet, the legislative organ in 
Japan, by either the cabinet or members of the Diet.30 The majority of the bills are submitted 
 
25 See the following. Martin Kintzinger, From the Late Middle Ages to the Peace of Westphalia, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 607 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters 
eds., 2009). Heinz Duchhardt, From the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 628 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters 
eds., 2009). Miloš Vec, From the Congress of Vienna To the Paris Peace Treaties of 1919, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 654 (Bardo Fassbender & Anne Peters 
eds., 2009). 
26 See 1.3.1., “Awareness of the Issue of Statelessness as a Challenge to International Order” and 4.2.2., 
“Status of the Norm of Prevention of Statelessness in International Society”. 
27 For instance, see the following. Yoshiro Matsui, Modern Japan, War and International Law, in 
JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 7 (Nisuke Ando ed., 2001). Kinji 
Akashi, Japan-Europe, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 724 
(Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters eds., 2012). 
28 See also “Methodology and Sources” in the Introduction. 
29 ABE, supra note 11. ARAKAKI, supra note 8. 
30 MAKOTO NAKAJIMA, RIPPOU GAKU: JORON, RIPPOU KATEI RON  [LEGISLATIVE STUDIES: 
INTRODUCTION AND LEGISLATION PROCESS] 30 (3rd ed,. 2014). 
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by the cabinet, and they are drafted by the ministries of the government,31  thus, it is 
significant to analyse the understanding of administration in relation to the necessity of 
legislation. If the administration recognises the necessity of legislation, it is possible that a 
ministry proposes a bill which can result in actual legislation in the Diet. As already 
discussed, international law triggered the amendment of a Japanese nationality act in 1984, 
and this is widely known as the only occasion that international law influenced on nationality 
law. However, the MOFA, for instance, might have examined the compatibility between the 
Japanese laws and the norm of preventing statelessness in international law. In such occasion, 
the normative influence of the prevention of statelessness in international law on the 
Japanese law may be observable. Thus, it is necessary to examine the administrative sources. 
However, this method is not globally valid. In other words, the role of the 
administration in the legislation process depends on the state. When the Japanese situation 
is compared with that of other states, the proportion of the bills submitted by the members 
of the Diet vis-à-vis all the bills submitted to the Diet including those submitted by the 
cabinet is small.32 In some states, the views of the administration may not influence on 
legislation much. Considering the situation in these states, the method adopted in this 
dissertation may not have as much validity as intended. This is a limitation of this method 
to examine the administrative sources. 
 
Scope and Terminology of the Dissertation 
 In this dissertation, the prevention of statelessness means any measure to prevent 
statelessness. A stateless person is defined as “a person who is not considered as a national 
 
31 Id, at 30. 
32 Mutsumi Shimizu, Rippou Katei niokeru Kokkai to Seifu no Yakuwari Buntan wo megette: Houan no 
Hatsuan, Teishutu wo Chuusin toshite [The Role of the Diet and Government in the Legislation 
Process: Focusing on Drafting and Submission of Drafts of Laws], in RIPPOU KATEI NO KENKYU: 
RIPPOU NIOKERU SEIFU NO YAKUWARI [A STUDY OF LEGISLATION PROCESS: THE ROLE OF THE 
GOVERNMENT IN LEGISLATION] 3, 20 (Mutsuo Nakamura and Hideaki Maeda eds., 1997). 
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by any State under the operation of its law”, pursuant to Article 1 of the 1954 Convention.33 
This definition is a reminder that it is the government’s view that determines whether a 
person is a national of a particular state or not.34 Thus, this dissertation focuses on the 
governmental view on nationality and statelessness. 
It distinguishes between the concepts of nationality and citizenship, and its scope is 
limited to nationality.35  Although some scholars use these terms interchangeably,36  the 
backgrounds of these concepts are different. The concept of citizenship originated from the 
city-state period of Ancient Greece, and the practical necessity of protecting the community 
was the basis of the concept. Citizens possessed military obligations to protect the 
community, 37  and in return, they participated in the politics of the city-state. 38  Thus, 
protection of the community from the external threats and citizens’ participation in the 
community were the principal features of citizenship. On the basis of this historical 
background, the word “citizenship” sometimes carries the implication of participation in 
politics.39 By contrast, “nationality” assumes that members of the “nation” share a certain 
identity. As this dissertation explains, the concept of nationality emerged after the French 
 
33 This definition is regarded as customary international law by the ILC. UN, REPORT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION: FIFTY-EIGHTH SESSION (1 MAY-9 JUNE AND 3 JULY-11 AUGUST 
2006), A/61/10, 49 (2006). In other words, non-contracting parties to the 1954 Convention, such as 
Japan, are also bound by this definition. 
34 With regard to the significance of the government’s view toward individuals, see the following. 
UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROTECTION OF STATELESS PERSONS: UNDER THE 1954 CONVENTION 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF STATELESS PERSONS paras. 23-24 (2014). Hajime Akiyama, 
Mukokusekisha toha Dareka: Kokusaihou niokeru Mukokusekisha no Teigi to Mitourokusha no 
Kanrensei kara [Who is a Stateless Person? Definition of a Stateless Person in International Law and 
Unregistered Persons], 22 SOCIAL-HUMAN ENVIRONMENTOLOGY 67, 69 (2016). 
35 The following sentences are reconstructed and modified on the basis of the paper published 
elsewhere. Hajime Akiyama, Enforcement of Nationality and Human Insecurity: A Case Study on 
Securitised Japanese Nationality of Koreans during the Colonial Era, 7(2) J. OF HUMAN SEC. STUDIES 
79, 82-84 (2018). 
36 For instance, see the following. Matthew J. Gibney, Statelessness and Citizenship in Ethical and 
Political Perspective, in NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 44, 44 (Alice 
Edwards and Laura van Waas eds., 2014). 
37 KEITH FAULKS, CITIZENSHIP 16 (2000). 
38 Engin F. Isin & Bryan S. Turner, Citizenship Studies: An Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP 
STUDIES 1, 5 (Engin F. Ishin and Bryan S. Turner eds., 2002). 
39 See the following. Jonathan Lepofsky and James C. Fraser, Building Community Citizens: Claiming 
the Right to Place-making in the City, 40(1) URBAN STUDIES 127, 130 (2003). 
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Revolution, and the shared identity of individuals who compose a nation has been 
emphasised.40 In international law, the definition of stateless persons refers to “nationals”, 
so the concept of nationality should be the basis of analysis of the prevention of statelessness. 
Thus, this dissertation focuses on nationality. 
This dissertation covers the prevention of statelessness by automatic conferral or loss 
of nationality. Naturalisation, however, is not covered in this dissertation. Statelessness can 
be reduced by naturalisation as well, but naturalisation is generally regarded as being at the 
discretion of the state.41 In other words, the system of naturalisation does not guarantee the 
prevention of statelessness. Therefore, this dissertation covers the automatic conferral of 
nationality which guarantees the prevention of statelessness when the criteria in law are met. 
For instance, its scope includes the prevention of individuals being stateless when they are 
born in Japan and the prevention of Japanese being made stateless as a result of loss of 
Japanese nationality. Conferral of nationality in the former case and prevention of loss of 
nationality in the latter case are necessary measures to prevent statelessness. 
The prevention of statelessness that can occur as a result of the application of the 
concept of the Japanese nation is the main scope of this dissertation. The basis for conferring 
Japanese nationality has been the Japanese household since the 1899 Nationality Act, the 
first nationality act in Japan. As a result, a jus sanguinis through the paternal line was applied 
as a method for conferring Japanese nationality by birth in the 1899 Nationality Act. Jus 
sanguinis is a principle by which the parents’ nationality is transmitted to the child, but only 
fathers can transmit the nationality when the jus sanguinis through the paternal line is applied. 
This can be contrasted with the jus soli principle, which confers nationality on the basis of 
the place in which a child is born. Measures to prevent statelessness that may arise as a result 
 
40 See 1.2., “The Emergence of Nationality and the Nation-State Principle”. 
41 For the Japanese case, see the following. KIDANA, supra note 8, at 234. 
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of jus sanguinis through the paternal line, derived from a Japanese household, comprise the 
scope of this dissertation. 
In terms of time range, this dissertation covers international law and nationality laws 
since 1889, when the first Japanese constitution was enacted. In international law, it mainly 
covers the 1930, 1957, and 1961 Conventions, as well as the ICCPR, CEDAW and CRC.42 
Japan participated in the conferences to adopt the 1930 and 1961 Conventions, so the 
Japanese positions in these conferences are examined too. This dissertation also concerns 
the Treaty of San Francisco since it could have covered the nationality of people from the 
former colonies although it did not do so. 
In this dissertation, a norm means a standard of appropriate behaviour for states. This 
definition is inspired by Finnemore and Sikkink’s definition of the same: “a standard of 
appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.”43 It must be noted that the identity 
as a member of international society, in other words, a state, is a basis for states to comply 
with international law.44 A norm emerges in international society when some states regard a 
certain action as appropriate behaviour as a state. When increasing number of states regard 
a certain action as appropriate, such norm is strengthened and more states commit to the 
 
42 Note that Japan is a contracting party to the ICCPR, CEDAW and CRC, but not to the other treaties 
listed above. This dissertation does not cover the CERD and CRPD even though they concern 
nationality. Article 5 (c) (iii) of the CERD provides that racial discrimination concerning “[t]he right to 
nationality” be prohibited. However, the meaning of this article is vague and it does not seem to have 
had much substantial impact on the prevention of statelessness. In addition, although Article 18 of the 
CRPD provides for the right of persons with disability to acquire and change nationality and prohibits 
the deprivation of nationality, prevention of statelessness was not mentioned during the drafting process 
of the CRPD. For the drafting process of the CRPD, see the following. UN, Ad Hoc Committee on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights 
and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, at https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoccom.htm 
(visited Jan. 16, 2019). This dissertation does not focus on documents that are regarded as non-legally 
binding documents such as political ones including the UDHR, since it pays attention to the reaction of 
states to treaties. However, it must be noted that there is a view that the UDHR is regarded as a 
customary international law. John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its 
History, Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION 21, 21 (Bertland G. Ramcharan ed., 1979). 
43 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52(4) 
INT’L ORG, 887, 891 (1998). 
44 See 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
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norm.45 In this sense, this dissertation’s understanding of a “norm” is different from a “legal 
norm” in traditional international legal studies which covers customary law and treaties 
which the state is a contracting party. 
The verb “follow” is used when international treaties, including those to which the 
state is not a contracting party, influence the text or interpretation of municipal law. The 
scope of “following” is wider than that of “compliance with” international law in the existing 
literature. “Compliance” is typically used to describe situations in which states act in line 
with a treaty to which the state is a contracting party.46 In this dissertation, “following” 
includes the impact of the provisions of treaties to which Japan is not a contracting party.47  
International treaties’ influence is observable if the Japanese government officials refer to 
international treaties when a new law is legislated or an existing law is amended. The scope 
of “following” international treaties is not limited to the influence of the text of international 
treaties. It includes the interpretation of or the drafting process of international law. For 
instance, if Japan uses an interpretation or drafting process of international law to interpret 
municipal law, Japan is regarded as “following” international law.48 
In this dissertation, the term “nationality laws” refers to Japanese laws that cover 
nationality. The main law to examine is the Japanese nationality act. The first Japanese 
nationality act was enacted in 1899 and amended in 1916. New nationality acts were enacted 
in 1950 and 1984. This dissertation also covers the 1889 and 1946 Constitutions since they 
 
45 For detailed analysis, see 4.2.2., “Status of the Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International 
Society” and Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 43, at 895. 
46 For instance, Chayes and Chayes argue that “it is not realistic to expect 100 percent compliance from 
the day a treaty enters into force” (emphasis added). Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, 
Compliance without Enforcement: State Behavior under Regulatory Treaties, 7(3) NEGOTIATION J. 311, 
312 (1991). This implies that legally binding nature based on the action for being a contracting party is 
assumed in the word of “compliance”. 
47 For explanation of the “impact” of the norm of preventing statelessness, see note 7. 
48 This interest in the drafting process is similar to the International Legal Process School. For the 
International Legal Process School, see ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH AND ANDREAS 
LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS (1968). 
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also concern nationality matters. Laws and circulars on nationality related to the former 
colonies are also examined. 
 
Structure of the Dissertation 
There are four chapters in this dissertation following introduction, as well as a 
conclusion. 
Chapter One reviews the development of the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law. It indicates a number of international treaties paid attention to the 
prevention of statelessness even if their text did not explicitly provide for it. 
Chapters Two and Three are the main parts of this dissertation. They examine the 
extent to which the norm of preventing statelessness in international law has influenced 
Japanese nationality laws. Chapter Two covers the nationality laws from 1889 to 1945 under 
the 1889 Constitution, and it argues that the norm of preventing statelessness in international 
law influenced the first Japanese nationality act, and Japan paid attention to the prevention 
of statelessness when the 1930 Convention was discussed in the Codification Conference. 
Chapter Three covers the development of the norm of preventing statelessness under the 
1946 Constitution. It argues that the norm of preventing statelessness in international law 
did not influence Japanese laws except the 1930 Convention, which influenced the 
interpretation of the clause on nationality in the 1946 Constitution. 
Chapter Four analyses the findings of Chapters One to Three, and examines the 
factors that determined whether the norm of preventing statelessness in international law 
influenced on Japanese nationality laws. It indicates that international and national factors 
explain the Japanese stance towards the norm of preventing statelessness in international law. 
The dissertation concludes with insights for the future. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE NORM OF PREVENTING 
STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1.1. Summary of the Chapter 
 This chapter explores the development of the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law. It indicates that the prevention of statelessness was intended by some 
treaties even if these treaties’ text did not explicitly provide for the prevention of 
statelessness. It also examines why the prevention of statelessness was included in the 
provision or discussed in the drafting process of each treaty. 
Scholars on international law have pointed out that, from the perspective of 
maintaining the international order, statelessness has been an issue since the end of the 
nineteenth century. Married women’s experience of statelessness was also regarded as a 
practical problem, and the 1930 Convention provided for the prevention of statelessness 
among married women and some children, such as foundlings. After the adoption of the 
UDHR, the 1957 Convention that provides for the prevention of statelessness among married 
women was adopted on the basis of the concept of human rights. The 1961 Convention, the 
most holistic convention for preventing statelessness, was drafted in order to find a solution 
for the issues that refugees and stateless persons faced, and is of a different context for 
dealing with statelessness from that faced by the 1930 and 1957 Conventions. Children’s 
right to acquire a nationality was included in the ICCPR, and the prevention of statelessness 
was intended by the provision. The CEDAW covers nationality from the perspective of 
gender equality and provides for the prevention of statelessness as a result of marriage. 
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Similar to the ICCPR, states intended to prevent statelessness by the CRC’s clause on the 
children’s right to acquire a nationality. Although a measure to implement the prevention of 
statelessness was not included in the provision, the emphasis on the prevention of 
statelessness allowed the CRC to mention the “stateless” in Article 7(2). This chapter begins 
with an analysis of the emergence of nationality, which is a precondition of the occurrence 
of statelessness. 
 
1.2. The Emergence of Nationality and the Nation-State Principle 
The concepts of nationality and statelessness emerged after the introduction of the 
nation-state principle. The nation-state principle developed after the French Revolution. In 
the eighteenth century, ideas of the Enlightenment spread throughout France.49 Around that 
time, people, the elites in particular, questioned the monarchical system in place at the time.50 
The Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen in 1789 played an 
important part in people’s questioning of the existing system. This declaration was drafted 
by liberal revolutionaries and Article 3 of the declaration provided that “sovereignty” 
essentially resides with the “nation”.51 When the sovereign state system became the norm in 
the seventeenth century,52 secular kings and princes were regarded as sovereign.53 However, 
 
49 Marisa Linton, The Intellectual Origins of the French Revolution, in THE ORIGINS OF THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 139, 140 (Peter R. Campbell ed., 2006). 
50 Note that it is said that the Enlightenment is not the only cause of the French Revolution. Id, at 141. 
51 The original text of the Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen can be found 
from the following. Conseil Constitutionnel, Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789 
[The 1789 Universal Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen], available at 
http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-
4-octobre-1958/declaration-des-droits-de-l-homme-et-du-citoyen-de-1789.5076.html (visited Jan. 16, 
2019). 
52 It is said that 1648, when the Thirty Years’ War ended, is the beginning of the current sovereign state 
system. While some secular political units exercised sovereignty even before the end of the Thirty 
Years’ War (Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 55(2) 
INT’L ORG. 251, 251 (2001).), the sovereignty of secular political unit were recognised as a principle in 
international society as a result of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. Daud Hassan, The Rise of the 
Territorial State and the Treaty of Westphalia, 9 YEARBOOK OF NEW ZEALAND JURISPRUDENCE 62, 66-
67 (2006). 
53 See the following. Osiander, supra note 52, at 252. 
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this understanding was challenged by the declaration of 1789. By the “nation”, the 
declaration meant the people,54 and it shifted the bearer of sovereignty from the king to the 
people who constituted the state. For the liberal revolutionaries, there were two significant 
points. First, in order to mobilise the people of France to overthrow the king, the 
revolutionaries wanted to make them aware that the French people shared a collective 
identity.55 Second, in order to strengthen that shared collective identity, the concept of 
equality was necessary. Article 3 of the declaration was strong enough for the people of 
France to believe that they shared a collective identity as the French people, and as a result, 
they sought to liberate themselves from the tyranny of the king.56 This collective identity 
can be seen as nationalism, which provides an emotional basis for the concepts of the nation 
and nationality. 
 After the revolution, the extent of those considered nationals was “substantiated” by 
the concept of “nationality”.57 Since the “French people” became the bearer of sovereignty 
in France, it was necessary to determine who the French people were. In this context, the 
legal system developed, 58  determining the scope of the French nationals. In the first 
 
54 The word “nation” originated in the Latin word natio, which meant place of birth or origin. WALTER 
C. OPELLO, JR. & STEPHEN J. ROSOW, THE NATION-STATE AND GLOBAL ORDER: A HISTORICAL 
INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICS 181 (1999). Anderson defines a nation as “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. He explains that a nation 
has the features of being “imagined”, “limited”, and a “community”. First, a nation is imagined because 
the members of the nation have not met all other members of the nation. Second, it is limited because 
there are always the others, outside of the nation, and there is boundary between us and the others. 
Third, it is a community because the sense of the nation allows members to feel comradeship even if 
there is inequality among members. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6-7 (Rev. ed., 1991). 
55 In order to mobilise people, nationalism was “invented” by state elites. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS 
AND NATIONALISM 65 (1983). Although the concept of “nation” was invented by elites, there must also 
be a basis upon which the people can accept such a concept. See the following. ANDERSON, supra note 
54. 
56 OPELLO & ROSOW, supra note 54, at 183. 
57 ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 14. Even before then, there was a concept of being French. The Paris 
Parliament, the court under the monarchy system, decided who the French were. For details, see the 
following. PATRICK WEIL, HOW TO BE FRENCH: NATIONALITY IN THE MAKING SINCE 1980 (translated 
by Catherine Porter) 1-3 (2008). However, it was after the French Revolution that the concept of 
nationality developed. 
58 In a nation-state system, the law, the constitutional law in particular, plays a significant role. It is 
reported that during the era of the Bourbon Dynasty, Louis XIV said “l’état, c’est moi” [The State? I am 
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constitution of France, in 1791, conditions required to be “French citizens” were included.59 
At the time, the word “citizens” (citoyens in French) was used,60 but the background of the 
revolution indicates that the “citizens” in these constitutions assumed that citizens shared a 
collective identity. Therefore, the 1791 French Constitution can be seen as the first 
constitution under the nation-state system. The word “nationality” (nationalité in French) 
began to be used in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it was used as a synonym 
for the “quality of being French”, which was also used as substitute for “citizens” by many 
authors from the 1840s.61 In the legal sphere, the word “nationality” was used in the treaties 
France concluded with other states during the 1860s.62 In French law, the word nationality 
was used for the first time in 1889.63 
 This nation-state system spread across Europe after 1848 as a result of revolutions in 
many parts of Europe, referred to as the Spring of Nations. Although the revolutions were 
not necessarily successful in Italy or Germany in 1848, nationalism increased, helping in the 
 
the state.]. THOMAS CARLYLE, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A HISTORY Volume I 8 (1906). This implies 
that the king was the ruler and sovereign, and written law was not necessarily significant. However, 
after the bearer of sovereignty became the nationals of the state, laws played an important role since no 
one individual could make decisions as the only bearer of sovereignty. See the following. Ulrich K. 
Preuss, The Political Meaning of Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND 
SOVEREIGNTY: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 11, 15 (Richard Bellamy ed., 1996). 
59 See Title II, Article 2 of the following. Conseil Constitutionnel, Constitution de 1791 [The 1791 
Constitution], available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-
constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-de-1791.5082.html (visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
60 Constitutions in 1793 (Article 4), 1795 (Article 8) and 1799 (Article 2) also used the word “citizens”. 
See the following. Conseil Constitutionnel, Constitution du 24 juin 1793 [The Constitution of 24 June 
1793], available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-
constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-du-24-juin-1793.5084.html (visited Jan. 16, 
2019). Conseil Constitutionnel, Constitution du 5 Fructidor An III [The Constitution of 5 of the Twelfth 
Month, Year III], available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/la-
constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-du-5-fructidor-an-iii.5086.html (visited Jan. 16, 
2019). Conseil Constitutionnel, Constitution du 22 Frimaire An VIII [The Constitution of 22 of the 
Third Month, Year VIII], available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/les-constitutions-de-la-france/constitution-du-22-frimaire-an-
viii.5087.html (visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
61 WEIL, supra note 57, at 258-259. 
62 The Turin Treaty (24 March 1860) and annexation treaties between France and Monaco (2 February 
1861) and between France and Switzerland (8 December 1862) used the word “nationality”. Id, at 259. 
63 The reason why the word “nationality” appeared in the Constitution around that time is not clear from 
the available sources. Id, at 259. 
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unification of Italy in 186164 and Germany in 1871.65 Nationalism emerged in other parts of 
the Habsburg Empire at the time as well. 66  In Italy, the concept of nationality was 
incorporated into the 1865 Civil Code, 67  and the first German “nationality law” was 
introduced in 1913.68  
 Nationality was introduced into other regions, such as the Americas and Asia, in the 
late nineteenth century. New states in these regions learnt the concept of nationality from 
Europe, and they introduced the system of nationality.69 For instance, the US and Japan 
determined their definitions of nationals in their own municipal laws. Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution in 1868 provided that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside”.70 This Amendment of the constitution 
determined the scope of nationals of the US holistically for the first time. 71  As this 
 
64 GIOVANNA ZINCONE & MARZIA BASILI, COUNTRY REPORT: ITALY, EUDO CITIZENSHIP 
OBSERVATORY 4 (2013). For the process of Italian unification, see the following. JOHN MERRIMAN, A 
HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE: FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 754-765 (1996). 
65 For the process of the German unification, see the following. MERRIMAN, supra note 64, at 765-778. 
66 Id, at 778. 
67 The Civil Code used the word “citizenship” (cittadinanza). ZINCONE & BASILI, supra note 64, at 5. 
Italy prepared a law on nationality at an earlier period than did other states. 
68 KAY HAILBRONNER, COUNTRY REPORT: GERMANY, EUDO CITIZENSHIP OBSERVATORY 1 (2012). 
69 In the colonies, nationality was not necessarily introduced. For instance, in the French colonies, 
French citizenship, which entailed political rights, was introduced, but French nationality, which was 
composed of political rights and civil status, was not introduced at the end of the nineteenth century. 
Lorelle D. Semley, “Evolution Revolution” and the Journey from African Colonial Subject to French 
Citizen, 32(2) L. AND HISTORY REV. 267, 276 (2014). Although the difference between French 
citizenship and French nationality at the time is not clear, this indicates that people in the colonies were 
regarded as having some kind of tie with France, but they were not necessarily regarded as equal 
members of France. 
70 For more details on Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, see the following. Library of 
Congress, Fourteenth Amendment and Citizenship, at 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/citizenship/fourteenth_amendment_citizenship.php (visited Jan. 16, 
2019). 
71 This amendment was triggered by the abolition of slavery after the end of the Civil War. There had 
previously been a decision that did not recognise the status of black people as citizens of the US, but 
this decision was overturned by the Fourteenth Amendment. JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE 
UNITED STATES AND ITS AMENDMENTS 185 (4th ed., 2006). As a result, black people born in the US 
became US nationals. With regard to terminology, it must be pointed out that the term “citizens” is used 
in the US law. However, this “citizenship” should be interpreted as “nationality” in the international 
legal sense, so this dissertation uses “nationality” instead. See “Scope and Terminology of the 
Dissertation” in the Introduction. 
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dissertation discusses, Japan adopted its first nationality act in 1899.72 These examples 
indicate that, in some cases, the concept and practice of nationality spread not because 
European states imposed such a system but because there were non-European states who 
introduced a nationality system.73   
 
1.3. The Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International Law 
1.3.1. Awareness of the Issue of Statelessness as a Challenge to the International Order 
 Statelessness began to be regarded as an issue by international legal scholars in the 
late nineteenth century and by states in the 1920s.74 After that, the prevention of statelessness 
was provided for in international law. This subsection explores why statelessness came to 
be regarded as an issue during those periods, and the following subsections examine how 
and why the prevention of statelessness was intended by international treaties, referring to 
the drafting process of each treaty. 
 In the late nineteenth century, states were the main actors in international law, and 
international legal scholars regarded statelessness as something that should be prevented, 
mainly from the perspective of the maintenance of international order. 75  At the time, 
individuals were not regarded as subjects in international law; they were recognised by 
 
72 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
73 This point is relevant to the analysis of this dissertation. See 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in 
International Society”. 
74 Arakaki notes that “nationality and statelessness have the same length of history”. ARAKAKI, supra 
note 8, at 14. However, it must be noted that statelessness was not necessarily regarded as an issue when 
the concept of nationality emerged in the French Revolution. Theoretically, statelessness could have 
arisen when France introduced the concept of nationality, but at the time, many states had not 
introduced it. In other words, nationality was not necessarily a significant issue for many states, and as a 
result, statelessness was not a significant issue either. Thus, it must be emphasised that statelessness was 
regarded as an issue to be discussed only after a certain number of states had introduced a nationality 
system. 
75 This can be contrasted with the emphasis on the prevention of statelessness in current international 
law from the perspective of human rights. See the following. Peter J. Spiro, A New International Law of 
Citizenship 105 AJIL 694, 709 (2011). 
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international law through their nationality, which bound individuals and states.76 Stateless 
persons were regarded as a challenge to the international order because no state was 
responsible for their actions, including illegal ones.77 This is one reason why international 
legal scholars called for the prevention of statelessness. In 1895, at a conference held in 
Cambridge, the IDI, an organisation composed of experts in international law,78 adopted a 
resolution called “Principles relating to conflicts of laws concerning nationality”.79 The first 
principle was that “No one shall be without nationality”.80 This indicates that international 
lawyers were beginning to regard statelessness as an issue by the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
Statelessness and nationality matters were discussed in the LN, which was 
established in 1920. Pursuant to the resolution of the LN Assembly on 22 September 1924, 
the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law discussed 
matters necessary for codification,81 and nationality was included as one of them.82 The 
report of the sub-committee on nationality in 1926 mentioned that the “lack of any 
 
76 By 1928, the role of nationality in individuals’ entitlement to receive benefits provided by 
international law was recognised. Lassa Oppenheim, a well-known international legal scholar, stated 
that “since they [i.e., stateless persons] do not own a nationality, the link by which they could derive 
benefits from International Law is missing”. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE VOL. I. 
PEACE 546 (4th ed., 1928). 
77 Spiro, supra note 75, at 709. 
78 The IDI was established in 1873, and its purpose was to “promote the progress of international law”. 
For the statutes of the IDI, see the following. IDI, Statutes, available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/Statutes-of-the-Institute-of-International-Law.pdf (visited Jan. 16, 2019). 
79 IDI, Principles relatifs aux conflits de lois en matière de nationalité (naturalisation et expatriation) 
[Principles relating to Conflicts of Laws concerning Nationality (Naturalisation and Expatriation)], 
available at http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/1895_camb_02_fr.pdf (visited Jan, 16, 2019). 
80 The second principle was “No one can have two nationalities simultaneously”. Id. Both principles 
were translated from French by the author. These principles indicate that both positive and negative 
conflicts of nationality was regarded as an issue. 
81 The committee was composed of “representatives of the main forms of civilization and the principal 
legal systems of the world”. ILC, About the Commission, at http://legal.un.org/ilc/league.shtml (visited 
Aug. 14, 2019). See the following. Manley O. Hudson, General Introduction, 23(2) AJIL 1, 1-3 (1929). 
82 Territorial waters, diplomatic privileges and immunities, responsibility of states in respect to injury 
caused in their territory to persons or property of foreigners, procedure of international conferences and 
procedure for the conclusion and drafting of treaties, piracy, and exploitation of the products of the sea 
were also listed as issues to be discussed. UN, Documents on the Development and Codification of 
International Law 41 Supplement AJIL 29, 68-69 (1947). 
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nationality (Heimatlosat) has become very frequent and constitutes a serious problem in 
international life”,83 and it called for the prevention of statelessness.84 For instance, many 
people were denationalised by Russia in 1921, and this resulted in statelessness.85 In this 
context, the Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law 
regarded nationality issues needed to be codified by the LN Assembly in 1927,86  and 
statelessness was discussed in the Codification Conference held in 1930. 
 
1.3.2. The 1930 Convention: The Emphasis on Married Women and Children 
The 1930 Convention was the first convention to provide for the prevention of 
statelessness among married women and children. 87  In addition to the concern for 
statelessness from the perspective of maintenance of international order,88 the hardships that 
stateless married women faced was another driving force for states to work on the prevention 
of statelessness among married women. There were cases in which women married to 
foreign men became stateless. Marriage between non-American women and American men 
was one example. Some states provided that women lost their nationality when they married 
 
83 Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, LN, Questionnaire No. 
1, adopted by the Committee at its Second Session, held in January 1926: Nationality, LN Doc. 
C.43.M.18.1926.V [C.P.D.I. 53], 2 (1926). Heimatlosat means homelessness in German. 
84 Id, at 5. 
85 J. H. W. VERZIJI, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PART V NATIONALITY AND 
OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO INDIVIDUALS 44 (1972). 
86 See the following. Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, LN, 
supra note 83, at 2. Territorial waters and the responsibility of states also remained as issues to be 
codified. UN, supra note 82, at 106. 
87 It must be noted that the 1930 Convention provides for the prevention of statelessness among children 
only in some cases as will be explained later. The Committee of Experts for the Progressive 
Codification of International Law, which drafted the 1930 Convention, stated that, as of 1926, there was 
no customary law providing for the prevention of statelessness. Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law, LN, supra note 83, at 5. Thus, the prevention of 
statelessness was covered in international law for the first time in the 1930 Convention. It must also be 
noted that Article 1 of the 1930 Convention provided that “It is for each State to determine under its 
own law who are its nationals”. Thus, the 1930 Convention assumed that determination of nationals was 
a matter for each state, and it was on the basis of this understanding that the Convention covered the 
prevention of statelessness. 
88 See 1.3.1., “Awareness of the Issue of Statelessness as a Challenge to the International Order”. 
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foreigners.89 In addition, US law did not confer nationality on non-American women who 
married American men. 90  As a result, some women became stateless when marrying 
Americans. In order to mitigate the “hardship”91 and “injustices”92 married women faced, a 
method of preventing statelessness among married women was considered. Women’s 
organisations campaigned on this issue in the international arena.93 The 1930 Convention 
included articles on the prevention of statelessness in this context. It also provided for the 
prevention of statelessness among children in some cases, while the reason why this was 
included in the 1930 Convention is not clear from available sources. 94  Although the 
hardships that married women faced comprised one trigger for the drafters of the 1930 
Convention to include the prevention of statelessness among married women, it must be 
emphasised that the basic motivation of the 1930 Convention seems to have been 
maintenance of international order, and the concept of human rights, including women’s 
rights, did not develop in international law until the end of WWII.95 
 
89 It is said that 24 states determined loss of women’s nationality in cases of international marriage. J. 
W. Garner, Uniformity of Law in Respect to Nationality, 19(3) AJIL 547, 548-549 (1925). It was 
assumed that women acquired the nationality of their husband in cases of international marriage. 
90 Id, at 549. 
91 Richard W. Flournoy, Jr., Nationality Convention, Protocols and Recommendations Adopted by the 
First Conference on the Codification of International Law, 24(3) AJIL 467, 476 (1930). 
92 Garner, supra note 89, at 548. 
93 Flournoy, supra note 91, at 476. In 1923, the International Woman Suffrage Alliance adopted a draft 
convention that prevented “the hardships arising from conflicts of law”. Id, at 551. 
94 However, one possibility is that the prevention of statelessness among children was regarded as the 
first step to preventing statelessness that was regarded as necessary from the perspective of maintenance 
of international order. As will be discussed later, the scope of the prevention of statelessness among 
children covered in the 1930 Convention was limited to the case of foundlings. It may have been less 
controversial for states to include this provision than a principle that nationality to be conferred on the 
basis of either jus soli or jus sanguinis, such as Articles 1 and 4 of the 1961 Convention. See also 1.3.4., 
“The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
95 The preamble of the 1930 Convention states that “it is in the general interest of the international 
community to secure that all its members should recognise that every person should have a nationality 
and should have one nationality only” (emphasis added). Although it is difficult to interpret what “the 
general interest of the international community” means, this preamble implies that married women’s 
rights were not considered the most significant motivation for adopting the 1930 Convention. However, 
it must be pointed out that the “interests of individuals” were also mentioned during the drafting process 
of the 1930 Convention. See the following. LN, Acts of the Conference for the Codification of 
International Law Held at The Hague from March 13th to April 12th, 1930: Meetings of the 
Committees, Vol. II Minutes of the First Committee, Nationality, LN Doc. C.351(a).M.145(a).1930.V, 
18 (1930). 
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Articles 8, 9 and 14 to 16 of the 1930 Convention covered the prevention of 
statelessness. Articles 8 and 9 concerned married women, and they contributed to preventing 
married women’s loss of nationality. Article 8 established that the nationality of a married 
woman could be lost only when she acquires the nationality of her husband. Article 9 held 
that when a husband changed his nationality during marriage, the nationality of the woman 
to whom he was married could be lost only if she acquired the new nationality of her husband. 
These articles ensured that married women acquired another nationality when they lost their 
original nationality. Articles 14 to 16 covered children. Article 14 stated that a child whose 
both parents were not known, namely, foundlings, acquired the nationality of the state in 
which the child was born. Article 15 allowed a state to confer a nationality on a child born 
in the territory of the state whose parents did not have any nationality or whose nationality 
was unknown.96 Article 16 provided that when the nationality of a child born out of wedlock 
was lost as a result of a change in civil status, such as recognition by a parent, the loss had 
to be conditional on the child’s acquisition of another nationality. Although the 1930 
Convention was not a comprehensive treaty in preventing statelessness, it determined some 
measures to prevent statelessness among married women and, in some cases, children. 
 
1.3.3. The 1957 Convention: Married Women’s Human Rights 
 The first universal treaty that covered the prevention of statelessness from a human 
rights perspective was the 1957 Convention. Both the 1930 and 1957 Conventions concerned 
the nationality of married women, but they were different because human rights were the 
driving force of adoption for the latter while the former did not mention human rights. One 
 
96 It must be emphasised that Article 15 did not place an obligation on states to confer a nationality on 
the basis of the jus soli principle since the provision stated that nationality “may” be conferred. Article 
15 reads that “Where the nationality of a State is not acquired automatically by reason of birth on its 
territory, a child born on the territory of that State of parents having no nationality, or of unknown 
nationality, may obtain the nationality of the said State” (emphasis added). However, it is notable that 
the jus soli principle was mentioned in cases where both parents’ nationalities were not known. 
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significant development was the adoption of the UDHR. The UDHR, the first international 
instrument on human rights, covers nationality, and nationality began to be regarded as a 
human right.97 The preamble of the 1957 Convention mentioned the UDHR, indicating that 
human rights were the basis of the 1957 Convention.98 
The origin of the 1957 Convention dates back to 1949. Referring to the reality that 
married women tended to face a conflict between nationality laws and Article 15 of the 
UDHR, the CSW stated that a convention on the nationality of married women should be 
adopted. 99  The CSW also stated that the convention should “prevent a woman from 
becoming stateless or otherwise suffering hardships arising out of these conflicts in law”.100 
In 1950, it proposed the ILC to draft a convention on married women “as soon as 
possible”, 101  and the ECOSOC was also requested to draft a convention to eliminate 
statelessness.102 In a report prepared by the ILC in 1952, a draft convention was attached, 
but the subject was not married women, as requested by the CSW, but married persons in 
 
97 Article 15 of the UDHR stated that: “(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.” 
98 A paragraph of the preamble of the 1957 Convention states that (sic): 
Recognizing that, in article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
General Assembly of the United Nations has proclaimed that “everyone has the right to 
a nationality” and that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor 
denied the right to change his nationality. 
99 E/RES/242 (IX) C. Report of the Third Session of the Commission on the Status of Women: 
Resolutions of 1 August 1949. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth 
Session, 5 July–15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 39 (1949). The CSW is 
a commission of the ECOSOC which is mandated to “prepare recommendations and reports to the 
Economic and Social Council on promoting women’s rights.” E/RES/11(II). Commission on the Status 
of Women, 21 June 1946. 
100 E/RES/242 (IX) C. Report of the Third Session of the Commission on the Status of Women: 
Resolutions of 1 August 1949. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth 
Session, 5 July–15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 39 (1949). 
101 E/RES/304 (XI) D. Report of the Commission on the Status of Women (fourth session). Economic 
and Social Council Official Records: Fifth Year, Eleventh Session, Supplement No. 1 Resolutions 
E/1849/Corr.1&2, 30-31 (Nov. 29, 1950). The ILC was established by the Resolution 174 of the UNGA 
in 1947 to promote “the progressive development of international law and its codification.” Article 1 of 
the Statute of the ILC. A/RES/174(II), Nov. 21, 1947. 
102 E/RES/319 (XI) B. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fifth Year, Eleventh Session, 
Supplement No. 1 E/1849/Corr. 1&2, 58-59 (Nov. 29, 1950). See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link 
with Refugee Issues”. 
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general.103 The ILC believed that there must be “no distinction based on sex” in dealing with 
nationality issues, so married persons rather than married women became the subjects of the 
draft convention.104 
The draft convention on the nationality of married persons was negotiated in the 
CSW in 1953, and some states argued that married women should be the focus of the 
convention because of the “urgent necessity of action to improve the status of married 
women in the field of nationality”.105  In response, Cuba proposed a convention on the 
nationality of married women, and the Cuban draft was discussed in the CSW in 1954.106 
This draft became a basis for the 1957 Convention. This drafting process indicates that 
mitigation of the plight of married women was the motivation for adopting the 1957 
Convention, so human rights were the normative basis of the Convention. 
Article 1 provided that marriages to aliens or the dissolution of marriages with aliens 
did not affect the nationality of the wife. This functioned to prevent women’s loss of 
nationality that might result in statelessness in cases of international marriages or the 
dissolution of international marriages. Article 2 determined that the husband’s acquisition 
of another nationality or renunciation of his original nationality did not prevent his wife from 
 
103 UN, Report on Nationality, Including Statelessness by Mr. Manley O. Hudson, Special Rapporteur, 
A/CN.4/50, 13 (Feb. 21, 1952). Although the ILC did not discuss matters relevant to statelessness in 
1951, because it discussed other matters, such as reservations to multilateral conventions, definitions of 
aggression, the law of treaties, and the regime of the high seas, it stated that statelessness would be dealt 
with in the ILC in the future. UN, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1951 
VOLUME II, Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly: Report of the 
International Law Commission Covering the Work of its Third Session, 16 May-27 July 1951, 
A/CN.4/48 and Corr.1 & 2, 123-144 (1951). In such circumstances, the CSW “express[ed] the hope” 
[sic] that the ILC would draft a convention on the nationality of married women in 1951. 
E/RES/385(XIII) F, Report of the Commission on the Status of Women (fifth session) (Aug. 27, 1951). 
104 UN, supra note 103 (A/CN.4/50), at 13. 
105 UN, Commission on the Status of Women: Report of the Seventh Session (16 March-3 April 1953) 
ECOSOC Official Records: Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 2, E/2401, E/CN.6/227, para. 19 (1953). 
It must be noted that married women tended to be stateless around that time. See 1.3.2., “The 1930 
Convention: The Emphasis on Married Women and Children”. The CSW argued that the prevention of 
an automatic loss of nationality upon marriage to an alien husband was the most significant concern for 
it. UN, Commission on the Status of Women, Report of the Eighth Session, 22 March-9 April 1954, 
ECOSOC, Official Records: Eighteenth Session, Supplement No. 6, E/CN.6/253, 6 (1954). 
106 UN, supra note 105 (E/CN.6/253), at 5-6. 
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retaining her nationality. This article itself did not provide for the prevention of statelessness, 
but it prevented married women’s loss of nationality in certain cases and therefore 
effectively helped to prevent statelessness.107 The prevention of women’s loss of nationality 
in relation to marriage was the central concern for states when the 1957 Convention was 
drafted. 
 
1.3.4. The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues 
 The 1961 Convention was a holistic convention to prevent statelessness. The 
background of the 1961 Convention was different from that of the 1930 and 1957 
Conventions.108 The 1961 Convention was drafted to react to refugee issues. 
When WWII ended, there were many stateless persons in Europe, and this triggered 
the UN to work on the prevention of statelessness. It was estimated that most of the 400,000 
to 450,000 German nationals were denationalised.109 In 1947, the International Refugee 
Organization recognised 2.7 million stateless refugees,110 and solutions for refugees and 
stateless persons were explored. In this context, in 1948, the ECOSOC requested that the 
Secretary-General undertakes a study of the existing situation of the protection of stateless 
persons and municipal and international laws relevant to statelessness.111 In addition, the 
Secretary-General was requested to submit recommendations on the desirability of 
concluding international agreements on statelessness.112  In response, the Department of 
 
107 Article 3 provided for married women’s privileged naturalisation to the nationality that her husband 
possessed. Because the focus of this dissertation is not naturalisation, it does not cover this article. 
108 See 1.3.2., “The 1930 Convention: The Emphasis on Married Women and Children”, and 1.3.3., 
“The 1957 Convention: Married Women’s Human Rights”. 
109 The UN report also refers to cases of statelessness in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Russia and 
Eastern Europe. UN, supra note 103 (A/CN.4/50), at 17. 
110 UN, A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS E/1112, E/1112/Add. 1, 7-8 (1949). 
111 E/RES/116 (VI) D. Resolutions adopted by the Economic and Social Council during its Sixth 
Session 18 (2 February to 11 March 1948). 
112 Id, at 18. 
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Social Affairs of the UN published A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS.113 In this study, not only 
stateless persons but also refugees were covered since they were in a similar situation in 
practice at the time.114 The study stated that there were no statistics on stateless persons who 
were not refugees, and continued that “[t]he only thing that can be said is that their number 
[i.e., the number of stateless persons who are not refugees] is limited”.115 This implies that 
the phenomena of stateless persons and refugees were closely linked at the time.116 The study 
proposed two solutions to the issue of statelessness: “improvement of the status of stateless 
persons and the elimination of statelessness”. 117  In other words, “the elimination of 
statelessness” was coupled with an improvement in the status of stateless persons in the same 
context of the “question of displaced persons, refugees and stateless persons”.118 This is a 
significant finding of this dissertation because it has been commonly understood that the 
1930 Convention was a conceptual root of the 1961 Convention, and the historical 
relationship between the 1961 Convention and an improvement in the status of stateless 
persons has not been explained before.119 
After A STUDY OF STATELESSNESS was published, the ECOSOC considered the 
status of stateless persons and the elimination of statelessness as a response to the issues of 
stateless persons and refugees. It adopted a resolution on a “Study of Statelessness”, and this 
resolution on the “question of displaced persons, refugees and stateless persons” considered 
 
113 UN, supra note 110. 
114 It must be pointed out that stateless persons and refugees were not separated historically. Osamu 
Arakaki, Mukokusekisha no Nanminsei: Nyuujiiranndo no Jissen no Kentou wo Chuushin ni [Stateless 
Refugees: Practice of New Zealand as a Case Study of Refugee Status Determination], 31 YEARBOOK 
OF WORLD L. 65, 68 (2012). 
115 UN, supra note 110, at 5. 
116 However, it must be noted that this study introduced both the concepts of stateless persons and 
refugees. Thus, there seems to have been a conceptual distinction between stateless persons and 
refugees at the time although the exact difference is not clear from the study. 
117 UN, supra note 110, at 12. 
118 E/RES/248 (IX). Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth Session 5 July-
15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 60 (1949). 
119 For an example of the typical understanding of the history of the drafting process of the 1961 
Convention, see Paul Weis, The United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961, 11 
INT’L & COMPARATIVE L. QUARTERLY 1073, 1073-1078 (1962). ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 23-24. 
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the following two matters: the status of refugees and stateless persons and the elimination of 
statelessness. 120  It then decided to appoint an Ad Hoc Committee, composed of 
representatives from thirteen states, to work on preparing a “convention relating to the 
international status of refugees and stateless persons”121 and on considering the desirability 
of requesting that the ILC prepare a study on the elimination of statelessness.122 
The status of refugees and stateless persons received more attention than the 
elimination of statelessness, particularly after the discussions in the Ad Hoc Committee. The 
Ad Hoc Committee discussed the international status of refugees and stateless persons and 
means of eliminating statelessness.123 On the one hand, it prepared a Draft Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and a Protocol relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 
which provided a basis for the Refugee Convention and the 1954 Convention in response to 
the request from the ECOSOC.124 On the other hand, it did not prepare a convention to 
eliminate statelessness although it identified four basic causes of statelessness – failure to 
acquire nationality at birth, loss of nationality through marriage and dissolution of marriage, 
voluntary renunciation of nationality and deprivation of nationality – and recommended that 
the ECOSOC request that the ILC prepare a draft convention to eliminate statelessness.125 It 
offered two reasons for not preparing a draft convention on the elimination of statelessness. 
 
120 E/RES/248 (IX). Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth Session 5 July 
– 15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 60 (1949). 
121 E/RES/248 (IX) B. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth Session 5 
July – 15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 60 (1949). 
122 E/RES/248 (IX) B. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth Session 5 
July – 15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 60-61(1949). 
123 UN ECOSOC, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems: Lake 
Success, New York 16 January to 16 February 1950. E/1618, E/AC.32/5, para. 13 (Feb. 17, 1950), 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/40aa15374.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
124 Id, at 11-63. It must be noted that refugees received more attention than stateless persons at the time. 
The Ad Hoc Committee stated that refugees are “the special concern of the United Nations”. Id, at 63. 
As a result, a Draft Convention relating to the status of refugees and a Draft Protocol relating to the 
status of stateless persons were drafted. See the following. ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 20. For the 
relationship between reaction to the refugees and stateless persons, see 4.2.2., “Status of the Norm of 
Preventing Statelessness in International Society”. 
125 UN ECOSOC, supra note 123, at paras. 23, 26. 
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First, it spent so much time on drafting the Draft Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees that no time remained for drafting a convention on the elimination of 
statelessness.126 Second, it was difficult for the Ad Hoc Committee “to approach in the 
necessary detail a matter of such complexity”.127 It must be emphasised that the ECOSOC 
did not request that the Ad Hoc Committee draft a convention on the elimination of 
statelessness. 128  As a result, the elimination of statelessness was separated from the 
protection of the status of refugees and stateless persons. The Refugee Convention was 
adopted in 1951, and the 1954 Convention was adopted in 1954, while a convention to 
eliminate statelessness was not adopted at the time.129 
On the basis of the report submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee, the ECOSOC adopted 
a resolution on refugees and stateless persons in 1950, and it urged the ILC to draft an 
international convention for the elimination of statelessness. 130  In 1953, two draft 
conventions, namely, a Draft Convention on Elimination and a Draft Convention on 
Reduction, 131  were prepared, and they were discussed in the UN Conference on the 
 
126 Id, at para. 25. 
127 Id, at para. 25. 
128 E/RES/248 (IX) B. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fourth Year, Ninth Session 5 
July-15 August 1949 Resolutions. Supplement No. 1, E/1553/Corr.1, 60-61(1949). Although the reason 
why the ECOSOC did not request this is not clear from the available sources, there are three possible 
reasons. The first possibility is that the status of refugees and stateless persons was regarded as more 
significant than the elimination of statelessness. The protection of refugees and stateless persons 
stabilised the status of refugees and stateless persons at the time while the elimination of statelessness 
was a preventive measure. Thus, in practical terms, the immediate impact for refugees and stateless 
persons might have been more important than any preventive measure. The second possibility is that the 
implementation of the elimination of statelessness was too controversial even though states had agreed 
the need to eliminate statelessness. Since the elimination of statelessness requires a state to confer its 
nationality, it is directly relevant to membership of the state, which is regarded as the central issue for 
each state. As a result, states might have been cautious about drafting a convention on the elimination of 
statelessness. The third possibility is that nationality matters were regarded as too technical, so it was 
assumed that legal experts, members of the ILC, should draft a convention, not state representatives. 
This may have been what the Ad Hoc Committee meant by “complexity” when it explained why it did 
not draft a convention on the elimination of statelessness. Id, at para. 25. 
129 ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 21. For further analysis, see 4.2.2., “Status of the Norm of Preventing 
Statelessness in International Society”. 
130 E/RES/319 (XI) B. Economic and Social Council Official Records: Fifth Year, Eleventh Session. 
Supplement No. 1 E/1849/Corr. 1&2, 58-59 (Nov. 29, 1950). 
131 UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness: Text of 
the Draft Conventions on the Elimination of Future Statelessness and on the Reduction of Future 
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Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness that took place in 1959 and 1961.132 The 
drafting process at the conference implies that the states intended to maintain their discretion 
on nationality matters while they agreed to eliminate or reduce statelessness. The Draft 
Convention on Elimination was more ambitious than the Draft Convention on Reduction in 
preventing statelessness.133 For instance, while the Draft Convention on Elimination applied 
the jus soli principle to all cases where individuals could not acquire other nationalities, the 
Draft Convention on Reduction limited the cases where the jus soli principle was to be 
applied.134 Concerning the deprivation of nationality, the Draft Convention on Elimination 
prohibited any case of deprivation of nationality.135 By contrast, the Draft Convention on 
Reduction listed some exceptions to prohibition of deprivation of nationality.136 At the 
conference, many representatives supported the Draft Convention on Reduction because it 
would receive wider support from states, and the Draft Convention on Reduction became 
 
Statelessness prepared by the International Law Commission at its Sixth Session, A/CONF.9/L.1 
(March 20, 1959). 
132 They were first prepared by Roberto Córdova, the Special Rapporteur of the ILC, and revised by the 
ILC in 1953. UN, Nationality, including Statelessness, Report on the Elimination or Reduction of 
Statelessness, by Mr. Roberto Córdova, Special Rapporteur, YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION, Vol. II, A/CN.4/64, 187-194 (Mar. 30, 1953). See the following. ARAKAKI, supra note 8, 
at 23. In addition to these drafts, the draft submitted by the Danish delegation was also presented on 24 
March 1959, the first day of the conference. The Denmark draft put an emphasis on jus sanguinis. 
UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, Denmark: 
Memorandum with Draft Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, A/CONF.9/4 (Jan. 15, 1959). 
However, the Danish draft did not receive much support. 
133 ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 23. 
134 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1 of the Draft Convention on Reduction read as follows: 
2. The national law of the Party may make preservation of such nationality dependent on 
the person being normally resident in its territory until the age of eighteen years and on the 
condition that on attaining that age he does not opt for and acquire another nationality. 
3. If, in accordance of the operation of paragraph 2, a person on attaining the age of 
eighteen years would become stateless, he shall acquire the nationality of one of his 
parents, if such parent has the nationality of one of the Parties. Such Party may make the 
acquisition of its nationality dependent on the persons having been normally resident in its 
territory. The nationality of the father shall prevail over that of the mother.  
UNGA, supra note 131, at 3. 
135 Id, at 5. 
136 If a person became a threat to the security of the state of the person’s nationality, he or she could be 
deprived of their nationality. In addition, if a person acquired a nationality via naturalisation, and that 
person lived in the state of their birth, which was not the state of their nationality, for more than five 
years, they could be deprived of their nationality. Even in such cases, nationality could not be removed 
if such deprivation of nationality rendered the person stateless. Id, at 5. 
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the basis of discussions.137 This drafting process of the 1961 Convention indicates that 
although states could agree to reduce statelessness, their commitment was not strong enough 
to eliminate statelessness completely. 
The 1961 Convention provided for the acquisition of nationality by birth and 
prevention of loss of nationality from the perspective of human rights.138 Articles 1 to 4 
concerned a child’s acquisition of nationality. Article 1 established that the nationality of the 
state of birth is granted to persons “who would otherwise be stateless”.139 Article 2 provided 
that a foundling found in the territory of a state is considered to have been born in the territory 
of that state from its parents having that nationality. It did not provide for the conferral of 
nationality by itself, but it was expected to constitute the basis for conferral of nationality 
since it made an assumption about the parents and the place of birth.140 Article 3 provided 
that persons born on a ship or in an aircraft were considered to be born in the territory of the 
state of the flag flown by the ship or of the state to which the aircraft was registered. It was 
 
137 28 voted for and none against, with five abstentions. Orally, nine states (the UK, China, Yugoslavia, 
France, Canada, Ceylon, the US, the Netherlands and Sweden) supported the Draft Convention on 
Reduction. Four states (Belgium, Italy, Brazil, and Turkey) supported the Draft Convention on 
Elimination. Italy preferred the draft on elimination on the basis that it was better for individuals. 
UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, Summary 
Record of the Second Plenary Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Wednesday, 25 
March 1959, at 10.05 a.m., A/CONF.9/SR.2 (Apr. 24, 1961). 
138 Although the 1961 Convention did not explicitly mention human rights in its preamble, the drafting 
process and a careful reading of the provisions of the 1961 Convention imply that human rights were 
the basis of the 1961 Convention. The first reason for claiming this is that human rights were considered 
during the drafting process of the Convention. The preamble of the Draft Convention on Reduction 
stated that “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that ‘everyone has the right to a 
nationality’”. UNGA, supra note 131, at 2. However, this was omitted in the final stage of the drafting 
process of the Convention. Mr. Larsen, the Danish chairman of the conference, stated that the 
Convention would not guarantee everyone the right to a nationality because statelessness could take 
place even when the Convention was fully implemented. In other words, he admitted that the 
Convention was not perfect to ensure the right to a nationality. This indicates that the purpose of the 
1961 Convention was to guarantee human rights even though the Convention was not regarded as 
sufficient to guarantee human rights. The second reason is that a human rights perspective was 
mentioned in the provisions of the Convention. Although Article 7(1)(a) stated that a renunciation of 
nationality was prohibited unless the person acquired another nationality, Article 7(1)(b) stated that this 
principle (i.e. the prohibition of renunciation of nationality) did not apply if it was inconsistent with 
Articles 13 (freedom of movement) and 14 (right to seek asylum from persecution) of the UDHR. These 
reasons suggest that human rights were the underlying principle of the 1961 Convention. 
139 Conferral of a nationality can be conditional on application. See Article 1(1)(b) of the 1961 
Convention. 
140 ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 70. 
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introduced to prevent any confusion over the determination of the child’s place of birth, 
which would have been problematic for determining nationality if states adopted the jus soli 
principle. Article 4 provided that the nationality of one of a child’s parents would be granted 
to the child when he or she would otherwise be stateless, even if he or she was not born in 
the territory of the relevant state. 
Articles 5 to 10 covered loss of nationality. Article 5 stated that nationality could not 
be lost in the case of a change in personal status, such as marriage, termination of marriage, 
recognition, or adoption unless the person acquired another nationality. Article 6 provided 
that even if the nationality of a child or of a spouse was lost as a result of a parent’s or 
spouse’s loss of nationality, the loss was conditional on the acquisition of another nationality. 
Article 7 stated that if renunciation of nationality was allowed under municipal law, this 
needed to be conditional on the acquisition of another nationality. Article 8 prohibited the 
deprivation of nationality if it led to the person becoming stateless.141 Article 9 also banned 
deprivations of nationality based on racial, ethnic, religious or political reasons even if this 
did not lead to statelessness. Article 10 required states to include provisions on prevention 
of statelessness when they concluded treaties that provided for the transfer of territory. By 
these articles, the 1961 Convention prevented statelessness although statelessness could still 
occur even if the 1961 Convention was implemented. 
 
 
141 However, Articles 8(2) and 8(3) listed exceptions for prohibition of deprivation of nationality. For 
instance, if a nationality was acquired by misrepresentation or fraud, it could be deprived (Article 8(2)). 
In the 1961 Convention, deprivation is interpreted as withdrawal of a nationality initiated by state 
authorities not based on the operation of law. UNHCR, Expert Meeting - Interpreting the 1961 
Statelessness Convention and Avoiding Statelessness resulting from Loss and Deprivation of 
Nationality (“Tunis Conclusions”) para. 9 (2014), available at  
http://www.refworld.org/docid/533a754b4.html. 
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1.3.5. ICCPR: Children’s Right to Acquire a Nationality 
The ICCPR was the first instrument to provide for the acquisition of nationality as a 
child’s right. Article 24(3) of the ICCPR provided that “[e]very child has the right to acquire 
a nationality”. 
States primarily intended prevention of statelessness during the drafting process of a 
child’s right to acquire a nationality in the ICCPR. First, Poland proposed the inclusion of 
the following provision: “The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality” 
when it proposed a clause on protection of children to the ICCPR, and this became a basis 
of Article 24(3). 142  When Poland proposed a provision on a nationality, “there was 
agreement that every effort should be made to prevent statelessness among children”, and 
many states supported the inclusion of this provision on nationality.143 However, there were 
also objections to the inclusion of such a provision in the ICCPR. Opponents argued that “a 
State could not undertake an unqualified obligation to accord its nationality to every child 
born on its territory regardless of circumstances”.144 They pointed out that prevention of 
statelessness did not seem to receive much support from states, referring to the fact that the 
1961 Convention had not received any ratification as of 1963.145 Although there were such 
opponents, a provision on nationality remained and was adopted by 51 votes to 4, with 16 
abstentions, after the text was changed to “Every child has the right to acquire a 
nationality.”146 
 
142 UNGA, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, Report of the Third Committee, A/5365, 
para. 5 (Dec. 17, 1962).  
143 Id, at para. 25. 
144 UNGA, Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, Report of the Third Committee, A/5655, 
para. 76 (Dec. 10, 1963). 
145 Id, at para. 76. See the following. UN Treaty Collection, Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, at, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-
4&chapter=5&clang=_en (visited Aug. 30, 2019). 
146 Afghanistan, Brazil, Iran, Nigeria, Panama, Poland, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia 
proposed this text. UNGA, supra note 144, at paras. 61, 84. Although the intention of this modified text 
is not clear from the available sources, one possibility is that it was intended to clarify the scope of the 
article since “the right to acquire a nationality” seems more concrete than “[t]he child shall be entitled 
from his birth to […] a nationality”. The relationship between the right to acquire a nationality and 
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The subject of the article was limited to children, and there was no substantial debate 
to regard acquisition of a nationality as a human right in general. Some states “regretted the 
absence from the draft Covenant of an article on the right of everyone to a nationality”.147 
However, they did not propose a clause on the acquisition of nationality in terms of human 
rights in general. Some states were even critical of the inclusion of the right of everyone to 
a nationality “because of the complexity of the problem”.148 It is not clear exactly what this 
meant, but opponents implied that the nationality issue was too controversial to regard as a 
human rights issue since nationality was a matter that each state determined.149  In this 
context, it was not realistic for the right to acquire a nationality in the ICCPR to be regarded 
considered as a human rights in general. As a result, the ICCPR provided for children’s right 
to acquire a nationality.150 
 
1.3.6. CEDAW: Women’s Right to a Nationality 
 Article 9 of the CEDAW read as follows: 
 
prevention of statelessness needs careful consideration. Although prevention of statelessness was 
mentioned during the drafting process, the provision did not include the words “prevention of 
statelessness”. There are two possible interpretations of this. First, states intended to prevent 
statelessness by the words “the right to acquire a nationality”. This interpretation is justified by the fact 
that many states agreed to prevent statelessness among children during the drafting process. UNGA, 
supra note 142, at para. 25. The second interpretation is that states were not ambitious enough to 
include a provision to implement the prevention of statelessness. Even states that supported the 
prevention of statelessness among children may not have wanted to place an obligation on states to 
prevent statelessness under the ICCPR. 
147 UNGA, supra note 144, at para. 76. 
148 Id, at para. 76. 
149 It must be noted that opponents stated that the right of everyone to a nationality was included in the 
UDHR but that it was not in the draft of the ICCPR. UNGA, supra note 142, at para. 25. Opponents 
seemed to mean that states agreed to include the right of everyone to a nationality in the UDHR because 
the UDHR was not a legally binding treaty. They seem to have hesitated to introduce such provision in 
the ICCPR because it was too controversial to include in a legally binding treaty. 
150 From the available documents, it is not clear why loss of nationality was not considered during the 
drafting process. However, it is possible that states assumed that a guarantee of acquisition of 
nationality was sufficient to prevent statelessness. Another possibility is that states may have believed 
that they had the discretion to determine individuals’ nationality. However, elimination of statelessness 
was mentioned by some states during the drafting process, and it received a certain level of commitment 
from states. Thus, it is probable that acquisition of nationality was regarded as a sufficient measure to 
prevent statelessness among children. 
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1. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men to acquire, change or 
retain their nationality. They shall ensure in particular that neither marriage 
to an alien nor change of nationality by the husband during marriage shall 
automatically change the nationality of the wife, render her stateless or force 
upon her the nationality of the husband. 
2. States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the 
nationality of their children. 
 
This covers nationality in the context of women’s rights. Although prevention of 
statelessness was not the sole purpose of the CEDAW, it was one central feature of the 
provision. Nationality and prevention of statelessness were included in the draft of the 
CEDAW from the beginning. 151  Article 5 of the DEDAW, which constitutes the 
philosophical basis of the CEDAW, provided for the prevention of statelessness among 
women.152 Thus, inclusion of nationality and prevention of statelessness in the CEDAW was 
a natural consequence, given the history of the women’s rights in international instruments. 
Since married women tended to be stateless, the provision on the prevention of 
statelessness was included in Article 9(1) of the CEDAW. 153  In addition, Article 9(2) 
 
151 UN ECOSOC, Consideration of Proposals concerning a New Instrument or Instruments of 
International Law to Eliminate Discrimination against Women: Report of the Working Group to the 
Commission on the Status of Women, E/CN.6/574, 10-11 (Jan. 18, 1974). For the history of the drafting 
process of the CEDAW, see the following. Christine Chinkin & Marsha A. Freeman, Introduction, in 
THE UN CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A 
COMMENTARY 1, 6-7 (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin and Beate Rudolf eds., 2012). 
152 Article 5 of the DEDAW read as follows: “Women shall have the same rights as men to acquire, 
change or retain their nationality. Marriage to an alien shall not automatically affect the nationality of 
the wife either by rendering her stateless or by forcing upon her the nationality of her husband”. UNGA, 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly: 2263 (XXII). Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, A/RES/22/2263 (Nov. 7, 1967). 
153 UN ECOSOC, International Instruments and National Standards relating to the Status of Women: 
Consideration of Proposals concerning a New Instrument or Instruments of International Law to 
Eliminate Discrimination against Women, Working Paper by the Secretary-General, E/CN.6/573, para. 
67 (Nov. 6, 1973). See also 1.3.2., “The 1930 Convention: The Emphasis on Married Women and 
Children”, and 1.3.3., “The 1957 Convention: Married Women’s Human Rights”. 
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determined that “States Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the 
nationality of their children”. This paragraph itself provided for neither prevention of 
statelessness nor acquisition of a nationality. However, it must be emphasised that this 
paragraph did provide that both father and mother had equal rights to transmit their 
nationality where the jus sanguinis principle was applied, and this contributed to children’s 
acquisition of their mother’s nationality.154 Thus, this paragraph had the potential to prevent 
statelessness in cases where children do not acquire the nationality of their father and that of 
the state which they were born. This marked the first time that women had equal rights with 
men with respect to the nationality of their children, which was included as part of the right 
to nationality in an international instrument. Such rights were included from the first draft 
of the CEDAW.155 During the drafting process, the Philippines’ delegate stated that although 
women’s rights on the nationality of their children were mentioned in neither the DEDAW 
nor the 1961 Convention, it is necessary for such rights to be included in the CEDAW.156 In 
particular, the delegate mentioned Article 1(3) of the 1961 Convention, which recognised 
children’s right to acquire their mother’s nationality if they would otherwise have been 
stateless.157 The delegate then stated that the provision of the 1961 Convention was not 
sufficient because the scope was limited to legitimate children.158 This indicated that the 
Philippines intended the prevention of statelessness among children born out of wedlock by 
introducing women’s rights vis-à-vis the nationality of their children.159 
 
154 However, note that this did not make any difference regarding states that adopted the jus soli 
principle. 
155 See Article 6 of the “Text of the Draft Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women Proposed by the Philippines”. UN ECOSOC, supra note 153, at Annex I, 2-3 (Nov. 6, 1973). 
156 Id, at para. 67. 
157 Id, at para. 67. 
158 Id, at para. 67. Article 1(3) of the 1961 Convention provided that “a child born in wedlock in the 
territory of a Contracting State, whose mother has the nationality of that State, shall acquire at birth that 
nationality if it otherwise would be stateless”. 
159 It is important to point out that the CEDAW itself did not provide for the independent right of 
women except in cases of statelessness; rather, it provided for their “equal rights with men to acquire, 
change or retain nationality” (emphasis added; CEDAW, Article 9(1)). In addition, Article 9(2) 
provided for women’s equal rights with men to pass their nationality to their children. Thus, the rights 
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1.3.7. CRC: The Commitment to Preventing Statelessness among Children 
 Article 7 of the CRC read as follows: 
 
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right 
from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, 
the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.  
2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance 
with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be 
stateless. 
 
Prevention of statelessness was considered from an early stage of the drafting process of the 
CRC. When Poland proposed the first draft of the CRC in 1978, the following provision was 
included: “The child shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.”160 Later, 
Poland submitted another draft in 1980, and it added the second paragraph to implement the 
right to a nationality:161 
 
1. The child shall have the right from his birth to a name and a nationality. 
2. The States Parties to the present Convention undertake to introduce 
into their legislation the principle according to which a child shall 
acquire the nationality of the state in the territory of which he has been 
 
of women in the CEDAW were dependent on men. Women’s rights on the nationality of their children 
were not guaranteed if the corresponding rights of men were not also guaranteed. 
160 Article III of draft. CHR, Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child Poland: Draft 
Resolution, E/CN.4/L.1366, 3 (Feb. 7, 1978). 
161 Article 2 of the draft. CHR, Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child: Note Verbale dated 
5 October 1979 Addressed to the Division of Human Rights by the Permanent Representation of the 
Polish People’s Republic to the United Nations in Geneva, E/CN.4/1349*, 2 (Jan. 17, 1980). 
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born if, at the time of the child’s birth, the application of the proper 
national law would not grant him any nationality whatever. 
 
The second paragraph introduced the jus soli principle if a child did not acquire any other 
nationality. Thus, this provision aimed at the prevention of statelessness. 
There were states that supported the prevention of statelessness by the CRC and 
states that opposed it. With regard to paragraph 1, the US proposed the following 
amendment: “In accordance with the laws and practices of each Contracting State, the child 
shall have the right from his birth to acquire a name and a nationality” (emphasis added).162 
The US stated that this amendment “would avoid any implication that the draft convention 
would automatically entitle stateless children entering the territory of a State party to the 
nationality of that State”.163 This statement indicated that the US prioritised a state’s right or 
discretion to confer nationality over the prevention of statelessness. In response, some states 
opposed this amendment from the perspective of the protection of stateless children.164 
Under these circumstances, the following text was adopted: “The child shall have the right 
from his birth to a name and to acquire a nationality.” 165  “[T]he right […] to […] a 
nationality” was amended to “the right […] to […] acquire a nationality” (emphasis added). 
Since the phrase “[i]n accordance with the laws and practices of each Contracting State” 
from the US proposal was not included, it is clear that the text was not substantially modified 
to meet the request of the US. Although the purpose of this adopted text is not clear, the right 
to acquire a nationality seems to have been more concrete than the right to a nationality, the 
expression in the former draft. This background indicates that the right to acquire a 
 
162 CHR, Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child: Report of the Working Group, 
E/CN.4/L.1542, para. 37 (March 10, 1980). 
163 Id, at para. 37. 
164 Id, at para. 39. 
165 Id, at para. 38. 
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nationality in the CRC is intended to ensure the prevention of statelessness among children 
from the time of their birth.166 Thus, as intended by the paragraph, the emphasis on the 
prevention of statelessness prevailed over the US idea to recognise the states’ right to 
determine who qualified as their nationals. 
There were diverse positions on paragraph 2, which was intended to implement the 
prevention of statelessness. One group of states, including Australia, supported the 
prevention of statelessness. It was not satisfied by the Polish proposal of 1980, which placed 
an obligation on states to make an effort to apply jus soli, and it proposed instead to place 
an obligation on contracting states to apply jus soli.167 This Australian proposal followed 
Article 1 of the 1961 Convention, the application of the jus soli principle.168 It “aimed at 
providing every child with a nationality so as to prevent cases of statelessness among 
children”.169 However, this Australian proposal was opposed and criticised by states that did 
not adopt the jus soli principle. 170  Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, and Tunisia proposed the insertion of the phrase “in 
accordance with their laws” ahead of the introduction of the jus soli principle.171 It was 
argued that many states did not prioritise jus soli over jus sanguinis, and these states’ 
proposal wanted to allow states to choose either jus sanguinis or jus soli.172 Given these 
 
166 Note that for children soon after the birth, acquisition of a nationality ensures the prevention of 
statelessness while the prevention of a loss of nationality is also necessary to prevent statelessness 
among children and adults who have already acquired a nationality. 
167 CHR, supra note 162, at paras. 40-41. 
168 Australia acceded to the 1961 Convention in 1970, before this phase of the drafting process of the 
CRC took place in 1980. 
169 CHR, Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
E/CN.4/L.1575, para. 14 (February 17, 1981). 
170 CHR, supra note 162, at para. 42. UN ECOSOC, “Commission on Human Rights, Forty-second 
Session, Agenda Item 13: Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child, Report of the Working 
Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child,” E/CN.4/1986/39, Annex IV, 2 (March 13, 
1986). 
171 CHR, Question of a Convention on the Rights of the Child: Report of the Working Group on a Draft 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, E/CN.4/1989/48, para. 93 (March 2, 1989). 
172 Id, at paras. 94-95. Some other states also made other proposals. For instance, the Federal Republic 
of Germany proposed to include a clause that a nationality to be acquired after application if the child 
would otherwise be stateless. This proposal is similar to Article 1(1)(b) of the 1961 Convention. See 
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circumstances, a drafting group for a paragraph on nationality was established, and the 
following provision was proposed:173 
 
States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with 
their national law and their obligations under the relevant international 
instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless. 
 
This provision received states’ support, 174  and it was adopted without substantial 
amendment. Although the reason for this proposal was not clear, its background suggests 
that the drafters were trying to make the draft acceptable to states that did not adopt the jus 
soli principle. However, it is interesting to note that the emphasis on stateless children 
persisted in the finalised text. Although the jus soli principle was not provided for in 
paragraph 2 of the article on nationality in the CRC, and the CRC failed to specify which 
state’s nationality needed to be conferred on a child, an emphasis on the prevention of 
statelessness is observable in the drafting process of the CRC. 
 
1.4. Conclusion on the Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International Law 
This chapter explored the development of the prevention of statelessness in 
international law. It covered not only treaties that provided for the prevention of statelessness 
by the text of provision, such as the 1961 Convention, but also treaties that did not provide 
for prevention of statelessness explicitly by the text, such as the ICCPR. An analysis of the 
drafting process of treaties whose text do not explicitly cover the prevention of statelessness 
 
note 139. The Netherlands proposed the insertion of a certain period of habitual residence in the 
conditions for the application of the jus soli principle. Id, paras. 98-101. 
173 Id, at para. 104. This seems to have been based on the draft proposed by the USSR. The USSR 
proposal read as follows: “The States Parties shall ensure the realization of this right in accordance with 
their national legislation and their international legal obligations in this field.” Id, at para. 102. 
174 Id, at para. 106. 
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reveal that the prevention of statelessness was discussed when these treaties were drafted. 
Since states were involved in the drafting process, it is possible that the drafting process 
became a source of development of the norm of preventing statelessness even if that 
principle or norm was not explicitly provided for in the treaty. This chapter serves as a 
standard by means of which to analyse the Japanese position on the prevention of 
statelessness in international law. 
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CHAPTER 2: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
PREVENTION OF STATELESSNESS IN JAPAN UNDER 
THE 1889 CONSTITUTION 
 
2.1. Summary of the Chapter 
The following two chapters examine the influence of the norm of preventing 
statelessness in international law on Japanese laws. This chapter deals with how the norm of 
preventing statelessness in international law influenced Japanese laws under the 1889 
Constitution, the first Japanese constitution. The main findings of this chapter are as follows. 
First, the drafters of the 1889 Constitution learnt that nationality could be covered by 
international law, and they decided to legislate a specific law on nationality, which is 
separate from the constitution. Second, the norm of preventing statelessness in international 
law influenced the 1899 Nationality Act, the first nationality act in Japan. The drafters of the 
Act referred to a resolution from the IDI, an organisation composed of experts in 
international law, and learnt the necessity to prevent statelessness. Although the 1899 
Nationality Act adopted a jus sanguinis through the paternal line, it also possessed some 
provisions to prevent statelessness. Third, because Japanese laws were already in line with 
provisions on the prevention of statelessness from the 1930 Convention, the Convention did 
not trigger the amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act. Preparations for the Codification 
Conference that adopted the 1930 Convention and the Japanese position during the drafting 
process of the Convention indicated the Japanese commitment to preventing statelessness 
and to international law. 
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2.2. Nationality in the 1889 Constitution 
 Article 18 of the 1889 Constitution provided that “[t]he conditions necessary for 
being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law”,175 and the constitution was the first 
positive law that covered nationality in Japan.176  However, it did not specify who the 
Japanese were, and it required a specific law to determine who qualified as Japanese 
nationals. Since it was assumed that international law could influence nationality matters, 
amendment of any law that determined who qualified as a Japanese national might well have 
been necessary. In this context, the constitution required a specific law to determine 
qualification as a Japanese national from the perspective of the stability of the constitution. 
This section begins with the analysis of background of the 1889 Constitution. 
After the US black ships arrived in Japan in 1853, Japan was forced to conclude 
unequal treaties with the West, and Japanese status was inferior to Western status in 
international society.177 In order to amend unequal treaties, the West asked Japan to develop 
the kind of modern legal system that was common in “civilised nations”, 178  so Japan 
 
175 This translation derives from an English translation of the commentary on the 1889 Constitution 
written by Hirobumi Ito, who contributed to the drafting of the 1889 Constitution. HIROBUMI ITO, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (translated by Miyoji Ito) 37 (1889). 
176 While “Provisions Permitting Marriage with an Alien” (Proclamation No. 103 of the Great Council 
of State) in 1873 already concerned a nationality issue, it merely covered the nationality of people who 
were married to foreigners. In other words, it was not a general provision on the acquisition and loss of 
Japanese nationality. Thus, the 1889 Constitution was the first positive law that determined the general 
method of acquiring and losing Japanese nationality. Note that Tashiro argues that there used to be an 
“assumed nationality law” even before the drafting of the 1889 Constitution and 1899 Nationality Act. 
ARITSUGU TASHIRO, KOKUSEKI HOU CHIKUJOU KAISETSU [A COMMENTARY ON NATIONALITY LAW] 58 
(1974). For details of the “assumed nationality law”, see note 202. This dissertation uses “subjects” and 
“nationals” synonymously because both concepts entail a sense of a shared collective identity. The 
difference between these concepts is that the term “subjects” emphasises a vertical relationship between 
the Emperor and Japanese nationals while the term “nationals” emphasises a horizontal relationship 
among Japanese nationals. For the shared collective identity of the Japanese, see 4.3.2., “Japanese 
National Identity”. For the historical relationship between a shared collective identity and nationality, 
see 1.2., “The Emergence of Nationality and the Nation-State Principle”. 
177 For historical background, see 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
178 YOSHIHIKO KAWAGUCHI, NIHON KINDAI HOUSEI SHI [HISTORY OF MODERN JAPANESE LAW] 3 (2nd 
ed., 2014). 
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attempted to develop municipal laws by hiring foreign advisers and by sending missions to 
the West. For instance, Hermann Roesler, a foreign adviser, played a significant role during 
the drafting process of the 1889 Constitution.179 With regard to Japanese missions sent to 
the West, the Iwakura Mission led by Tomomi Iwakura, an Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipontentiary, visited the West from 1871 to 1873 to learn about the systems and culture 
of “the developed states”.180 From 1882 to 1883, Hirobumi Ito visited Germany and met 
legal scholars, such as Rudolf von Gneist, Lorenz von Stein, and Albert Mosse, to learn 
about the Constitutions of Europe.181 As a result of the research, Japan developed municipal 
laws, including the 1889 Constitution. 
The Roesler Draft prepared in April 1887 became the basis of Article 18 of the 1889 
Constitution, and the role of international law in nationality matters was recognised during 
the drafting process.182 Article 50 of the Roesler Draft stated that “The principles concerning 
 
179 JOHANNES SIEMES, NIHON KOKKA NO KINDAIKA TO ROESUERAA [MODERNISATION OF THE JAPANESE 
STATE AND ROESLER] (translated by Nagayo Homma) 139-180 (1970). As another example, Gustave 
Boissonade, another foreign adviser, was commissioned to draft the Civil Code in 1879 (MASAO IKEDA, 
BOWASONAADO TO SONO MIMPOU [BOISSONADE AND THE CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN] 80 (2011).) This 
Boissonade’s draft constituted the basis of the first draft of the Civil Code of Japan, although the draft 
was amended to a great extent before the Civil Code was enforced. 
180 It visited the US, UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Germany, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Italy, 
Austria and Switzerland. AKIRA TANAKA, IWAKURA SHISETSUDAN NO REKISHITEKI KENKYUU 
[HISTORICAL STUDIES OF THE IWAKURA MISSION] 3 (2002). 
181 SHIN SHIMIZU, DOKUOUNI OKERU ITOU HIROBUMI NO KEMPOU TORISHIRABE TO NIHON KEMPOU 
[HIROBUMI ITO’S RESEARCH ON CONSTITUTION IN GERMANY AND AUSTRIA AND JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION] 3-4 (1939). 
182 ANNA NAKAMURA, KOKUMIN GAINEN NO KEISEI TO HENYOU: KEMPOU TO KOKUSEKIHOU NO KANTEN 
KARA, NIHON TO DOITSU NO HIKAKUWO TOOSHITE [THE BUILDING AND CHANGE OF THE CONCEPT OF 
“NATIONALITY” IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND NATIONALITY-LAW, COMPARING JAPAN WITH 
GERMANY], Dissertation (Meiji University) 54 (2013). A provision on nationality in the Roesler Draft 
was the basis of the Natsushima Draft, which was the final draft of the 1889 Constitution. For details of 
the drafting process after the Roesler Draft, see the following. NAKAMURA, supra note 182, at 53-54. It 
must be noted that earlier drafts prepared by the Japanese government already included a clause on 
nationality although these drafts were abandoned because they were regarded as being overly influenced 
by the West. Hirobumi Ito criticised these drafts because the drafters had “imitate[d] constitutions of the 
West” and “ignore[d] Japan’s uniqueness” (translated by the author). MASATSUGU INADA, MEIJI 
KEMPOU SEIRITSU SHI JOUKAN [DRAFTING PROCESS OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION I] 335-337 (1960). 
The early drafts of the constitution, in 1876 and 1878, provided that the acquisition and loss of Japanese 
nationality would be determined by a separate law from the constitution. Article 1 of Book III of the 
First Draft in 1876 and the Second Draft in 1878 stated that “all people of the Empire of Japan shall 
possess the rights of Japanese nationals” and “the means of acquiring and losing the [r]ights of being 
Japanese shall be determined by law”. Article 1 of Book III of the Third Draft, in 1880, stated that 
“Japanese nationals acquire rights” and “when they acquire and lose such rights shall be determined by 
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acquisition and loss of status of being a national shall be determined by law.”183 It is not 
clear why Roesler entrusted a specific law to determining qualification for nationality, but 
communication between Roesler, Mosse and Kowashi Inoue, who played a significant role 
in drafting the 1889 Constitution, 184  indicates that foreign advisers believed that 
international law could determine such qualification, so methods of acquisition and loss of 
nationality needed to be covered by a separate law from the constitution. Inoue learnt that 
one group of states had constitutions that determined the methods of acquisition and loss of 
nationality, while another group had constitutions that mentioned nationality but whose 
methods of acquiring and losing nationality were determined by a separate law.185 In 1886, 
he asked Roesler and Mosse whether the Japanese Constitution should include the 
determination of qualification for nationality.186 Mosse responded that nationality should be 
determined by a law, not the constitution.187 He explained that nationality is an international 
matter and so is established by international treaties.188 Thus, amendments to the regulation 
of nationality may be necessary.189 Since it is easier to amend a law than the constitution, 
Mosse argued, qualification for nationality should be covered by a law separate from the 
constitution.190 Roesler took the same stance.191 This indicates that Roesler was aware of the 
 
law” (both translated by the author). Yasuhisa Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (3) [History of 
the Japanese Nationality Act 3], 456 KOSEKI 1, 2 (1982). The drafters stated that they had referred to 
the constitutions of Prussia, Austria, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland. For more detail, see the 
following. Tanaka, supra note 182, at 3. This indicates that early drafts of the constitution already 
included nationality and that the details of the acquisition and loss of nationality would be determined in 
a separate law. 
183 NAKAMURA, supra note 182, at 86. Translated by the author. 
184 Nakamura evaluates Inoue as “the father of the 1889 Constitution” (translated by the author). Id, at 
52. 
185 Id, at 52. 
186 HIROBUMI ITO (ed.), HISHO RUISAN HOUSEI KANKEI SHIRYOU JOU [HISHO RUISAN LEGISLATION 
DOCUMENT COLLECTION, VOL. I] 435 (1969). 
187 Id, at 434. 
188 Id, at 434-436. 
189 Id, at 434-436. 
190 Mosse stated that the constitution should not be amended frequently because the constitution reflects 
the principles of the state. Id, at 434-436. 
191 Id, at 483. 
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role of international law in the determination of nationals and of the need to define 
qualification for nationality in a law. This is the background to the clause on nationality in 
the 1889 Constitution. 
Available sources do not indicate why Mosse and Roesler believed that international 
law might affect matters of nationality. However, international treaties had begun to 
influence such matters before 1886, when Mosse and Roesler explained the influence of 
international law on nationality in Japan. On 22 February 1868, the “Convention between 
the United States of America and the King of Prussia, relative to Naturalization” was 
concluded. 192  This was concluded to solve issues concerning military service by dual 
nationals,193 and the US concluded this kind of convention with several European states in 
1868.194 These conventions seem to have been the first conventions to cover nationality, and 
Prussia, the homeland of Mosse and Roesler, had concluded this treaty with the US nearly 
20 years before Mosse and Roesler commented on the relationship between international 
law and nationality in Japan. Although it is not clear whether Mosse and Roesler were aware 
of this treaty, the treaty indicates that nationality was already a matter for discussion in 
international law at the end of 1860s. On the basis of Roesler Draft, the 1889 Constitution 
itself did not determine who Japanese nationals were, and a separate law on nationality was 
entrusted to determining who qualified as nationals. 
 
192 VERZIJI, supra note 85, at 80.  
193 Article 1 of the treaty stated that “Citizens of the North German Confederation who become 
naturalized citizens of the United States of America and shall have resided uninterruptedly within the 
United States five years shall be held by the North German Confederation to be American citizens and 
shall be treated as such.” Article 2 contained a reciprocal provision. Id, at 80. Note that the King of 
Prussia represented the North German Union at the time. GOVERNMENT OF THE US, DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAN AND 
OTHER POWERS, SINCE JULY 4, 1776 638 (Revised ed., 1873). 
194 For instance, the US concluded treaties with Bavaria (part of the current Germany, 20 May), Mexico 
(10 July), Württemberg (part of the current Germany, 17 July), Baden (part of the current Germany, 19 
July), Hasse (part of the current Germany, 1 August) and Belgium (6 November). GOVERNMENT OF THE 
US, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 193, at 5-8. These treaties are called the Bancroft Treaties. 
Roberto Córdova, Nationality, including Statelessness: Third Report on the Elimination or Reduction of 
Statelessness by Roberto Cordova, Special Rapporteur, in YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION 1954, VOLUME II, A/CN.4/81, 44 (1954). 
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2.3. The 1899 Nationality Act 
 The first law that substantially determined the scope of Japanese nationals was the 
1899 Nationality Act.195 During the drafting process, an IDI resolution was mentioned, and 
the Japanese government recognised the necessity of preventing statelessness. The 1899 
Nationality Act prepared some provisions to prevent statelessness that might arise as a result 
of the application of jus sanguinis through the paternal line, the basic principle of the 1899 
Nationality Act. This section begins with an analysis of jus sanguinis through the paternal 
line of the Act. 
The 1899 Nationality Act adopted jus sanguinis through the paternal line, and Article 
1 of the Act presented this principle. The first principle of the 1889 Nationality Act was to 
follow the Japanese household system. It was assumed that the Emperor was the great head 
of a collection of households,196 and that each household in Japan was headed by a father or 
husband.197 A Statement of Reasons of the Nationality Bill submitted to the Imperial Diet 
 
195 It must be noted that the Japanese government recognised the need to enact the 1899 Nationality Act 
in relation to international law. On 23 February 1899, Nobushige Hozumi, a government delegate, 
stated that “the day of enforcement of a new treaty is approaching”, and that a nationality act should be 
approved before the enforcement of the treaty in the Imperial Diet (translated by the author). It is not 
clear what “a new treaty” meant, but the 1894 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the US and 
Japan entered into force on 17 July 1899. Hozumi explained that a new nationality act was necessary in 
order to regulate the nationality of woman who married foreigners and that of foreigners who might be 
adopted. Since the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the US and Japan was expected to 
facilitate exchanges and movement between Japan and the US, legislation on nationality was required. 
See MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku (14) [Proceedings of 
the Nationality Act 14], 296 KOSEKI 19, 22-23 (1971). Haruna Asonuma, Nichiei, Nichibei Tsuushou 
Koukai Jouyaku (1894 Nen) “Bunmei Koku” heno Nakama Iri [Anglo-Japanese and the US-Japanese 
Treaties of Commerce and Navigation (1894): Japan Became a Member of “Civilised Nations”], in 
HANDOBUKKU KINDAI NIHON GAIKOUSHI: KUROFUNE RAIKOUKARA SENRYOUKI MADE [HANDBOOK OF 
MODERN JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLACK SHIPS TO THE OCCUPIED 
ERA] 34, 34-35 (Toshihiro Minohara and Souchi Naraoka eds., 2016). 
196 MIKIHARU ITO, KAZOKU KOKKA KAN NO JINRUI GAKU [AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF THE FAMILY STATE 
IDEOLOGY] 2 (1982). 
197 NORIYO HAYAKAWA, KINDAI TENNOU SEI TO KOKUMIN KOKKA: RYOUSEI KANKEI WO JIKU TOSHITE 
[THE MODERN EMPEROR SYSTEM AND THE NATION-STATE: FOCUSING ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MALES AND FEMALES] 26 (2005). However, a woman could be the head of the household in cases of 
nyufu. See Article 5 of the 1899 Nationality Act. Although blood and jus sanguinis were dominant 
principles in the Japanese household, they were not the only features of the Japanese household. For 
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noted that the first principle of the draft was to be compatible with the “unique family system 
of our country”,198 and this principle is included in the first draft of the 1899 Nationality Act 
submitted to the Investigation Committee of Codes before the deliberations in the Imperial 
Diet.199 
Jus sanguinis through the paternal line was regarded as representative of the Japanese 
household system. The Statement of Reasons submitted to the Imperial Diet explained that 
loyal nationals intended for themselves and their descendants to contribute to “the state of 
the Emperor”, and this was one reason why the jus sanguinis was adopted. 200  This 
explanation indicates that the Emperor system and jus sanguinis were connected in the 1899 
Nationality Act. In addition, the Statement of Reasons wrote that jus sanguinis through the 
paternal line “follows […] our customs since the ancient times”.201 Tashiro refers to the 
literature in the early eighteenth century that states that the blood of the father matters in 
determining Japanese status.202 
 
instance, children who were adopted by a Japanese father acquired Japanese nationality even if they did 
not share the blood of the father. 
198 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku (1) [Proceedings of the 
Nationality Act 1], 276 KOSEKI 28, 31 (1969). 
199 MOJ, Department of Judicial System Investigation (supervised), Houten Chousa Kai: Kokuseki Hou 
Narabi Meiji 6 Nen Dai 103 Gou Fukoku Kaisei An Giji Sokkiroku [Investigation Committee of Codes: 
Proceedings of the Nationality Act and Revision of Proclamation No. 103, 1873], in NIHON KINDAI 
RIPPOU SHIRYOU SOUSHO 26 [MONOGRAPH ON MODERN JAPANESE LEGISLATION DOCUMENTS 26] 1, 1 
(1986). This dissertation examines the negotiations at the Investigation Committee of Codes in 1898 
and the Imperial Diet in 1898 and 1899. There must have been a drafting process before the 
negotiations in the Investigation Committee of Codes, but documents on the drafting process are not 
available, according to Tanaka, who dealt with nationality matters as an official of the MOJ. Yasuhisa 
Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (7) [History of the Japanese Nationality Act 7], 467 KOSEKI 
1, 1 (1983). 
200 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 198, at 31. The basis of this argument 
seems to be that one needs to be a national of the state to contribute to the state. 
201 Translated by the author. Id, at 32. This idea of the family system is the basis of some articles of the 
1899 Nationality Act, such as Articles 5(ii), 5(iii), 5(iv), 13 and 18. It must be emphasised that an 
international perspective was also taken into account in defining jus sanguinis through the paternal line. 
The Statement of Reasons noted that jus sanguinis through the paternal line was in line with the 
“general rules of laws of other states”, as well as the Japanese tradition. Id, at 32. 
202 He stated that the blood of the mother did not matter in determining Japanese status, indicating that 
the blood of the paternal line was prioritised over that of the maternal line in Japan. TASHIRO, supra 
note 176, at 44-45. In order to define Japanese nationality on the basis of the jus sanguinis principle, 
there must be original Japanese people. It is said that the original Japanese were determined on the basis 
of an “assumed nationality law”. TASHIRO, supra note 176, at 55. Tashiro argues that residents when the 
isolation policy was lifted in the middle of the nineteenth century in Japan were assumed to be 
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The 1899 Nationality Act paid particular attention to preventing statelessness that 
could arise as a result of the application of jus sanguinis through the paternal line. The 
Statement of Reasons recognised the principle that both positive and negative conflicts of 
nationality should be avoided. 203  It stated that both positive and negative conflicts of 
nationality, which resulted in multiple nationalities and statelessness, were “harmful for a 
state”.204 This understanding was based on the principle that each individual should have a 
single nationality, which was the mainstream idea in international society at the time.205 
The Japanese government referred to the international legal perspective to indicate 
that a conflict of nationality, such as multiple nationality and statelessness, was an issue. 
Hozumi, a government delegate, stated that “nationality matters [were] a part of international 
law”,206 and that the Nationality Bill attempted to avoid conflict with the principles of other 
states.207 He explained that the “resolution of the International Law Association also stated 
that avoidance of conflict of nationality should be the primary concern”, and this resolution 
was “highly influential”.208 
 
Japanese. TASHIRO, supra note 176, at 55-58. There is also an argument that those persons listed in the 
jinshin household registration in 1871 should be considered the original Japanese. NAKAMURA, supra 
note 182, at 64-65. These views conflict where unregistered people are concerned. Tashiro’s argument 
is valid if people who were not registered in the jinshin household registration were regarded as 
Japanese while Nakamura’s argument is valid if people who were not registered in the jinshin 
household registration were not regarded as Japanese. However, there is no reliable evidence to prove 
which argument is the valid one. 
203 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 198, at 31. 
204 Translated by the author. Id, at 31. Toru Terao, a government delegate, mentioned the same principle 
in the House of Peers, a house in the Imperial Diet. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, 
Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku (3) [Proceedings of the Nationality Act 3], 280 KOSEKI 27, 30 (1970). 
205 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 198, at 31. See also 1.3.1., “Awareness of 
the Issue of Statelessness as a Challenge to the International Order”. 
206 Translated by the author. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku 
(12) [Proceedings of the Nationality Act 12], 292 KOSEKI 33, 37 (1971). Hozumi also introduced the 
principle that a husband and wife should have the same nationality, referring to practice of other states 
and a resolution of “the Universal Association of International Law”. Translated by the author. MOJ, 
Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku (13) [Proceedings of the 
Nationality Act 13], 293 KOSEKI 29, 33 (1971). 
207 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku (11) [Proceedings of the 
Nationality Act 11], 290 KOSEKI 14, 19 (1970). 
208 Translated by the author. Id, at 19. He said that “resolution of the International Law Association also 
stated that avoidance of conflict of nationality should be the primary concern” (emphasis added), so he 
might not regard the international principle as the sole reason to prevent conflict of nationality. 
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What Hozumi was referring to as a resolution of the “International Law Association” 
and a “Universal Association of International Law” on another occasion209 seems to have 
been that made by the IDI, an organisation composed of experts in international law, in 1895. 
The first principle of the resolution was that “No one shall be without nationality.”210 The 
Japanese government learnt a principle of prevention of statelessness in international law 
from the IDI resolution.211 
There are some articles that prevented statelessness in the 1899 Nationality Act. 
Articles 3 and 4 concerned the prevention of statelessness by acquisition of nationality by 
birth. Article 3 provided for the application of jus sanguinis through the maternal line in 
cases where the father was not known, the nationality of the father was not known, or the 
father was stateless. Under jus sanguinis through the paternal line in the 1899 Nationality 
Act, a child born in Japan could be stateless when his or her father could not transmit their 
nationality. 212  In order to prevent statelessness in such circumstances, Article 3 was 
introduced.213 Article 4 provided that “If both parents of a child who is born in Japan are not 
known or do not possess any nationality, the child shall be Japanese.”214 The Statement of 
Reasons noted that Article 4 adopted the jus soli principle as an exception since it was 
“desir[able]” to prevent the occurrence of stateless persons.215 
 
However, this deliberation indicates that the drafters of the 1899 Nationality Act perceived the norm of 
preventing conflict of nationality including prevention of statelessness as a part of international law. 
209 See note 206. 
210 Translated from French by the author. IDI, supra note 79. See 1.3.1., “Awareness of the Issue of 
Statelessness as a Challenge to the International Order”. 
211 Although it is unclear how the Japanese government was aware of the resolution of the IDI, Kentaro 
Kaneko, a Japanese legal scholar, had been a member of the IDI since 1891 (MOFA, Bankoku Kokusai 
Hou Gakkai [Institut de Droit International], at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000013567.pdf 
(viewed Jan. 17, 2019).), so Japan might have paid particular attention to the activities of the IDI. 
212 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 198, at 32. 
213 Although stateless persons are commonly called mukokuseki sha today, they were called mukokuseki 
jin in the Statement of Reasons to introduce Article 3. Id, at 32. 
214 Translated by the author. 
215 Translated by the author. The term mukokuseki jin was used to introduce Article 4, too. MOJ, Civil 
Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 198, at 32. 
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Articles 19, 20, 21 and 23 provided for limitations on the loss of nationality. Article 
19 stated that individuals who acquired Japanese nationality by marriage or adoption would 
lose their Japanese nationality in cases of dissolution of marriage or adoption only when they 
acquired another nationality. Article 5 of the 1889 Nationality Act determined that foreigners 
would acquire Japanese nationality when, in the case of women, they became the wife of a 
Japanese man, or when they were adopted by a Japanese national.216 Article 19 is related to 
persons who acquired Japanese nationality pursuant to Article 5. In principle, there was no 
need for a person who had acquired Japanese nationality by marriage or adoption to remain 
Japanese when he or she “left the Japanese family” by dissolving his or her marriage or by 
adoption.217 However, since the occurrence of “persons without any status”, which seems to 
have meant stateless persons, 218  was to be avoided, a person who acquired Japanese 
nationality by marriage or adoption did not lose their Japanese nationality if they did not 
 
216 Pursuant to Article 5 of the 1899 Nationality Act, a foreign man acquired Japanese nationality when 
he married a Japanese woman who had become the head of the family as an exception. For more details 
on this nyufu system, which allows a woman to be the head of the family, see the following. Reiko 
Shiraishi, Mimpou Hensan Katei niokeru Onna Koshu no Chii to Nyufu Konin: “Ie” no Zaisan wo 
megutte [Status of a Woman Head of the Family and Nyufu Marriage in the Drafting Process of the 
Civil Code: Property of the “Family”], 32 LEGAL HISTORY REV. 141, 141-142 (1982). 
217 Translated by the author. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku 
(2) [Proceedings of the Nationality Act 2], 277 KOSEKI 18, 19 (1970). It was also said that if a person 
who acquired Japanese nationality by marriage or adoption continued to be Japanese even after the 
dissolution of their marriage or adoption, such a person continued to be Japanese even if he or she did 
not qualify under the criteria of naturalisation, and this was an issue. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The 
Fifth Division, supra note 217, at 19. This argument implied that when persons who acquired Japanese 
nationality dissolved their marriage or adoption, they were regarded as foreigners, and their continued 
possession of their nationality could be regarded as similar to naturalisation. In order to become 
naturalised as Japanese, the person had to have an address in Japan for more than five years, be an adult, 
be well behaved, have the ability to make a living, and discard any other nationalities he or she 
possessed. It must also be noted that naturalisation was at the discretion of the Interior Minister under 
the 1899 Nationality Act. See Article 7 of the 1899 Nationality Act. 
218 Translated by the author. The phrase museki jin was used in Japanese. In today’s context, a person 
without status (museki sha) means a Japanese national who is not registered in the household 
registration. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, Director of the Civil Affairs First Division, Koseki ni Kisai 
ganaimono nikansuru Jouhou no Haaku oyobi Shien nitsuite (Irai) [A Request: Identification and 
Support of the Persons Who Are Not Listed in the Household Registration] (Houmushou Min Ichi Dai 
817 Gou) (31 July 2014). Requested in Disclosure of Administrative Documents in one of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Special Wards. Hajime Akiyama, Household Registration and Suffrage in Post World War 
II Japan: The Case of the Unregistered (Mukosekisha) 16(15(4)) THE ASIA-PACIFIC J.: JAPAN FOCUS 1, 
2 (2018). 
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acquire another nationality in the case of dissolution of marriage or adoption.219  Thus, 
Article 19 prioritised prevention of statelessness over the Japanese household, which was 
the main principle in the 1899 Nationality Act. 
Article 20 stated that if a Japanese national acquired another nationality “at his or her 
choice”, he or she would lose Japanese nationality.220 The Statement of Reasons noted that 
persons who left Japan to become nationals of other states should not remain Japanese for 
the following reasons. First, it was not beneficial for Japan to retain Japanese nationality of 
those who had acquired another nationality.221 Second, a conflict of nationality took place if 
Japanese who had acquired another nationality did not lose their Japanese nationality.222 
Although issues of statelessness were not discussed in the Statement of Reasons, since the 
acquisition of another nationality was a condition for losing Japanese nationality in Article 
20, this article functioned to prevent statelessness. 
It must be emphasised that Article 20 determined that the acquisition of another 
nationality “at his or her choice” was a condition of losing Japanese nationality. In other 
words, nationality could not be lost without the individual’s consent to acquire another 
nationality.223 The reason why “at his or her choice” was included was discussed neither in 
the Statement of Reasons nor during the deliberations in the Imperial Diet, but this article 
prevented the loss of Japanese nationality in cases where Japanese nationals acquired another 
nationality without intending to do so.224 
Article 20 was also interpreted as prohibiting deprivation of nationality without a 
person’s intention. Tatsukichi Minobe, a constitutional scholar, stated that “Although a 
 
219 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 217, at 20. 
220 Translated by the author. 
221 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 217, at 20. 
222 Id, at 20. 
223 As an exception, Japanese nationality could be lost when Japanese women were married to a 
foreigner pursuant to Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act. 
224 For instance, the acquisition of another nationality by birth or change of civil status can be regarded 
as the acquisition of another nationality without intention. 
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nationality remains the status of a person and is not itself a right, possession of a nationality 
is the right of nationals. Thus, a state [i.e., the Japanese government] cannot deprive 
[Japanese] nationals of their nationality against the will of those nationals.”225 This implies 
that depriving someone of their nationality against their will had not been permissible under 
Japanese law in the 1899 Nationality Act, and this understanding is shared by the subsequent 
nationality acts including the current 1984 Nationality Act.226 
Where the principle of the household system was emphasised, wives and children 
were expected to follow the nationality of the husband or father.227 In other words, when a 
man lost his Japanese nationality, his wife and children would also lose their Japanese 
nationality in principle. However, Article 21 provided that the wife and children of a man 
who lost his Japanese nationality would lose their Japanese nationality only if they acquired 
the nationality of the man. In other words, if a wife and children did not acquire a new 
nationality from the man, they remained Japanese. Thus, this article prevented statelessness 
among wives and children whose husbands or fathers acquired another nationality by 
naturalisation. The Statement of Reasons indicated that the occurrence of stateless persons 
should be avoided, so Article 21 was introduced.228 
 
225 Translated by the author. TATSUKICHI MINOBE, KEMPOU SATSUYOU [SUMMARY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION] 148 (Reprint, 1924).  
226 See Article 8 of the 1950 Nationality Act and Article 11 of the 1984 Nationality Act. TASHIRO, 
supra note 176, at 529-530. KIDANA, supra note 8, at 342-343. Regarding the 1950 Nationality Act, 
Tashiro stated that it was “cruel” to force Japanese nationals to lose their Japanese nationality if they did 
not intentionally acquire another nationality. Translated by the author. TASHIRO, supra note 176, at 513. 
It is interesting to compare the Japanese law and the some states’ current practice of deprivation of 
nationality. See 4.3.2., “Japanese National Identity”. 
227 See also note 202. 
228 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 217, at 20. Mukokuseki jin was used to 
refer to stateless persons. It must be noted that the use of terminology for stateless persons was not 
unified in the Statement of Reasons of the draft of the nationality act. For instance, mukokuseki jin 
(stateless persons) was used for Articles 3, 4, and 21 while museki jin (person without any status) was 
used for Article 19. See notes 213, 215 and 218. This indicates that although statelessness was regarded 
as a problem by the Japanese government at the time, there was not a fixed terminology within the 
Japanese government for stateless persons. 
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Article 23 stated that when a Japanese national was recognised by a foreigner and 
acquired a new nationality, he or she would lose Japanese nationality. In other words, if a 
Japanese person who was recognised by a foreigner did not acquire a new nationality, he or 
she did not lose Japanese nationality. The Statement of Reasons noted that Japanese 
nationality was lost as a result of acquisition of a new nationality after recognition by a 
foreigner because otherwise a “positive conflict of nationality” would occur.229 This implies 
the assumption that Japanese nationality should not be lost unless the Japanese person 
acquired another nationality. From the perspective of the household principle, it was possible 
for Japanese nationality to be lost when a Japanese person was recognised by a foreigner 
because it could be argued that the person had left the Japanese household. However, such 
an argument was not made by the government, and recognition by a foreigner did not 
automatically force a Japanese person to lose their nationality if he or she did not acquire 
another nationality. As a result, statelessness was effectively prevented. 
Among articles to prevent statelessness in the 1899 Nationality Act, there were some 
that were not normatively influenced by the norm of preventing statelessness in international 
law. On the one hand, the influence of international law can be seen in Articles 3 (jus 
sanguinis through the maternal line), 4 (jus soli), 19 (dissolution of marriage or adoption) 
and 21 (wife and children of men who lost their Japanese nationality). The Statement of 
Reasons of these articles mentioned the need to prevent statelessness. Since the need to 
prevent statelessness was mentioned in reference to international law in the Imperial Diet,230 
the influence of the norm of preventing statelessness in international law on these articles is 
observed. On the other hand, the desirability of preventing statelessness in international law 
does not seem to have influenced Articles 20 and 23 because the norm of preventing 
 
229 Translated by the author. Id, at 21. 
230 See notes 206 and 208 and accompanying text. 
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statelessness was not mentioned in the drafting process of these articles.231 Rather, different 
principles affected these articles. With regard to Article 20, the prohibition on the 
deprivation of a nationality seems to have been the main driving force for the article’s 
inclusion. Japanese scholars had stated that deprivation of nationality was not acceptable.232 
Prevention of a positive conflict of nationalities could be a principle at work in Article 23 
although this is not clear from the available sources. This suggests that although there seems 
to have been little or no impact of the norm of preventing statelessness in international law 
on Articles 20 and 23, statelessness could be prevented as a result of other principles. 
A resolution of the IDI influenced the norm of preventing statelessness in the 1899 
Nationality Act, but it did not present specific measures to prevent statelessness.233 The 
Japanese government learnt from other states and coined some articles of its own to prevent 
statelessness. Japan seems to have learnt Article 4 (jus soli) from other states, 234  and 
Yasuhisa Tanaka, who used to deal with nationality matters as an official of the MOJ, has 
indicated the possibility that Japan learnt jus sanguinis through the maternal line, the basis 
of Article 3, from a nationality law of the Netherlands at the time.235 However, the provisions 
of Articles 19, 20, 21, and 23 seem to have been coined in Japan. Tanaka states that the 
Japanese government coined Articles 19 and 21 to prevent statelessness deriving from the 
 
231 It must be noted that the desirability of preventing a positive conflict of nationality was mentioned 
during the drafting process of Articles 20 and 23. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra 
note 217, at 20-21. Since the Statement of Reasons regarded both positive and negative conflict of 
nationality to be a problem in reference to international law (MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth 
Division, supra note 198, at 31.), it can be argued that international law was the basis for the concern 
about a positive conflict of nationality. 
232 For the possible role of Japanese national identity in prohibiting deprivation of nationality, see 4.3.2., 
“Japanese National Identity”. 
233 The resolution of the IDI proposed some articles regarding nationality, but it did not propose 
particular measures to prevent statelessness. See the following. IDI, supra note 79. 
234 The nationality laws of France, the Netherlands, and Greece have similar provisions. Yasuhisa 
Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (8) [History of the Japanese Nationality Act 8], 468 KOSEKI 
1, 3 (1983). 
235 However, Tanaka states that there is no available evidence to confirm the relationship between the 
1899 Nationality Act and the Dutch law. Id, at 3. 
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household system, and Article 23 also considered the household system.236 Although the 
reasons and background are not clear, Article 20, the loss of Japanese nationality being 
conditional on the intentional acquisition of another nationality, is unique to the 1899 
Nationality Act, being absent from the legislation of other states at the time.237 This indicates 
that Japan was aware of the need to prevent statelessness from an international legal 
perspective, and it also coined its own methods of preventing statelessness in relation to the 
Japanese household system. 
 Although Japan adopted some measures to prevent statelessness, it was still possible 
for statelessness to occur in Japan. There were three categories of possible statelessness. 
First, if a child was born to parents of other nationalities in Japan, he or she could not acquire 
Japanese nationality. If he or she could not acquire the nationality of the parents either, he 
or she became stateless.238 Second, if a child was born in Japan to a Japanese mother and a 
father with another nationality, he or she could be stateless if the father could not transmit 
his nationality to the child.239 Third, a Japanese woman who married a foreign man could be 
stateless.240 Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act provided that Japanese women lost their 
Japanese nationality when they married foreign men. There was no article in the 1899 
Nationality Act that could prevent statelessness in such cases. Thus, when a Japanese woman 
married a foreigner but did not acquire his nationality, she could be stateless. This issue was 
discussed at the Investigation Committee of Codes in 1898. Kenjiro Ume, one of the drafters 
 
236 Yasuhisa Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (10) [History of the Japanese Nationality Act 
10], 470 KOSEKI 1, 7-8 (1983). Yasuhisa Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (11) [History of the 
Japanese Nationality Act 11], 471 KOSEKI 20, 20-22 (1983). 
237 Tanaka, supra note 236 (Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (10)), at 9. 
238 For instance, if the nationalities of the parents were conferred on the basis of the jus soli principle, 
the child became stateless. If the nationality of the mother was conferred on the basis of jus sanguinis 
through the paternal line and the nationality of the father was conferred on the basis of the jus soli 
principle, the child also became stateless. 
239 When the nationality of the father was conferred on the basis of the jus soli principle, the child 
became stateless. 
240 Such cases were discussed in the Imperial Diet in 1916. See 2.4., “The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 
Nationality Act”. 
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of the Nationality Bill,241 stated that cases of marriage with foreign men were different from 
cases of dissolution of marriage or the naturalisation of a woman’s husband.242 Dissolution 
of marriage and the naturalisation of a woman’s husband were unpredictable, whereas a 
woman would be aware of the nationality of her prospective husband.243 In other words, a 
woman would be able to foresee that she would lose her nationality when she married a 
foreign man. Ume argued that if a woman did not want to acquire the nationality of her 
husband and lose Japanese nationality, she should avoid marrying a foreign man.244 Thus, 
Japanese women who were married to foreigners lost their Japanese nationality. If such 
women were unable to acquire the nationality of their husband, they could become stateless. 
Although the 1899 Nationality Act prevented statelessness in some cases, the possibility of 
statelessness in Japan thus remained. 
 
2.4. The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act 
 The 1899 Nationality Act was amended in 1916. Although the main purpose of the 
amendment was to allow Japanese nationals born in the US to renounce their Japanese 
nationality in order to protect them in the US,245 the amendment also prevented statelessness 
 
241 NAKAMURA, supra note 182, at 55. 
242 Articles 19 and 21 prevented statelessness in cases of the dissolution of marriage or naturalisation of 
a woman’s husband. MOJ, Department of Judicial System Investigation (supervised), supra note 199, at 
22. 
243 Id, at 22. 
244 Id, at 22. See also the following. Tanaka, supra note 236 (Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (10)), at 
7. 
245 See the following. National Archives of Japan, Kokuseki Hou Chuu wo Kaisei su [Nationality Act to 
Be Amended], in KOUBUN RUISHUU DAI 40 HEN TAISHOU 5 NEN DAI 19 KAN [COLLECTIONS OF OFFICIAL 
DOCUMENTS, PART 40 BOOK 2 (1916)] (National Archives of Japan Digital Archive). Ref. Rui-
01242100 (1916). There were children who were born to Japanese fathers or Japanese unmarried 
mothers in the US, and they acquired both Japanese and US nationalities. However, an anti-Japan 
movement began in the US around 1916, and the Japanese government became concerned about the 
situation of Japanese-Americans. Yasuhisa Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (12) [History of 
the Japanese Nationality Act 12], 472 KOSEKI 13, 14 (1983). In particular, the Japanese government 
was afraid of future legislation in the US that would deny the US nationality of Japanese-American 
people. One idea was to allow the renunciation of Japanese nationality so that Japanese-Americans 
would not have to face discrimination based on the fact of multiple nationality. In this context, Article 
20-2 was proposed, according to which it was possible for Japanese nationals to withdraw from 
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among formerly Japanese women who were married to foreign men. It must be noted that 
the fact that statelessness took place in Japan, not the norm of preventing statelessness, was 
a driving force behind the Japanese government’s inclusion of the prevention of statelessness 
in the 1916 Amendment. 
 Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act provided that Japanese nationality would be 
lost if a Japanese woman married a foreign man. Thus, if a woman did not acquire the 
nationality of her husband, she could become stateless. In order to prevent this happening, 
Article 18 was amended so that a woman who married a foreign man lost her Japanese 
nationality only when she acquired her husband’s nationality.246 In 1914, some Japanese 
women were married to Canadian men and became stateless.247 The Japanese government 
had stated that Canadian nationality was not conferred on women who were married to 
Canadian men if the women were not admitted to Canada.248  Thus, formerly Japanese 
women who were married to Canadian men and living in Japan became stateless because 
they lost their Japanese nationality and did not acquire Canadian nationality.249 Statelessness 
among formerly Japanese women who were married to Canadian men was described as “a 
real problem” although the reason why statelessness among women was regarded as an issue 
is not clear from the discussion in the Imperial Diet.250 
The 1916 Amendment regarding the issue of statelessness among formerly Japanese 
women married to foreign men is interesting to compare with the 1899 Nationality Act. As 
has already been discussed, during the drafting process of the 1899 Nationality Act, it was 
 
Japanese nationality if they had acquired another nationality on the basis that they were born in the 
other state and had an address there. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou 
Shingi Roku (15) [Proceedings of the Nationality Act 15], 298 KOSEKI 11, 11, 13 (1971). 
246 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 245, at 11. 
247 During the deliberation in the Imperial Diet, the term “stateless persons” was not used, but “persons 
who do not belong to any nationality” was (translated by the author). MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The 
Fifth Division, Kokuseki Hou Shingi Roku (17) [Proceedings of the Nationality Act 17], 300 KOSEKI 
37, 38 (1971). 
248 Id, at 38. 
249 This case was observed in Shiga Prefecture. Id, at 38. 
250 Translated by the author. Id, at 38. 
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argued that statelessness derived from marriage to foreign men did not have to be prevented 
because women could avoid marrying foreign men if they did not want to lose their Japanese 
nationality.251 However, in 1916, statelessness among formerly Japanese women derived 
from marriage to Canadian men was regarded as a problem, and the need to prevent 
statelessness was discussed. Thus, the 1916 Amendment covered a wider scope of 
preventing statelessness than did the 1899 Nationality Act. There were three kinds of 
statelessness that could arise in Japan under the 1899 Nationality Act: children born to 
parents of other nationalities in Japan, children born to a Japanese mother and a father with 
another nationality in Japan, and Japanese women who were married to foreign men.252 As 
a result of the 1916 Amendment, the problem caused by the third potential cause of 
statelessness was solved, but the first two remained after the 1916 Amendment. 
 It must be noted that international law and principles did not play a key role in 
preventing statelessness in the 1916 Amendment. International law was not mentioned when 
the amendment was discussed. The driving force of the amendment was not international 
law, but “a real problem” of statelessness.253 Statelessness was regarded not as a mere 
theoretical issue, but as a real issue, and the Japanese government found it necessary to 
prevent statelessness. This was different from the drafting process of the 1899 Nationality 
Act, which referred to the norm of preventing statelessness in international law.254 
 
 
 
251 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
252 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
253 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 247, at 38. 
254 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. With regard to the relationship between the impact of 
statelessness and the Japanese government’s reaction to statelessness, see 4.3.1., “The Impact of 
Stateless Persons in Japan”. The 1899 Nationality Act was also amended in 1924, but the amendment 
did not affect the prevention of statelessness under nationality act (Yasuhisa Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki 
Hou Enkaku Shi (14) [History of the Japanese Nationality Act 14], 477 KOSEKI 1, 10-12 (1983).), so 
this dissertation does not cover it. 
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2.5. The 1930 Convention 
2.5.1. Japanese Reply to the Schedule of Points (1928) 
 The 1930 Convention covered the prevention of statelessness.255 Japanese law was 
in line with the articles on the prevention of statelessness in the 1930 Convention, so the 
Convention did not become a trigger for the amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act. 
However, it must be noted that the Japanese stance towards the convention and the 
Codification Conference that adopted the convention indicates that Japan was committed to 
preventing statelessness. This section separates the Japanese reaction to the Codification 
Conference and 1930 Convention into three parts: the Japanese reply to the schedule of 
points in 1928, the drafting of Japanese directives in 1929 and 1930, and the Japanese 
position in the Codification Conference in 1930. 
 The first phase began when Japan received the schedule of points submitted by the 
CPCC in May 1928, and it finished when Japan replied to the schedule in November 1928. 
Analysis of this phase indicates that Japan was committed to the prevention of statelessness 
but did not intend to amend Japanese law to ensure the prevention of statelessness. In 1927, 
the LN discussed the issues that required codification, and pointed out that nationality, 
territorial waters and state responsibility should be discussed for codification.256 In 1928, the 
CPCC was formed to prepare for the Codification Conference, and it submitted its schedule 
of points to member states of the LN to ask for their views on the codification for these three 
matters.257  After Japan received the schedule of points, scholars and officials from the 
MOFA met on 25 May 1928 and decided that the draft of the reply to the schedule would be 
 
255 For the 1930 Convention, see 1.3.2., “The 1930 Convention: The Emphasis on Married Women and 
Children”. 
256 UN, supra note 82, at 106. 
257 Rikiya Takahashi, Kokusai Renmei ni okeru Kokusai Houten Hensan Jigyou to Nihon Kokusai Hou 
Gakkai: Kokusai Hou no Ukete kara Tsukurite he [Codification in the League of Nations and the 
Japanese Society of International Law: The Dawn of Japanese International Law], 30 J. OF THE 
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ASIA-PACIFIC STUDIES 1, 4 (2015). 
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drafted by Dr. Saburo Yamada, a scholar on private international law.258 Consultation on the 
Yamada’s draft took place in the Inter-Ministerial Council, and the Japanese reply was 
finalised. 
The first item that the CPCC asked to examine was “[t]he general principle that the 
acquisition and loss of its nationality are matters which, by international law, fall solely 
within the domestic jurisdiction of each State”.259 The CPCC also asked whether there were 
limitations that states faced in legislating on nationality matters in their relationship with 
other states.260 Yamada wrote that although each state had freedom to determine who would 
acquire and lose its nationality, there had to be limitations to this freedom in order to “prevent 
positive and negative conflicts of nationality”.261 The preparatory document produced by 
Yamada stated that conflicts of nationality should be avoided because such conflicts became 
an obstacle to the “promotion of international cooperation”.262  At the Inter-Ministerial 
Council, there was no objection to Yamada’s draft. 263  Japan responded that while the 
 
258 MOFA, Kokusai Houten Hensan Chousa Jumbi Iinkai Dai 1 Kai Kaigi [Preparatory Committee on 
Investigation of Codification: The First Meeting] in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI KOKUSAI HOUTEN KAIGI 
IKKEN DAI 1 KAN 2-1 [LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION CONFERENCE VOL. 1. 2-1] (B-9-2-0-2_001) 
(Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Japan Center for Asian Historical 
Records, National Archives of Japan. Ref. B04014070600 (1928). 
259 LN, First Codification Conference: Schedules of Points Drawn Up by the Preparatory Committee for 
Submission to the Governments, C.44.M.21.1928.V, 1 (1928). 
260 Id, at 1. 
261 Translated by the author. MOFA, Kokuseki Mondai ni Kansuru Kaitou An [Draft of Reply 
concerning Nationality Matters] in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI KOKUSAI HOUTEN KAIGI IKKEN DAI 11 KAN 
BUNKATSU 1 [LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION CONFERENCE VOL. 11 PART 1] (B-9-2-0-2_014) 
(Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Japan Center for Asian Historical 
Records, National Archives of Japan. Ref. B04014077700 (1928). 
262 Translated by the author. MOFA, Kokuseki Mondai ni Kansuru Kaitou An Jumbi Shorui [Document 
to Prepare a Draft of Reply concerning Nationality Matters] in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI KOKUSAI 
HOUTEN KAIGI IKKEN DAI 1 KAN 2-1 SANKOU BUNKATSU 1 [LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION 
CONFERENCE VOL. 1. 2-1, REFERENCE PART 1] (B-9-2-0-2_001) (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan. 
Ref. B04014070600. (1928). 
263 MOFA, Kokusai Houten Hensan Mondai Kakushou Kyougikai Dai 3 Kai Kaigou [Inter-Ministerial 
Council for Codification: The Third Meeting] in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI KOKUSAI HOUTEN KAIGI 
IKKEN DAI 1 KAN 2-1 SANKOU BUNKATSU 1 [LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION CONFERENCE VOL. 1. 
2-1, REFERENCE PART 1] (B-9-2-0-2_001) (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan). Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan. Ref. B04014070600 
(1928). 
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acquisition and loss of nationality were matters for each state, “[t]he possible conflict of 
nationalities that may in consequence occur [could] be avoided only by international 
agreement”.264 This indicates that the Japanese government believed that it was desirable to 
prevent conflicts over nationality, including statelessness, and that international agreements 
should cover nationality matters when there was a conflict over nationality. 
The second item relevant to this dissertation was the nationality of persons born in 
the territory of a state to parents who were merely passing through the territory.265 Yamada 
wrote that the jus soli principle should not be applied to children whose parents were passing 
through by accident because it did not follow the “spirit of the jus soli principle”.266 From 
the available sources, it is not clear what the “spirit of the jus soli principle” meant here, but 
Yamada seems to have meant that the jus soli principle was based on the assumption that 
the child remained in the territory, and this assumption did not work in cases where the 
parents were merely passing through the territory. There was no objection in the Inter-
Ministerial Council to this Yamada’s view,267 and Japan stated that although it was common 
for states that adopted the jus soli principle not to consider the length of stay in their territory 
as an issue, these states should not apply the jus soli principle to children born to parents 
who were merely passing through their territory. 268  The Japanese government did not 
mention the Japanese law in this context, and it merely made a general statement.269 
 
264 MOFA, NIHON GAIKOU BUNSHO SHOUWA KI I DAI 2 BU DAI 2 KAN [DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE 
FOREIGN POLICY, SHOWA ERA, SERIES I (1927-1931), PART 2, VOLUME II] 586 (1992). 
265 LN, supra note 259, at 2. 
266 Translated by the author. MOFA, supra note 262. 
267 MOFA, Kokusai Houten Hensan Mondai Kakushou Kyougikai Dai 4 Kai Kaigou [Inter-Ministerial 
Council for Codification: The Fourth Meeting] in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI KOKUSAI HOUTEN KAIGI 
IKKEN DAI 1 KAN 2-1 SANKOU BUNKATSU 1 [LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION CONFERENCE VOL. 1. 
2-1, REFERENCE PART 1] (B-9-2-0-2_001) (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Japan). Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan. Ref. B04014070600 
(1928). 
268 MOFA, supra note 264, at 588. 
269 It is possible that Japan was not in favour of the other states’ application of the jus soli principle to 
children born to parents who were merely passing through a territory in order to prevent multiple 
nationalities. Japan applied jus sanguinis through the paternal line at the time, so other states’ 
application of the jus soli principle to children born to parents who were merely passing through the 
    64 
Third, the CPCC asked about the “[n]ationality of child of unknown parents, of 
having no nationality, or of parents of unknown nationality”.270 Yamada stated that the jus 
soli principle should be adopted “to prevent the occurrence of stateless persons”.271 Without 
any objection to this position in the Inter-Ministerial Council,272 Japan responded that even 
states that adopt the jus sanguinis principle should adopt the jus soli principle in cases of 
foundlings and children born to parents without a nationality or whose nationality was not 
known.273 It also introduced Article 4 of the 1899 Nationality Act, which adopted the jus 
soli principle.274 This indicates that the Japanese government was committed to preventing 
statelessness, as can be seen from the drafting process of the 1899 Nationality Act. 
Fourth, the nationality of women who were married to foreign men was discussed.275 
Yamada mentioned Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act, and explained that women’s loss 
of Japanese nationality was conditional on their acquisition of their husband’s nationality.276 
Thus, the Japanese government stated that “a negative conflict of nationality” was prevented 
by Japanese law.277 The Inter-Ministerial Council did not object to this,278 and the Japanese 
reply to the CPCC referred to Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act.279 However, in contrast 
to cases where the nationality of persons born in the territory of a state to parents who were 
 
territory could have increased the number of persons with multiple nationalities. Note that the jus soli 
principle was applied in Japan if a child’s parents were not known or if they did not have any nationality 
pursuant to Article 4 of the 1899 Nationality Act. See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”.  
270 LN, supra note 259, at 2. 
271 MOFA, supra note 261. Yamada used the term mukokuseki sha for “stateless persons”, which is a 
common phrase for stateless persons today. Compare this with the usage of words during the drafting 
process of the 1899 Constitution. See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
272 MOFA, supra note 267. 
273 MOFA, supra note 264, at 589. 
274 Id, at 589. 
275 LN, supra note 259, at 3. 
276 MOFA, supra note 261. Note that Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act had been amended in 1916, 
and that Japanese women who were married to foreign men no longer lost their Japanese nationality 
unless they had acquired the nationality of their husband. See 2.4., “The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 
Nationality Act”. 
277 Translated by the author. Id. 
278 MOFA, supra note 267. 
279 MOFA, supra note 264, at 591. 
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merely passing through it, the Japanese government did not express its stance on the 
nationality of women who were married to foreign men in general. It merely explained the 
Japanese law. 
Fifth, the CPCC asked about the nationality of an illegitimate child when his or her 
civil status changed.280 In particular, it asked whether the loss of nationality as a result of the 
change in civil status was conditional on the acquisition of another nationality.281 This 
question is related to statelessness because the loss of a former nationality being conditional 
on the acquisition of a new one functioned to prevent statelessness. Yamada stated that 
illegitimate children who had been legitimated by Japanese nationals acquired Japanese 
nationality. 282  The Inter-Ministerial Council did not object to Yamada’s statement. 283 
Yamada’s draft did not seem to answer the question of the CPCC properly because it merely 
discussed the case of foreigner children who are adopted by Japanese while the CPCC seems 
to have asked about the case of Japanese children who are adopted by foreigners. The reply 
to the CPCC modified Yamada’s draft to make sure that the reply answers the CPCC’s 
inquiry accurately, and it stated that “if a child who is Japanese acquires foreign nationality 
in virtue of recognition, [he or she] loses [his or her] Japanese nationality” with reference to 
Article 23 of the 1899 Nationality Act.284 The reply indicated that Japanese nationality was 
not lost if a child who was recognised by a foreign father did not acquire a new nationality. 
In other words, Japan was prepared to prevent statelessness among Japanese children whose 
civil status changed as a result of, for example, recognition by foreigners. 
Although Yamada recognised the need to prevent statelessness, it must be noted that 
the Inter-Ministerial Council stated that the treaty to be adopted should “merely obligate 
 
280 LN, supra note 259, at 3. 
281 Id, at 3. 
282 MOFA, supra note 261. 
283 MOFA, supra note 267. 
284 MOFA, supra note 264, at 593. 
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states to legislate”.285 Although the meaning of this phrase is not clear, the Inter-Ministerial 
Council did not want a new treaty to create the need to implement or amend municipal 
laws.286 This implies that ministries desired to make the new treaty compatible with the 
Japanese laws of the time, and did not want to amend the Japanese laws.287 
 
2.5.2. The Drafting of the Japanese Directives (1929-1930) 
 The second phase involved a drafting of directives within the Japanese government 
in 1929 and 1930, after Japan had received the bases of the discussion prepared by the CPCC. 
The Japanese stance during the drafting process of the directives indicates that it was in line 
with the norm of preventing statelessness in the CPCC’s bases of the discussion. In addition, 
it was more committed to the regulation of nationality matters in international law than in 
the previous phase because a phrase stating that the new treaty should not obligate Japan to 
amend its municipal law, included during the discussion at the Inter-Ministerial Council in 
the previous phase, was included neither in the draft of the directive nor in the directive. 
 
285 Translated by the author and emphasis added. MOFA, supra note 267. 
286 Id. 
287 It must be noted that the Japanese government’s stance seems to have been different from that of 
Yamada, who hoped to “contribute to the codification”, though this was not directly relevant to the 
prevention of statelessness. In his draft reply, Yamada added section XVI, while the CPCC’s schedule 
of points contained only 15 sections. The sixteenth section was entitled “The principle to solve issues of 
conflict of nationality”, and Yamada wanted to include this in the reply to the CPCC. It stated that if 
children acquired the nationality of their parents and place of birth, and they lived in the state of their 
birth, their nationality by place of birth should be recognised by every state. It continued that if they 
lived in the state of their parents’ nationality or third states, they could choose the nationality of their 
parents if they wished. Yamada was concerned that there was a conflict of nationality between jus 
sanguinis and jus soli, and thus he made this proposal. MOFA, supra note 261. The point is that the 
1899 Nationality Act did not have such a provision. In other words, this proposal could have led to the 
amendment of Japanese laws. In the Inter-Ministerial Council, the MOJ did not support this proposal 
because it was not compatible with the 1899 Japanese Act. Rikiya Takahashi, 1930 Nen Hagu Kokusai 
Houten Hensan Kaigi niokeru “Tsumano Kokuseki” Mondaito Nihon: “Kokusaihouno Shimpo” to 
“Teikokuno Rieki” [Nationality of Married Women in the Hague Codification Conference and Japan: 
Development of International Law and National Interest], 188 INT’L RELATIONS 15, 23 (2017). 
Although Yamada emphasised the importance of “contributing to the codification”, this proposal was 
not included in the Japanese government’s reply to the CPCC. This indicates the Inter-Ministerial 
Council’s hesitancy to amend Japanese laws and Yamada’s passion to solve issues of conflict of 
nationality by international law. 
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After the CPCC examined replies from states, it prepared the “bases of discussion”, 
which served as the draft of the 1930 Convention for discussion at the Codification 
Conference on the basis of the agreement included in the replies of the states to the schedule 
of points.288  The Japanese government examined the bases of discussion and prepared 
directives for its delegate to attend the conference. The bases of discussion number 1, 11, 12, 
16, 17 and 20 bis were relevant to the prevention of statelessness. The issue of the nationality 
of children born in the territory of a state to parents who were merely passing through the 
territory, included in the schedule of points, was excluded from the bases of discussion since 
the CPCC found that there was no agreement among states on this issue.289 
 Basis of discussion number 1 had three paragraphs, and the first paragraph noted that 
acquisition and loss of nationality was determined by “the law of the State whose nationality 
is claimed or disputed”.290 The second and third paragraphs listed methods of acquisition 
and loss of nationality.291 The draft of directives of the Japanese government stated that there 
was no problem in following the first paragraph but that the second and third paragraphs 
should be amended because they were “inappropriate as provisions”.292 In addition, the draft 
stated that the delegate should attempt to propose a provision on non-discrimination based 
 
288 For the bases of discussion, see the following. LN, Conference for the Codification of International 
Law, Bases of Discussion: Drawn up for the Conference by the Preparatory Committee, Volume I. 
Nationality, C.73.M.38.1929.V (1929). 
289 Id, at 61. 
290 Id, at 20. 
291 The second paragraph of basis of discussion number 1 stated that acquisition of nationality includes 
“bestowal of nationality by reason of the parents’ nationality or of birth on the national territory, 
marriage with a national, naturalisation on application by or on behalf of the person concerned, transfer 
of territory”. With regard to loss of nationality, “voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality, marriage 
with a foreigner, de facto attachment to another country accompanied by failure to comply with 
provisions governing the retention of the nationality, transfer of territory” were listed as examples in the 
third paragraph. LN, supra note 288, at 20. 
292 Translated by the author. From the available resources, it is not clear why the list was 
“inappropriate”. MOFA, Kokusai Houten Hensan Kaigi Kokuseki Mondai Kunrei An [International 
Codification Conference: A Draft of Directives on Nationality Issues], in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI 
KOKUSAI HOUTEN HENSAN KAIGI IKKEN DAI 3 (B) KAN 2 IPPAN JUMBI, DAI 1 KAI KAIGI BUNKATSU 1 
[LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION CONFERENCE VOL. 3(B) 2. GENERAL PREPARATION, THE FIRST 
MEETING PART 1] (B-9-2-0-2_004) (Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). 
Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, National Archives of Japan. Ref. B04014072700 (1930). 
    68 
on race, nationality, and religion.293 This was proposed because of “the unique status of” 
Japan.294 This reflected Japanese policy of the time, which paid particular attention to the 
prohibition of racial discrimination in the LN.295 The draft was transmitted to the Japanese 
delegate in the LN.296 However, Harukazu Nagaoka, a Japanese delegate to the Codification 
Conference and then-ambassador to Germany, claimed that Japan should not propose a 
clause on the prohibition of racial discrimination to the MOFA in Tokyo because there was 
little chance that issues of racial discrimination would be included in the treaty.297  He 
pointed out that Japan would be in a difficult position to negotiate on nationality matters if 
it proposed to include a provision on racial discrimination.298 After Nagaoka’s comment, the 
Japanese government decided to omit the proposal of a clause on the prohibition of racial 
discrimination from the directives.299 
 Basis of discussion number 11 concerned children whose parents were not known. It 
stated that “[a] child whose parents are unknown has the nationality of the country of birth”, 
and it continued that a foundling was assumed “to have been born on the territory of the 
State in which it was found”.300 The draft of the directives stated that since this basis shared 
the principle of the 1899 Nationality Act, there was no problem in following it,301 and this 
stance remained the same in the directives.302 
 
293 Id. 
294 Translated by the author. Id. 
295 The Japanese emphasis on the principle of prohibition of racial discrimination can be seen from the 
drafting process of the LN Covenant although this was opposed by other states, such as the US and 
Australia, and it was not included in the LN Covenant. See the following. NAOKO SHIMAZU, JAPAN, 
RACE AND EQUALITY: THE RACIAL EQUALITY PROPOSAL OF 1919 13-37, 89-163 (1998). 
296 MOFA, supra note 264, at 617-618. 
297 Id, at 628. 
298 Id, at 628. 
299 The directives also stated that the Japanese government possessed the freedom to determine issues of 
nationality of Koreans, given the unique circumstances of Korea. Id, at 630. For the Japanese stance on 
the nationality of Koreans, see 2.6.2., “Korea”. 
300 LN, supra note 288, at 67. 
301 MOFA, supra note 292. 
302 MOFA, supra note 264, at 619. 
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 Basis of discussion number 12 covered the nationality of children whose parents did 
not have any nationality. This was originally classified under the same category as basis of 
discussion number 11. However, the reply from governments to the schedule of points 
indicated that states’ stance on children who were born to stateless parents varied, while 
there was general conformity among states’ views in the case of foundlings.303 Thus, basis 
of discussion number 12 was separated from basis of discussion 11. It stated that the 
nationality of the state of birth was to be conferred on children whose parents did not have 
any nationality or whose parents’ nationalities were not known if the person lived in the state 
up to an age determined by that state, not exceeding eighteen years.304  The residential 
requirement rendered number 12 different from number 11 because the latter conferred 
nationality of the state of birth without a residential requirement. The draft of the directives 
stated that it would be appropriate to handle children of stateless persons and those whose 
nationality was not known in the same way as foundlings, as the 1899 Nationality Act did.305 
Since this basis of discussion did not conflict with the nationality act, the Japanese 
government stated that there was no reason to oppose this basis of discussion.306 This stance 
remained the same in the directives. 307  The 1899 Nationality Act conferred Japanese 
nationality on children whose parents were stateless.308 Thus, length of stay in the territory 
was not considered in the 1899 Nationality Act. In this sense, the Japanese stance and the 
1899 Nationality Act were more open to conferring nationality on children whose parents 
did not have any nationality than this basis of discussion was. 
 Bases of discussion numbers 16 and 17 concerned women who were married to 
foreign men. The sixteenth basis of discussion noted that women would not lose their 
 
303 LN, supra note 288, at 67. 
304 Id, at 67. 
305 MOFA, supra note 292. 
306 Id. 
307 MOFA, supra note 264, at 619. 
308 Article 4 of the 1899 Nationality Act. See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
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nationality when they married foreign men unless they acquired their husband’s 
nationality.309 Basis of discussion number 17 stated that women did not lose their nationality 
when their husband changed his nationality during marriage unless the women acquired their 
husband’s new nationality.310 Although the CPCC acknowledged that it was difficult to 
decide on a rule for married women’s nationality, it recognised that these provisions would 
prevent statelessness among women.311 The Japanese draft of the directives stated that there 
was no problem following these bases since they were compatible with the Japanese stance, 
which was expressed in the reply to the schedule of points,312 and this stance did not change 
in the directives.313 
 Basis of discussion number 20 bis stated that a child did not lose his or her original 
nationality in cases of change in civil status unless he or she acquired another nationality.314 
The draft of directives stated that there was no problem in supporting this basis,315 and this 
stance was maintained in the directives.316 
There is a notable difference between the discussions at the Inter-Ministerial Council 
of 1928, when the reply to the schedule of points was drafted, and the Japanese directives in 
1930. The Inter-Ministerial Council decided to include in the directives a phrase that a new 
treaty should not obligate Japan to amend its municipal laws.317 However, such a provision 
was included neither in the draft of the directive nor the directive itself.318 Although it is not 
clear why this proposal was omitted due to the lack of sources, this indicates that Japan did 
 
309 LN, supra note 288, at 95. 
310 Id, at 95. 
311 Id, at 94. 
312 MOFA, supra note 292. See 2.5.1., “Japanese Reply to the Schedule of Points (1928)”. 
313 MOFA, supra note 264, at 621. 
314 LN, supra note 288, at 112. 
315 MOFA, supra note 292. 
316 MOFA, supra note 264, at 621. 
317 See 2.5.1., “Japanese Reply to the Schedule of Points (1928)”. 
318 MOFA, supra note 292. MOFA, supra note 264, at 621. 
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not strongly oppose a treaty that could have required amendment of the 1899 Nationality 
Act in its official stance before participating in the Codification Conference.319 
 
2.5.3. The Japanese Position in the Codification Conference (1930) 
The third phase was a discussion at the meeting of the Codification Conference held 
at The Hague in 1930. In the discussion of the Codification Conference, Japan expressed its 
view that the conflict in the laws on nationality needed to be eliminated by international law. 
This indicates that the Japanese commitment to preventing statelessness remained at the 
Codification Conference. Since the 1899 Nationality Act was compatible with the provisions 
on the prevention of statelessness in the 1930 Convention, the Japanese government did not 
find the need for amending the nationality act since it already considered to ratify the 1930 
Convention. The Japanese commitment to preventing statelessness is also observable from 
the fact that Japan was in favour of a separate Protocol on Statelessness that was newly 
introduced at the Codification Conference. 
Discussions were based on the “bases of discussion”, which had already been 
circulated to states, and bases of discussion numbers 1, 11, 12, 16, 17 and 20 bis were 
relevant to the prevention of statelessness. When basis of discussion number 1 (each state’s 
competence to determine who its nationals are) was discussed, Nagaoka, a Japanese delegate, 
had the floor as the first speaker, and he stated that although each state had the freedom to 
decide on methods of acquisition and loss of nationality, such freedom had “reasonable 
limits, in order to eliminate as far as possible cases of statelessness and double 
 
319 Note that the Japanese delegate stated that Japan was willing to amend any nationality law if it 
conflicted with any new treaty in the Codification Conference. See 2.5.3., “The Japanese Position in the 
Codification Conference (1930)”. It was also said that Japan had prepared an amendment to the 
nationality act although the act was not amended in reality. See note 332. 
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nationality”. 320  He noted that the Japanese legislation paid attention to preventing 
statelessness in order “to [avoid] the disadvantages of statelessness”.321 He added:322 
 
If, in this Conference, the various States of the world find that they can, by agreement, 
eliminate the conflict of laws on this subject, I beg to state here and now that my 
Government will be prepared to introduce into its nationality law such changes as may 
be deemed necessary. 
 
This shows the Japanese delegate’s commitment to preventing statelessness and multiple 
nationalities. The Japanese directives stated that the delegate was not against the bases of 
discussion even though there was a basis that did not seem to be compatible with the 1899 
Nationality Act.323 The first paragraph of basis of discussion 1 became the basis of Article 1 
of the 1930 Convention. 324  It must be noted that Japan paid substantial attention to 
preventing any negative and positive conflicts of nationality, including statelessness, when 
the 1930 Convention was negotiated. 
 With regard to the bases of discussion relevant to the prevention of statelessness, 
Japan did not make many substantial comments during the discussions. There was no 
 
320 LN, supra note 95, at 19. 
321 Id, at 19. 
322 Id, at 19. 
323 For instance, the directives noted that the delegate did not need to oppose basis of discussion number 
18, which determined that “[n]aturalisation of the husband during the marriage does not involve a 
change of nationality for the wife except with her consent” (LN, supra note 288, at 95), while the 1899 
Nationality Act did not take the willingness of women into account. MOFA, supra note 264, at 621. 
Note that although some ministries requested that the treaty be made compatible with the 1899 
Nationality Act, this principle was not included in the directives. See 2.5.2., “The Drafting of the 
Japanese Directives (1929-1930)”. 
324 Japan and the US proposed to omit the second and third paragraphs of basis of discussion number 1, 
which listed examples of “acquisition of nationality” and “loss of nationality”. Although Japan did not 
explain why it sought to omit these, the US offered two reasons. First, it was not clear whether the 
contents listed in these paragraphs were exhaustive or merely examples of “acquisition” and “loss” of 
nationality. Second, the meaning of the contents listed in these paragraphs, such as “voluntary 
acquisition of a foreign nationality”, were not necessarily clear. Paragraphs 2 and 3 were then omitted 
by 18 votes to 17. LN, supra note 95, at 28, 33. 
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discussion about basis of discussion number 11 (application of jus soli in the case of 
foundlings) at the conference, and substantial parts of the basis of discussion remained the 
same as in Article 14 of the 1930 Convention.325  Basis of discussion number 12 was 
modified by the Drafting Committee, which was established during the conference, and a 
new basis of discussion stated that children whose parents did not have any nationality “may” 
acquire the nationality of their state of birth, which did not create any substantial legal 
obligation on states.326 Although states had different views about the nationality of children 
whose parents did not have any nationality, this amendment allowed states to agree on a 
provision,327 and the basis of discussion number 12 became the basis of Article 15 of the 
1930 Convention. There was not much discussion of bases of discussion numbers 16 and 17, 
and the text of these bases of discussion remained the same in Articles 8 and 9 of the 1930 
Convention. Japan did not comment on these articles.328 
With regard to basis of discussion number 20 bis (retention of the original nationality 
in cases of a change in civil status unless the child acquires another nationality), Japan stated 
that “the Japanese delegation is able to accept Basis No. 20 bis without any amendment”.329 
However, it did not comment further, and basis of discussion number 20 bis became the 
basis of Article 16.330 The prevention of statelessness was included in Articles 8, 9, 14, 15 
and 16 of the 1930 Convention. 
 
325 The Drafting Committee was appointed, and it redrafted the basis of discussion. It added that when 
parentage was established, the child’s nationality was determined by the established parentage. Id, at 
164. 
326 Id, at 164. 
327 See the following. Id, at 165. 
328 Although it is not clear from the available sources why Japan did not comment on these bases of 
discussion, one possible reason is that Japan was in favour of these bases of discussion, and there was 
no need to make comments on them because other states were also supporting these articles. Note that 
the Japanese government recognised that there was no problem in following bases of discussion 
numbers 16 and 17 in the directives. See 2.5.2., “The Drafting of the Japanese Directives (1929-1930)”. 
329 LN, supra note 95, at 175. 
330 It must be noted that bases of discussion numbers 20 and 20 bis had an effect on preventing both 
positive and negative conflicts of nationality, but basis of discussion number 20, which provided for 
prevention of possession of multiple nationalities, was not included in the 1930 Convention. Basis of 
discussion number 20 stated that when illegitimate children acquired the nationality of their father as a 
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 At the end of the Codification Conference, Japan signed the 1930 Convention on 12 
April 1930.331 However, it did not ratify the 1930 Convention, so the 1930 Convention did 
not legally bind Japan.332 
 In addition to the 1930 Convention, the conference adopted several protocols: the 
Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality, the 
Protocol on Statelessness and the Special Protocol on Statelessness. Of these, the Protocol 
on Statelessness is relevant to the prevention of statelessness.333 One idea of the Protocol on 
Statelessness was derived from the amendment proposed by Poland. 334  The Protocol 
provided for the application of jus sanguinis through the maternal line in cases where the jus 
soli principle was not adopted and the father of the child did not have any nationality or 
 
result of legitimation, they lost the nationality of their mother that they had previously acquired. LN, 
supra note 288, at 111. However, some states disagreed with this, and basis of discussion number 20 
was omitted. See the following. Id, at 175. It is interesting to note that states could not agree on 
preventing multiple nationalities among children whose civil status changed while they could agree on 
the prevention of statelessness among children whose civil status changed.  
331 HIDEBUMI EGAWA, RYOICHI YAMADA & YOSHIRO HAYATA, KOKUSEKI HOU [NATIONALITY ACT] 43 
(3rd ed., 1997). 
332 Japan reserved Articles 4, 10 and 13 when it signed the 1930 Convention. Ratification was not even 
discussed in the Imperial Diet. The reason why Japan did not ratify the 1930 Convention is not clear, 
but Tanaka, a former official of the MOJ who dealt with nationality matters, guesses that a change in 
the political situation soon after 1930 may have prevented ratification of the 1930 Convention from 
being discussed in the Imperial Diet. Yasuhisa Tanaka, Nihon Kokuseki Hou Enkaku Shi (Kan) 
[History of the Japanese Nationality Act Final], 478 KOSEKI 1, 2 (1984). The Mukden Incident took 
place in 1931, and Japan began to leave the international arena after that. This background may have 
influenced non-ratification of the 1930 Convention. However, it must be noted that the Home Ministry 
prepared an amendment to the Nationality Act in order to make the Nationality Act compatible with the 
provisions for multiple nationalities in the 1930 Convention. For instance, a new provision for Article 
20-4 was proposed. Article 6 of the 1930 Convention provided that people who possessed multiple 
nationalities involuntarily could renounce their nationality upon the authorisation of the state of their 
nationality. After the 1916 amendment, Article 20-2 of the 1899 Nationality Act permitted the  
renunciation of nationality by persons with multiple nationalities. However, this article was applied only 
to persons who were born in states that adopted jus soli, and this limitation conflicted with the 1930 
Convention. Thus, the proposed Article 20-4 lifted the condition of jus soli. By the introduction of 
Article 20-4, any Japanese individuals with other nationalities could apply for renunciation of their 
Japanese nationality. Tanaka, supra note 332, at 5. This implies that the 1930 Convention could 
influence the Japanese Nationality Act. 
333 The Special Protocol on Statelessness concerns which state is bound to admit a stateless person 
(Article 1), so this is not directly relevant to the prevention of statelessness. The Protocol on 
Statelessness entered into force on 1 July 1937. EGAWA, YAMADA & HAYATA, supra note 331, at 43. 
334 LN, supra note 95, at 201. 
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where his nationality was unknown.335 At an earlier stage, the “Convention Annexed to the 
Convention relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws” was proposed, containing three 
articles.336 The Polish delegation proposed to separate the articles in the proposed annex 
convention into three protocols.337 The Japanese delegate supported the Polish idea and 
stated that it could sign only Article 3 of the annex convention, which became a provision 
of the Protocol.338 The annex convention was separated into three protocols without any 
objection.339 
A brief discussion during the drafting process of the Protocol on Statelessness 
indicated states’ strong commitment to preventing statelessness. The draft stated that a child 
“shall have” a nationality of his or her mother if the jus soli principle is not adopted and the 
father of the child is stateless or the father’s nationality is not known.340 Belgium proposed 
to replace “shall have” with “shall be allowed to have” or “may have”.341 The purpose of 
this Belgian proposal was to allow children to have the option of possessing the nationality 
of his or her mother.342 However, this Belgian proposal was rejected.343 This indicates that 
states preferred the prevention of statelessness over acknowledging children’s right to 
choose their nationality. After that, this article was adopted.344 Japan voted in favour of this 
provision.345 
 
335 It stated that “In a State whose nationality is not conferred by the mere fact of birth in its territory, a 
child born in its territory of a mother possessing the nationality of that State and of a father without 
nationality or of unknown nationality shall have the nationality the said State”. Id, at 300. 
336 Id, at 300. 
337 Id, at 242. 
338 However, Nagaoka, a Japanese representative, did not comment on why he supported only Article 3. 
Id, at 242. 
339 Id, at 242. 
340 Id, at 248. 
341 Id, at 248. 
342 Id, at 248. This proposal is interesting because it allowed the child to choose either to possess his or 
her mother’s nationality or to be stateless, even though statelessness was regarded as an issue at the 
time. 
343 Id, at 249. 
344 This was adopted by 26 votes to two. Id, at 249. 
345 Id, at 249. 
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From the available sources, there was no communication between Tokyo and the 
Japanese delegation regarding the Protocol on Statelessness.346 Since this provision was in 
line with Article 3 of the 1899 Nationality Act,347 Japan seemed to support this provision. 
Japan signed the Protocol,348 but it did not become a contracting party to the Protocol.349 
With regard to the relationship between the 1899 Nationality Act and 1930 
Convention, Japan already complied with the norm of preventing statelessness in the 1930 
Convention, so the 1899 Nationality Act was not amended to comply with the 1930 
Convention.350 
 
2.6. Colonies of Japan 
2.6.1. Taiwan 
 The above-mentioned history covers mainland Japan. However, the story was 
different in the colonies that Japan possessed after 1895 because the legal status of the 
colonies was different from that of the mainland.351 The norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law did not seem to be considered in the colonies. This section concerns the 
prevention of statelessness in the colonies of Japan, such as Taiwan, Korea and the South 
Pacific Mandate.352 It begins with an analysis of Taiwan. Some indigenous people in Taiwan 
were not regarded as Japanese, and this resulted in their statelessness. 
 
346 See the following. MOFA, supra note 264, at 583-645. 
347 Article 3 of the 1899 Nationality Act proided for the adoption of jus sanguinis through the maternal 
line if the father was not known or if he did not have a nationality. 
348 EGAWA, YAMADA & HAYATA, supra note 331, at 43. 
349 Although the reason is not apparent, it could be similar to that for the lack of ratification of the 1930 
Convention. See note 332. 
350 Note that with regard to multiple nationalities, there was a need to amend the 1899 Nationality Act to 
make it compatible with the 1930 Convention. See note 332. 
351 Colonies were called gaichi (outland), and the mainland was called naichi (inland) during the 
colonial era. 
352 While the mandate was different from the colonies because the concept of sovereignty over the 
mandate was vague, this dissertation covers nationality in the South Pacific Mandate. There were 
several possible bearers of sovereignty over the South Pacific Mandate, such as the LN, the collective 
nations of the inhabitants, the five winners of WWI, the former coloniser (Germany) or the Mandatory. 
RYOICHI TAOKA, ININ TOUCHI NO HONSHITSU [A NATURE OF MANDATE] 119-256 (1941). However, the 
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 Taiwan was ceded by China in 1895, pursuant to Article 2(b) of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki. Regarding nationality, Article 5 of the treaty provided that:353 
 
The inhabitants of the territories ceded to Japan who wish to take up their residence 
outside the ceded districts shall be at liberty to sell their real property and retire. 
For this purpose, a period of two years from the date of the exchange of ratifications 
of the present Act shall be granted. At the expiration of that period, those of the 
inhabitants who shall not have left such territories shall, at the option of Japan, be 
deemed to be Japanese subjects. 
 
There were two interpretations of this article, and each of them made different arguments 
about when Taiwanese people lost their Chinese nationality and acquired Japanese 
nationality.354 However, neither of them concerned statelessness because they assumed that 
when Chinese nationality was lost, the Taiwanese people acquired Japanese nationality. 
 Taiwanese people had acquired Japanese nationality by 1897 at the latest. The 
“Procedure to Deal with the Status of Taiwanese Residents”, which was approved by the 
cabinet and promulgated by the Governor-General of Taiwan, regarded people who had an 
address in Taiwan or the Penghu Islands before 8 May 1895 to be residents of Taiwan, and 
 
South Pacific Islands had come under the administration of Japan since 1922, pursuant to the Treaty of 
Versailles, and there was no other possible state able to confer nationality. In other words, if Japanese 
nationality was not conferred, inhabitants in the South Pacific Mandate would be stateless. Thus, this 
issue of the South Pacific Mandate is within the scope of this dissertation. 
353 The English translation of the Treaty of Shimonoseki is available from the following. Taiwan 
Documents Project, Treaty of Shimonoseki, available at 
http://www.taiwanbasic.com/treaties/Shimonoseki.htm (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
354 On the one hand, there was the argument that the Japanese government assumed that Taiwanese 
people remained nationals of the Qing Dynasty of China until the Japanese government came to regard 
them as Japanese, after 1897, two years after the date of the exchange of ratifications of the Treaty. On 
the other hand, there was the view that Taiwanese people became Japanese in 1895, and people who left 
Taiwan recovered the nationality of the Qing Dynasty. EGAWA, YAMADA & HAYATA, supra note 331, 
at 194. 
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those who remained in Taiwan until 8 May 1897 were regarded as “subjects” of Japan.355 
When the 1899 Nationality Act was promulgated on 18 March 1899, it was not automatically 
effective in Taiwan because the legal system in the colonies was separate from that on the 
mainland.356 However, the 1899 Nationality Act was enforced in Taiwan on 20 June 1899, 
pursuant to an imperial ordinance.357 
 Since the 1899 Nationality Act was enforced in Taiwan too, in principle, 
statelessness was prevented in Taiwan as it was in mainland Japan. However, there were 
some unique reasons why statelessness could arise in Taiwan. First, there was the possibility 
that some residents of Taiwan were not regarded as Japanese nationals. Article 2 of the 
“Procedure to Deal with the Status of Taiwanese Residents” of 1897 stated that residents of 
Taiwan might not be regarded as Japanese nationals if the Governor-General of Taiwan 
rejected such consideration.358 This clause was introduced because the Japanese government 
was trying to avoid conferring Japanese nationality on people who would be “obviously 
harmful” for Japan.359 In other words, the Governor-General of Taiwan had the discretion to 
reject Japanese nationality for Taiwanese people in 1897. If some Taiwanese people were 
not regarded as Japanese nationals, and the Qing Dynasty did not regard them as its nationals, 
then those people could be stateless although no available sources indicate that there were 
such people, except indigenous people as explained below. 
 
355 Translated by the author. Articles 1 and 2 of the Procedure to Deal with the Status of Taiwanese 
Residents. MASATAKA ENDO, KINDAI NIHON NO SHOKUMINCHI TOUCHI NIOKERU KOKUSEKI TO KOSEKI: 
MANSHU, CHOSEN, TAIWAN [NATIONALITY AND KOSEKI IN THE COLONIAL GOVERNANCE IN MODERN 
JAPAN: MANCHURIA, KOREA AND TAIWAN] 76 (2010). For the conceptual relationship between 
“subjects” and “nationals”, see note 176. 
356 NAKAMURA, supra note 182, at 70. 
357 Masataka Endo, Taiwan Sekiminwo meguru Nihon Seifuno Kokuseki Seisakuno Shuttatsu: Nijuu 
Kokuseki Mondaito Sinkoku Kokusekihou heno Taiouwo Chuushinn toshite [Beginning of Nationality 
Policy of the Japanese Government on Taiwanese People: Dual Nationality Issues and Nationality Law 
of the Qing Dynasty], 376 THE WASEDA J. OF POLITICAL SCI. AND ECON. 51, 53 (2009). 
358 ENDO, supra note 355, at 76. 
359 Translated by the author. Id, at 76-77. 
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Second, the Japanese government interpreted the 1899 Nationality Act as not 
applying to some indigenous people in Taiwan because they were not included as 
“inhabitants” of Taiwan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki.360  The Qing Dynasty classified 
indigenous people into two categories. The first group of indigenous people were called 
“mature indigenous people”, and they were regarded as subjects of the Qing Dynasty.361 
Thus, “mature indigenous people” were regarded as “residents” of Taiwan under Article 5 
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and they were came to be considered nationals of Japan.362 
The second group of indigenous people were called “immature indigenous people”.363 
“Immature indigenous people” were regarded as “barbarous people” and abandoned by the 
Qing Dynasty.364 The Qing Dynasty regarded them as “beasts” since they were “in the habit 
of beheading”.365 As a result, “immature indigenous people” were not regarded as “residents” 
under Article 5 of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, and they did not acquire Japanese 
nationality.366 In other words, they seem to have been stateless.367 However, there was the 
possibility that “immature indigenous people” could become “mature indigenous people” if 
“they [were] civilised and obedient to laws”.368 It must be noted that “immature indigenous 
people” were regarded as beasts at the time, and their nationality does not seem to have been 
regarded as an issue.369 However, this case should be regarded as an issue of statelessness in 
 
360 Translated by the author. Id, at 79. 
361 Translated by the author. Katsuji Yasui, Seibanjin no Kokuhoujou no Chii nitsuite [The Legal Status 
of Indigenous People in Taiwan], 7(1) TAIWAN KANSHUU KIJI 1, 9 (1907). 
362 Translated by the author. Id, at 14. 
363 Translated by the author. Id, at 9. 
364 Translated by the author. Id, at 9. 
365 Translated by the author. Id, at 18. 
366 Id, at 16. 
367 There were some groups of indigenous people who were classified under this category, such as the 
Atayal, Tsou, Paiwan, Puyuma, and Amis. Id, at 4. 
368 Translated by the author. Id, at 16. This reminds the author that the importance of civility for Japan 
in being regarded as a member of international society. See 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International 
Society”. 
369 Since the 1899 Nationality Act had been enforced in Taiwan, the children of “immature indigenous 
people” who would have been stateless could have acquired Japanese nationality pursuant to Article 4 
of the 1899 Nationality Act in theory, but there are no reports of such cases. See 2.3., “The 1899 
Nationality Act”. The main reason seems to have been that “immature indigenous people” were not 
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today’s context. This is a case where the norm of preventing statelessness did not work in 
Taiwan. 
 
2.6.2. Korea 
 In Korea, children born there to unknown parents or stateless parents could be 
stateless. In 1910, Japan annexed Korea pursuant to the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty, and 
Korea became a colony of Japan. Article 6 of the treaty stated that “the Government of Japan 
[…] undertake[s] to afford full protection for the persons and property of Koreans obeying 
the laws there in force to promote the welfare of all such Koreans”, but the treaty did not 
discuss the general method of acquisition or loss of nationality. However, it was assumed 
that Korean residents acquired Japanese nationality automatically because Korea was 
annexed peacefully.370 
 Although the 1899 Nationality Act was not enforced in Korea, “a custom and nature” 
compatible with the 1899 Nationality Act were assumed to be applied in Korea,371 and in 
fact, the MOFA regarded Korean people as possessing Japanese nationality.372 It is said that 
the nationality act was not enforced in order to prevent Korean people’s naturalisation in 
other states that would have resulted in the loss of Japanese nationality pursuant to Article 
20 of the 1899 Nationality Act.373 The MOFA regarded this prevention of renunciation of 
 
regarded as human which the law is applied to since they were regarded as “beasts”. Note that when a 
child was born in Taiwan, the child was regarded as having been born in “Japan”. See also note 377. 
370 It was argued that in cases of peaceful annexation, the nationality of the annexing state was 
conferred on nationals of the annexed state. EGAWA, YAMADA & HAYATA, supra note 331, at 201. 
371 Translated by the author. TOSHIYOSHI MIYAZAWA, KEMPO RYAKUSETSU [SUMMARY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION] 46 (1942). 
372 MOFA, TREATIES BUREAU, LEGAL DIVISION, NIHON TOUCHI JIDAI NO CHOUSEN (“GAICHI HOUSEI 
SHI” DAI 4 BU NO 2) [KOREA UNDER THE JAPANESE RULE: “LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE OUTLAND” VOLUME 
IV-II] 145-146 (1971). 
373 Article 20 of the 1899 Nationality Act provided for the renunciation of Japanese nationality when 
Japanese nationals acquired another nationality. Thus, if the 1899 Nationality Act was enforced in 
Korea, Korean people could have renounced their Japanese nationality. The Japanese government 
wanted to prevent Koreans from renouncing their Japanese nationality for security reasons, regarding it 
as easier to control Korean people if renunciation was prevented. See the following. MOFA, Kokusai 
Houten Hensan Kaigi: Chouseijin no Kokuseki Sousitsu nitsuite [Codification Conference: Concerning 
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Koreans’ Japanese nationality as an issue from an international legal perspective. 374 
However, the MOFA’s concern was not strong enough for the government to enforce the 
1899 Nationality Act in Korea. Although prevention of renunciation of Japanese nationality 
was not a problem from the perspective of prevention of statelessness because enforcement 
of Japanese nationality resulted in the prevention of statelessness, it must be noted that the 
MOFA’s recognition of a problem of enforcement of nationality did not encourage the 
Japanese government to enforce the 1899 Nationality Act. This case indicates that there were 
obstacles for the Japanese government in following international laws and norms in a 
colonial setting.375 
 There were some possible issues of statelessness in Korea as well. In addition to the 
possibilities of statelessness on the mainland, it was possible that Japanese nationality might 
not be conferred on people who were born in Korea to unknown parents or stateless parents. 
There was a view that the “Japan” referred to in Article 4 of the 1899 Nationality Act (jus 
soli) meant the mainland, Taiwan and Sakhalin,376 so Korea was excluded.377 This view was 
justified by the fact that the nationality act was not enforced in Korea.378 On the basis of this 
understanding, a child born to unknown parents or parents without a nationality in Korea 
 
Koreans’ Loss of Nationality] in KOKUSAI RENMEI KANKEI KOKUSAI HOUTEN KAIGI IKKEN DAISAN (B) 
KAN [LEAGUE OF NATIONS CODIFICATION CONFERENCE VOL. 3(B)] (B-9-2-0-2_004) (Diplomatic 
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan). Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, 
National Archives of Japan. Ref. B04014072900 (1930). Id, at 145-146. Akiyama, supra note 35, at 86-
88. Endo, supra note 357, at 57. 
374 The MOFA stated that the 1899 Nationality Act should be enforced in Korea. MOFA, supra note 
373. 
375 See the following. Akiyama, supra note 35, at 89-90. 
376 MIYAZAWA, supra note 371, at 46. 
377 There is also the view that Korea was included in “Japan” when applying Article 4 of the 1899 
Nationality Act. This view claims that “Japan” referred to mainland, Korea, Taiwan, Sakhalin, the 
South Pacific Mandate, Japanese territorial waters, Japanese warships, and Japanese merchant ships on 
the High Seas. Masao Sanekata, Kokuseki Hou [Nationality Act], in KOKUSAI HOU III [INTERNATIONAL 
LAW III] 1, 13 (Izutaro Suehiro ed., 1938). This view is supported by the fact that Korean territory was 
a part of Japan. If the Japanese government followed this understanding, Japanese nationality would be 
conferred on children born in Korea to unknown parents and stateless parents. In contrast with Korea, 
both interpretations regarded Taiwan as part of Japan, so Article 4 could be applied to children born in 
Taiwan to prevent statelessness although there is no evidence of this occurring.  
378 Toshiyoshi Miyazawa, Kokuseki Hou Zatsudai [Miscellaneous Problems of the Nationality Act], 
57(5) J. OF THE JURISPRUDENCE ASS’N 847, 852 (1939). 
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could have been stateless. Although the practice at the time is not known,379 it is fair to say 
that there was a risk that children born in Korea to unknown parents or stateless parents 
could become stateless. 
 
2.6.3. South Pacific Mandate 
 The status of inhabitants of the South Pacific Mandate was unstable, and they were 
not regarded as Japanese nationals, though the Japanese government exercised its diplomatic 
protection. In 1914, Japan occupied the South Pacific Islands, a colony of Germany at the 
time, and ruled the South Pacific Islands.380 After WWI, the Pacific Islands came under the 
administration of Japan and became “integral parts” of Japan.381 The South Pacific Islands 
became a C mandate of the LN, which was “close […] to colonial rule” by Japan.382  
Inhabitants in the South Pacific Mandate were not Japanese nationals but the 
Japanese government could exercise diplomatic protection over the people in the South 
Pacific Mandate. Neither the 1889 Constitution nor the 1899 Nationality Act was effective 
in the South Pacific Mandate. As in the case of other colonies, the laws on the mainland 
became effective in the South Pacific Mandate when a special law was enacted,383 but there 
was no such legislation to make the 1889 Constitution and 1899 Nationality Act effective in 
the South Pacific Mandate.384 In an annual report on the mandate that was submitted to the 
 
379 Miyazawa, a constitutional scholar, believes that in practice, Korea appears to have been excluded 
from “Japan”. Id, at 861. 
380 HARUO TOMATSU, NIPPON TEIKOKU TO ININ TOUCHI: NANYOU GUNTOU WO MEGURU KOKUSAI SEIJI 
1914-1947 [THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AND MANDATE: INTERNATIONAL POLITICS CONCERNING SOUTH 
PACIFIC ISLANDS FROM 1914 TO 1947] 54 (2011). 
381 Nele Matz, Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of 
Trusteeship, 9 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS L. 47, 73 (2005). 
382 The South Pacific Islands were regarded as being “remote […] from the centres of civilization”, so 
they were classified as a C mandate. Id, at 73. For details of the Mandate system, see the following. Id, 
at 72-73. 
383 MOFA (ed.), GAICHI HOUSEI SHI DAI 10 KAN: ININ TOUCHIRYOU NANYOU GUNTOU ZENPEN [LAWS OF 
THE OUTLAND VOL. X: SOUTH PACIFIC MANDATE I] 58 (1990). 
384 It was also assumed that the order issued by the government was regarded as the law in the South 
Pacific Mandate. Id, at 58-59. 
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Council of the LN in 1933, the Japanese government stated that the people in the South 
Pacific Mandate were considered “[i]nhabitants of the islands”, and as different from  
“Japanese subjects”.385 As a result, they could not be Japanese subjects or nationals unless 
they were naturalised as Japanese or acquired Japanese nationality by marriage.386 This 
indicates that people in the South Pacific Mandate did not possess Japanese nationality. 
However, in the scholarly literature, Miyazawa, a well-known constitutional scholar, stated 
that people in the South Pacific Mandate were not necessarily stateless from an international 
point of view, and that they had a status equivalent to Japanese nationals.387 
This vague status of the people of the South Pacific Mandate seems to have been 
justified by the principle developed by the LN at the time. A resolution of the Council of the 
LN in 1923 stated that indigenous people in the C mandate could be naturalised by the 
Mandatory,388 but they did not automatically acquire the nationality of the Mandatory. 389 
However, pursuant to Article 127 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Mandatory had a right to 
diplomatic protection over the people of the mandate.390 Therefore, Japan had the right of 
diplomatic protection over the people in the South Pacific Mandate, but they were not 
regarded as Japanese nationals, unlike those in Taiwan and Korea. Thus, it is difficult to 
judge whether or not the people in the South Pacific Mandate were stateless. However, it 
must be noted that the Japanese stance on the people of the South Pacific Mandate was in 
line with the principle developed by the LN at the time. 
 
 
385 Id, at 59. 
386 In fact, it was reported that three inhabitants of the islands acquired Japanese nationality as a result 
of marriage with Japanese men. Id, at 59. 
387 MIYAZAWA, supra note 371, at 47. 
388 The Mandatory of the South Pacific Mandate was Japan. 
389 MOFA (ed.), supra note 383, at 59.  
390 Id, at 59. 
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2.7. Conclusion on the Prevention of Statelessness under the 1889 Constitution 
 This chapter examined the prevention of statelessness in Japanese laws from 1889 to 
1945, and it indicated that Japan was committed to the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law. There are two notable findings. First, Japan referred to a resolution of the 
IDI, which Japan regarded as a ‘highly influential’ document in international law,391 around 
the time of the enactment of the 1899 Nationality Act. This implies that Japan believed that 
states needed to follow “international law” even though the resolution of the IDI was not a 
legally binding document. Second, Japan was passionate about promoting the principle of 
prevention of conflict of nationality, including statelessness, at the Codification Conference. 
 In addition, there is one interesting observation concerning the colonies. The 
prevention of statelessness was considered when the 1899 Nationality Act, which was 
effective on the mainland, was discussed, but it was not discussed in relation to the colonies. 
There are two factors for this. The first factor is that the Japanese government did not allow 
the norm of preventing statelessness in international law to intervene in the governance of 
its colonies even though the principle was recognised on the mainland. For instance, the 
nationality policy of Korea was regarded as an issue referring to international law, but it did 
not change because security issues were also considered.392 The second factor is that the 
international principle acknowledged the different treatment of mainland and colony, as can 
be seen in the case of the South Pacific Mandate in particular. A combination of these 
elements seems to have assisted the limited commitment to the prevention of statelessness 
in the colonies.  
 
391 Translated by the author. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 207, at 19. 
392 See 2.6.2., “Korea”. 
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
PREVENTION OF STATELESSNESS IN JAPAN UNDER 
THE 1946 CONSTITUTION 
3.1. Summary of the Chapter 
The norm of preventing statelessness in international law played a role in the 
interpretation of the freedom to renounce one’s nationality under the 1946 Constitution. 
Japanese government officials argued that the constitution did not allow Japanese nationals 
to renounce their nationality if this resulted in statelessness, referring to the preamble of the 
1930 Convention. However, the norm of preventing statelessness in other treaties had no 
influence on Japanese nationality law. For instance, Japan participated in the UN Conference 
on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, which adopted the 1961 Convention, 
but this did not trigger an amendment to Japanese nationality law. Furthermore, the 
provisions on children’s right to acquire a nationality in the ICCPR and CRC did not trigger 
the argument within government that Japan needed to prevent statelessness by conferring 
Japanese nationality on children because these articles were not interpreted as placing an 
obligation on Japan to do so. While the 1984 Nationality Act had the effect of preventing 
statelessness among the children of Japanese women because it adopted jus sanguinis 
through both paternal and maternal lines, the norm of preventing statelessness in the 
CEDAW had no influence on the 1984 Nationality Act. 
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3.2. The 1946 Constitution 
3.2.1. Article 10: General Provision of Nationality 
3.2.1.1. The Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee’s Draft: Persistent Clause on 
Nationality based on the 1889 Constitution 
In 1946, a new constitution was promulgated, coming into effect in 1947. Article 10 
of the 1946 Constitution stated that “The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national 
shall be determined by law”, and Article 22(2) stated that individuals’ “[f]reedom […] to 
renounce their nationality shall be inviolate”.393 Neither international law nor the norm of 
preventing statelessness was recognised as having a role to play when Article 10 was 
included in the 1946 Constitution. However, with regard to Article 22(2), the Japanese 
government recognised the role of international law in renunciation of nationality. The norm 
of preventing statelessness in the 1930 Convention influenced the interpretation of Article 
22(2) after the 1946 Constitution was enacted. This section begins with an analysis of Article 
10. It separates the drafting process of Article 10 into three parts: a draft prepared by the 
Japanese government, a draft prepared by the GHQ, and the Japanese reaction to the draft 
prepared by the GHQ. 
The first draft of the 1946 Constitution was drafted by the Constitutional Problems 
Investigation Committee of the Japanese government, and there is no evidence of the 
influence of international law in it. After Japan lost WWII in 1945,394 there was a need to 
legislate for a new Japanese constitution. In October 1945, Douglas MacArthur, the SCAP, 
informed Prime Minister Shidehara of Japan that a new constitution needed to include liberal 
 
393 Although the Japanese Law Translation Database uses the word “divest” instead of “renounce”, this 
dissertation uses “renounce” because it seems to be a better term for the original Japanese term, ridatsu. 
394 The Potsdam Declaration, which Japan accepted on 14 August, stated that the Japanese territory 
would be occupied by the Allied Powers until militarism in Japan was destroyed. The text of the 
Potsdam Declaration is available from the following. NDL, Potsdam Declaration, available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). Japanese nationals were 
informed of Japan’s acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on 15 August. On 2 September, Japan 
signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, and Japan legally accepted the Potsdam Declaration. 
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ideas, in contrast to the 1889 Constitution which determined that the Emperor was 
sovereign.395 In response, the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee, chaired by 
Joji Matsumoto, the minister dealing with legislation of a new constitution, was established 
to prepare a draft amendment to the 1889 Constitution.396 
The draft prepared by the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee included 
a clause on nationality. In the first investigation meeting, on 30 October 1945, the committee 
discussed which provisions in the 1889 Constitution needed to be amended. With regard to 
Article 18 of the 1889 Constitution, which covered nationality, the committee decided that 
it was necessary to “study legislative examples [on nationality] very well”.397 From the 
available documents, it is not clear what the outcome of the study of legislative examples 
was,398 but it was decided in the ninth investigation committee, on 5 January 1946, that 
Article 18 should remain in the draft of the constitution.399  The draft prepared by the 
investigation committee amended parts of the 1889 Constitution, but it did not find it 
necessary to amend Article 18.400 Since the available documents do not show any further 
discussion about the clause on nationality, it is not clear whether international law and the 
prevention of statelessness were discussed during the drafting process of the investigation 
committee’s draft. 
 
395 NOBUYOSHI ASHIBE (supplemented by Kazuyuki Takahashi), KEMPOU [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 23 
(6th ed., 2015). 
396 Id, at 24. 
397 Translated by the author. NDL, Kempou Mondai Chousa Iinkai Gijiroku [Minutes of the 
Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee], Miyazawa Collection, Rikkyo University (1945--
1946), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/02/002_24a/002_24atx.html. 
398 However, it is possible that legislative examples from other states were not researched well because 
Matsumoto, the chair of the committee, stated in the Privy Council, an advisory council to the Emperor, 
on 8 May 1946 that he did not know about other states’ legislation. NDL, Suumitsuin Iinkai Kiroku 
[Record of the Privy Council Committee], Toshio Irie Document, No. 31 (1946), available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/04/111_1/111_1tx.html. For the role of the Privy Council, see 
note 413. 
399 NDL, supra note 397. 
400 See the following. NDL, Kempou Kaisei Youkou [Summary of the Amendment of the Constitution], 
Tatsuo Sato Document, No. 18 (1946), Kempou Mondai Chousa Iinkai Kou An Otsu An [Drafts of the 
Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee], available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/02/067a/067atx.html. 
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3.2.1.2. The GHQ Draft and 2 March Draft: The Disappeared Clause on Nationality 
The clause on nationality disappeared after the GHQ Draft was introduced, and when 
the Japanese government considered the GHQ Draft, it justified the omission of the clause 
from the draft by referring to the impact of international law on nationality matters. However, 
since this governmental position was not raised when the clause on nationality was 
reintroduced at a later stage by the Imperial Diet, the role of international law in nationality 
matters seems to have been mentioned merely to defend the GHQ Draft.401 
The draft prepared by the investigation committee was criticised by the GHQ, which 
found the draft to be “extremely conservative”,402 so the GHQ decided to prepare a draft of 
the constitution of its own on 4 February 1946.403 The Government Section of the GHQ, 
which was in charge of matters related to the constitution, established many thematic 
committees, and each committee was mandated to draft a chapter of the constitution. The 
Civil Rights Committee could have covered nationality matters, but it did not include them 
in its draft.404 It prepared its draft of the constitution by referring to the constitutions of other 
states. An interview conducted by Ross Driver, an assistant of Dale M. Hellegers, a scholar 
on the history of the Japanese constitution, indicates that members of the Civil Rights 
 
401 Note that there is no available source showing directly that defense of the GHQ Draft was the reason 
why international law was mentioned. However, it should also be noted that the Japanese government 
decided that the GHQ Draft should be the basis for the new constitution. NDL, 3-15 GHQ Souan 1946 
Nen 2 Gatsu 13 Nichi [3-15 GHQ Draft, 13 February 1946], at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/076shoshi.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
402 The draft was not officially shared with the GHQ, but was leaked by a newspaper, Mainichi 
Shimbun. Although it is not clear why the GHQ found the draft to be “extremely conservative”, the 
GHQ noted that the Emperor remained sovereign in the draft, and this may be one reason. 2 February 
1946 – Memorandum for the Supreme Commander from Gen. Courtney Whitney, Chief, Government 
Section. Rowell Papers. in DALE M. HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 7 (1946). Holding of the Harry S. Truman 
Presidential Library. 
403 Summary Report on Meeting of the Government Section, 4 February 1946. in DALE M. HELLEGERS 
PAPERS BOX 7 (1946). Holding of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
404 NDL, Constitution of Japan, Alfred Hussey Papers; Constitution File No. 1, Doc. No. 12, available 
at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/076a_e/076a_etx.html. 
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Committee had not read the draft prepared by the Japanese investigation committee.405 Thus, 
members of the Civil Rights Committee were not aware of a clause on nationality based on 
Article 18 of the 1889 Constitution, which the investigation committee developed in the 
investigation committee’s draft. Since the constitutions of other states did not encourage the 
members of the Civil Rights Committee to include a nationality clause, such a clause was 
not included in the GHQ Draft. In addition, none of the available sources indicate that the 
committee referred to international law. Thus, there is no evidence that international law 
played a role in the omission of the nationality clause. 
The Japanese government received the GHQ Draft on 13 February 1946, and it 
prepared the “2 March Draft” on the basis of the GHQ Draft, with some modifications.406 A 
clause on nationality was reintroduced by the Japanese government at this stage. The earlier 
drafts of the 2 March Draft, prepared on 28 February and 1 March, included a text similar to 
that of Article 18 of the 1889 Constitution.407 However, this article is nowhere to be seen in 
the 2 March Draft, which was submitted to the GHQ on 4 March,408 or in later drafts, such 
as the “5 March Draft” or the “Draft Amendment of the Constitution”.409 While it is not clear 
 
405 Harry Emerson Wildes 23 April 1972. in DALE M. HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 7 (1972) 16. Holding of 
the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
406 NDL, Part 3 Formulation of the GHQ Draft and Response of the Japanese Government, available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/outline/03outline.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
407 For the first and second drafts of the 2 March Draft, see the following. NDL, Shokou [The First 
Draft], Holding of the National Archives of Japan, 5 (Feb. 28, 1946), available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/086/086_001l.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). NDL, Dai Ni 
Kou [The Second Draft], Holding of the National Archives of Japan, 5 (March 1, 1946), available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/087/087_001r.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). For the 
background to the 2 March Draft, see the following. NDL, 3-20 Drafting the Constitution of Japan 
(March 2 Draft) and Its Submission to GHQ, available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/03/086shoshi.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). “The conditions 
necessary for being a Japanese subject” in the 1889 Constitution was changed to “The conditions 
necessary for being a national (Japanese national)” in the first draft, and “The conditions necessary for 
being a Japanese national” in the second draft. Translated by the author. 
408 For the 2 March Draft, see the following. NDL, Nihon Koku Kempou [Constitution of Japan], 
Toshio Irie Document, No. 15, Sangatsu Muika Happyou Kempou Kaisei Souan Youkou [Outline of the 
Draft Amendment of the Constitution Announced in 6 March], available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/088/088tx.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
409 The Japanese government and GHQ negotiated the 2 March Draft, the 5 March Draft and Draft 
Amendment of the Constitution. For the “5 March Draft”, see the following link. NDL, Nihon Koku 
Kempou [Constitution of Japan], Tatsuo Sato Document, No. 41 (March 5, 1946), available at 
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why the article was not included in the 2 March Draft, the second draft of the 2 March Draft 
crossed out Article 10 on nationality, and the word “unnecessary” is written in pencil just 
above the article.410 
After the Draft Amendment of the Constitution was finalised on 17 April 1947, the 
draft was discussed in the Privy Council and Imperial Diet.411 In the deliberation, it became 
clear on many occasions that the Japanese government believed that a new constitution did 
not need to include nationality matters since both municipal law and unwritten principles 
and treaties already defined who were regarded as nationals. The first source for this is the 
deliberation in the Privy Council in April and May 1946. Raizaburo Hayashi, a member of 
the council, stated that the determination of Japanese nationality clarified the holders of 
rights and duties under the Japanese constitution, and since this was a legal matter, 
nationality should be covered by the constitution. 412  In response, the government 
representatives stated that Japanese nationality was not solely determined by the nationality 
act. 413  They explained, for instance, that since the original Japanese were considered 
automatically as Japanese nationals,414 the criteria for their inclusion could not be written 
into the constitution.415 They added that naturalisation was covered by treaties, and that the 
“general principle” was applied in the case of the annexation of Korea.416 This indicates that 
 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/091/091tx.html. For the Draft Amendment of the 
Constitution, see the following link. NDL, Nihon Koku Kempou [Constitution of Japan], Tatsuo Sato 
Document, No. 74 (Apr. 17, 1946), available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/03/109/109tx.html. 
410 Translated by the author. NDL, supra note 408. 
411 The Privy Council “deliberate[d] upon important matters of State when they have been consulted by 
the Emperor” (Article 56 of the 1889 Constitution). This translation derives from the following. ITO, 
supra note 175, at 97. 
412 NDL, supra note 398. 
413 Id. 
414 Statement of Tatsuo Sato, the Deputy Director-General of the Legislation Bureau at the time. Id.  
415 Id. 
416 Id. The meaning of “general principle” is not clear, but this seems to mean an unwritten principle in 
nationality matters. Note that the nationality matters of Koreans were not determined by either 
municipal or international law, but by customs. See 2.6.2., “Korea”. 
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municipal law was not regarded as the sole source for determining the scope of nationality; 
customs, treaties and general principles of law were also regarded as sources.417 
Second, the Enlarged Version of the Anticipated Questions and Answers for the 
Imperial Diet, prepared by the Legislative Bureau in June 1946, stated that the determination 
of nationality was not determined by law, but by customs and treaties, and the nationality 
act under the 1889 Constitution did not cover all matters related to nationality.418 It added 
that it was also possible that treaties determined who nationals were.419 Since a municipal 
law did not monopolise determination of nationals, it was “impossible and inappropriate” to 
cover nationality in the constitution.420 
Third, during the discussion of the draft of the constitution in the Imperial Diet in 
June and July 1946, Tokujiro Kanamori, the minister in charge of the constitution and the 
successor to Matsumoto, argued that nationality was determined not only by law, but also 
 
417 A similar explanation is observable in the following. TATSUO SATO (supplemented by Isao Sato), 
NIHON KOKU KEMPOU SEIRITSU SHI [THE HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTION] VOL. III 396 
(1994). Id. Since “unnecessary” was written in the 2 March Draft, it is fair to conclude that nationality 
was not included in the Draft Amendment of the Constitution because a clause on nationality was not 
regarded as necessary. However, it must be noted that there was another explanation for the exclusion 
of nationality matters. Minister Joji Matsumoto, the former chair of the Constitutional Problems 
Investigation Committee, stated that the clause on nationality was excluded because the earlier drafts 
with a clause on nationality prepared by the Japanese government were rejected by the GHQ on 8 May 
1946. He claimed that it was difficult for him to negotiate on the inclusion of nationality matters with 
the GHQ. Id. This explanation reminds the author that the GHQ played a dominant role in the drafting 
process of the new constitution.  
418 SATO, supra note 417, at 470. NDL, Kempou Kaisei Souan ni kansuru Soutei Mondou (Dai 1 Shuu – 
Dai 7 Shuu, Zouho Dai 1 Shuu – Dai 5 Shuu) [Expected Questions and Answers on the Draft 
Amendment of the Constitution (The First to Seventh Collection and Added First to Fifth Collection)], 
Tastuo Sato Document, No. 77-79 (1946), available at 
http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/04/118/118_001l.html. 
419 SATO, supra note 417, at 470. 
420 Translated by the author. Id, at 470. 
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by customs, treaties and principles in international law.421 Thus, he noted, the constitution 
did not have to cover nationality matters.422 
The absence of a clause on nationality in the Draft Amendment of the Constitution 
was justified by the role of sources other than municipal law, such as customs and 
international law, in many occasions. However, interestingly, this argument to justify the 
absence of a clause on nationality is not in evidence at the later stage, after a clause on 
nationality had been inserted by the Imperial Diet. 423  This implies the possibility that 
international law was mentioned to defend the GHQ Draft, but the role of international law 
in nationality matters was not necessarily regarded as a significant one. Note that the 
 
421 DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH 
SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 3, Committee on Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, the 
House of Peers, 2 July 1946) p. 29. On another occasion, Kanamori said the treaties and international 
law determined the scope of Japanese nationality. DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU 
[MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 8, Committee on 
Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, the House of Peers, 8 July 1946) p. 128. 
422 DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH 
SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 3, Committee on Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, the 
House of Peers, 2 July 1946) p. 29. There were other explanations in the Imperial Diet as well. One 
explanation was that the nationality act, not the constitution, determined who nationals were. Kanamori 
said that although determining the conditions for being Japanese was a significant matter, nationality 
matters could not be fully covered by the constitution, and needed to be covered by a specific law, not 
by a constitution. DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF 
PEERS, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 5, Plenary Session, the House of Peers, 25 June 
1946) p. 76. Another explanation is that it was obvious that nationality was determined by laws. 
Kanamori expressed his view that the 1889 Constitution covered nationality in order to clarify that 
nationality should be determined by laws, not by orders. He believed that if there was no article similar 
to Article 18 of the 1889 Constitution (“The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be 
determined by law”), it could be taken to mean that orders, which are issued by administrative organs, 
determined who Japanese nationals were. However, determination of Japanese nationals was a 
significant matter, so Kanamori assumed that it should be the law, not orders, that determined who 
Japanese nationals were. For him, Article 18 of the 1889 Constitution played a role in clarifying that the 
scope of Japanese nationality should be determined by law. By contrast, he argued that matters related 
to individuals needed to be determined by law, as can be observed by the framework of the new 
constitution. He added that since it was clear that the conditions for being Japanese had to be 
determined by law, it was not necessary to include a provision on nationality in the constitution. DAI 90 
KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI SHUUGIIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 
90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 3, Committee on Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, 
the House of Representatives, 2 July 1946) p. 29. DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI SHUUGIINN GIJI 
SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] 
(No. 8, Committee on Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, the House of Representatives, 8 July 
1946) p. 128. 
423 See 3.2.1.3., “Drafting Process in the Imperial Diet: Reintroduced Clause on Nationality”. 
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prevention of statelessness was not discussed in this phase of the drafting process of the 
constitution. 
 
3.2.1.3. Drafting Process in the Imperial Diet: Reintroduced Clause on Nationality 
At the final stage of the drafting process in the Imperial Diet, a clause on nationality 
was inserted into the draft of the constitution, even though neither international law nor 
prevention of statelessness was discussed. Political parties in the Imperial Diet made 
comments on the draft proposed by the government at the Sub-Committee on Amendment 
of the Imperial Constitution, and some parties proposed the inclusion of a clause on 
nationality at the beginning of the chapter on the rights and duties of nationals. 424  A 
provision on nationality was inserted into the draft in the House of Representatives.425 When 
the draft was discussed in the House of Peers later, a member of the House of Peers asked 
why a nationality clause was included in the draft while it had not been included in the first 
drafts.426 Minister Kanamori replied that although the Japanese government did not think 
this clause was necessary, members of the House of Representatives requested its 
inclusion.427 He continued that since the constitution should be drafted by the “will of the 
people” and the government had no objection to including it, the clause on nationality was 
 
424 Although the Japanese Law Translation Database uses “Rights and Duties of the People”, the 
Japanese draft uses the word “national”. Thus, this dissertation uses “national (kokumin)”. For instance, 
the Liberal Party, Jiyu To, proposed the inclusion of a provision that “The conditions necessary for 
being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.” The Cooperative Democratic Party, Kyodo 
Minshu To, made the same proposal. The Japan Progress Party, Nihon Shimpo To, proposed the 
inclusion of the phrase “The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national needs to be determined 
by law.” All proposals from parties were translated by the author. House of Representatives, DAI 90 KAI 
TEIKOKU GIKAI SHUUGIIN TEIKOKU KEMPOU KAISEIAN IIN SHOU IINKAI SOKKIROKU “FUROKU” 
[APPENDIX, RECORD OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENT OF THE IMPERIAL CONSTITUTION, THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (1995) 9, 11, 21. 
425 Id. 
426 DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH 
SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 13, Special Committee on Amendment of the Imperial 
Constitution, the House of Peers, 14 September 1946) p. 11. 
427 DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH 
SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 13, Special Committee on Amendment of the Imperial 
Constitution, the House of Peers, 14 September 1946) p. 12. 
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included.428 After that, Article 10 of the 1946 Constitution was finalised.429 After a clause 
on nationality was included, the role of international law was not discussed, whereas it was 
mentioned when the GHQ Draft was discussed.430 Since the Japanese government did not 
oppose the inclusion of a clause on nationality referring to international law, it seems to have 
referred to international law in order to defend the GHQ Draft, which did not possess a clause 
on nationality at the earlier stage. Based on the foregoing, the clause on nationality was 
included in the 1946 Constitution. During the discussion in the Imperial Diet, the prevention 
of statelessness was not mentioned. 
 
3.2.2. Article 22(2): Freedom to Renounce a Nationality 
One significant difference between the 1889 and 1946 Constitutions relevant to 
nationality is an article on the freedom to renounce one’s nationality. Article 22(2) of the 
1946 Constitution provides that people’s “[f]reedom […] to renounce their nationality shall 
be inviolate”.431 Since renunciation of nationality can result in statelessness, this article can 
produce statelessness. Although available sources do not indicate that international law was 
referred to when this article was drafted, the norm of preventing statelessness influenced the 
interpretation of this article by the Japanese government. 
The basis of the article on the freedom to renounce one’s nationality is found in the 
drafts that were prepared by the GHQ, but there is no evidence to indicate the influence of 
international law. The freedom to renounce one’s nationality was introduced in the context 
of freedom to emigrate. In the first stage, the Civil Rights Committee of the Government 
 
428 Translated by the author. DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE 
HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 13, Special Committee on 
Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, the House of Peers, 14 September 1946) p. 12. For details of 
the drafting process of the clause on nationality in the 1946 Constitution, see the following. 
NAKAMURA, supra note 182, at 95-102. 
429 NAKAMURA, supra note 182, at 102. 
430 See 3.2.1.2., “The GHQ Draft and 2 March Draft: The Disappeared Clause on Nationality”. 
431 For this translation, see note 393. 
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Section of the GHQ introduced the basis of Article 22(2) as follows: “All persons shall be 
free to emigrate if they so desire and if the laws of the country of their choice permit their 
entrance and residence; but no Japanese citizen can be banished from Japanese territory.”432 
It must be noted that nationality was not mentioned at the time. The draft with this provision 
was discussed with the Steering Committee of the GHQ, and the committee added 
“Emigrants shall be permitted to change their nationality.”433  At this stage, freedom to 
emigrate was translated into the freedom to change one’s nationality, and the freedom to 
change one’s nationality was expected to secure freedom of movement.434 However, from 
the available documents, the reason why nationality was mentioned to secure freedom of 
movement is not clear.435 Paragraph 2 of Article XXI of the GHQ Draft stated that “All 
persons shall be free to emigrate and to change their nationality.”436 After that, the Japanese 
government considered the GHQ Draft, and “freedom to change nationality” was changed 
to “freedom to renounce nationality” although the reason why this was changed is not 
clear.437 
Before the enactment of the 1946 Constitution, the norm of preventing statelessness 
was not explicitly considered in relation to the freedom to renounce nationality. In the Privy 
 
432 First Draft of the Committee on Civil Rights. Hussey Papers, 24-G. in DALE M. HELLEGERS PAPERS 
BOX 8. Holding of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
433 First Draft of the Committee on Civil Rights, as amended by the Steering Committee on 8 February 
1946 in DALE M. HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 8. Holding of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
434 The preceding paragraph to that on the right to change one’s nationality provided that “Freedom of 
movement and choice of domicile are guaranteed to every person […]” (Emphasis added). First Draft of 
the Committee on Civil Rights, as amended by the Steering Committee on 8 February 1946 in DALE M. 
HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 8. Holding of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
435 Charles L. Kades, Milo E. Rowell and Ruth Ellerman, members of the Steering Committee, did not 
talk about nationality in an interview that Dale Hellegers conducted. Charles L. Kades in DALE M. 
HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 3. Holding of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. Milo E. Rowell 
Interview 5/4/72 & 5/5/72 in DALE M. HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 5. Holding of the Harry S. Truman 
Presidential Library. Ruth Ellerman Hussey 3-29-72 in DALE M. HELLEGERS PAPERS BOX 2. Holding of 
the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. 
436 NDL, supra note 404. 
437 Freedom to renounce nationality had been included since the first draft prepared by the Japanese 
government in response to the GHQ Draft. NDL, supra note 409 (Shokou), 10. NDL, supra note 409 
(Dai Ni Kou), 16. NDL, supra note 408. 
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Council, which was convened after the announcement of the Draft Amendment of the 
Constitution, Toshio Irie, the Director-General of the Legislation Bureau at the time, stated 
that an article on freedom to renounce nationality could allow renunciation of Japanese 
nationality by Japanese living in Japan. 438  Irie’s statement indicates that the Japanese 
government had not considered the prevention of statelessness because statelessness could 
occur when Japanese people living in Japan renounced their nationality. 439  After the 
discussion in the Privy Council, the Legislative Bureau, administered by the Prime Minister, 
prepared a commentary on the Draft Amendment of the Constitution before the draft was 
submitted to the Imperial Diet. The commentary did not mention the prevention of 
statelessness.440 There was no debate on the relationship between an article on renunciation 
of nationality and the norm of preventing statelessness in the Imperial Diet.441 This indicates 
that the article was not particularly intended as a measure to prevent statelessness when it 
 
438 This communication took place on 6 May 1946. NDL, supra note 398. 
439 Irie’s statement is in response to a question from a committee member of the Privy Council. The 
committee member asked whether Article 20 of the Draft Amendment of the Constitution on the 
freedom to renounce nationality allowed the renunciation of Japanese nationality by Japanese people 
living in Japan. The intention of the question was not all that clear, but since he was asking about 
Japanese people living in Japan, he seems to have been asking whether Japanese people without any 
other nationality could renounce their Japanese nationality. 
440 NDL, 4-4. “Kempou Kaisei Souan ni kansuru Soutei Mondou, Dou Chikujou Setsumei” 1946 Nen 4 
Gatsu – 6 Gatsu [4-4. “Expected Questions and Answers and Commentary on the Draft Amendment of 
the Constitution” April-June 1946], at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/shiryo/04/118shoshi.html 
(viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
441 However, it must be noted that public welfare was regarded as a matter that could limit the freedom 
to renounce one’s nationality. Minister Tokujiro Kanamori stated that the constitution would ensure that 
the freedom to renounce one’s nationality was inviolate, but if public welfare required it, such a 
freedom would be limited. DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE 
HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 26, Plenary Session, the House of 
Peers, 30 August 1946) p. 315. DAI 90 KAI TEIKOKU GIKAI KIZOKUIN GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE 
HOUSE OF PEERS, THE 90TH SESSION OF THE IMPERIAL DIET] (No. 15, Special Committee on 
Amendment of the Imperial Constitution, the House of Peers, 17 September 1946) p. 28. If statelessness 
was regarded as an issue in light of public welfare, the article could be interpreted as prohibiting the 
renunciation of nationality in cases where such a renunciation caused statelessness. However, there is 
no source indicating that statelessness was regarded as an issue from the perspective of public welfare. 
Note that in the current context, Yasuhiro Okudaira, a constitutional scholar, states that “allowing 
[statelessness] […] costs much, and it causes trouble for the whole society” (translated by the author). 
YASUHIRO OKUDAIRA, KEMPOU III: KEMPOUGA HOSHOUSURU KENRI [CONSTITUTION III: THE RIGHTS 
GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION] 219 (1993). 
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was drafted. If Japanese people without any other nationality could renounce their 
nationality, they could become stateless. 
It must be noted that the role of international law was mentioned in the context of 
the freedom to renounce one’s nationality. A commentary prepared by the Legislation 
Bureau stated that the relationship between immigration/migration and the 
renunciation/acquisition of nationality was determined by “common international treaties” 
and nationality acts, and an article on the freedom to emigrate and renounce one’s nationality 
in the constitution provided the fundamental principles on this matter.442  It added that 
detailed rules on this matter would be determined by international treaties and a nationality 
act.443 However, the norm of preventing statelessness was not mentioned in this context. 
Thus, when the 1946 Constitution was enacted, the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law did not affect the freedom to renounce a nationality in the constitution. 
However, the norm of preventing statelessness did affect the interpretation of Article 
22(2) of the 1946 Constitution with regard to the freedom to renounce one’s nationality in 
1950. When a draft of the 1950 Nationality Act was discussed in the Diet, the relationship 
between the freedom to renounce nationality and the possibility of statelessness was 
discussed. Tomokazu Murakami, a government representative, stated that Article 22(2) 
covered the principle of non-enforcement of nationality, and this principle was applied to 
those who had another nationality. 444  Japanese nationals who did not have any other 
nationality could not renounce their Japanese nationality because they would become 
 
442 Translated by the author. The original Japanese of “common international treaties” is kokusai 
jouyaku kyoutsu ho. NDL, supra note 418. 
443 Id. Note that the international law’s role in nationality matters in general was mentioned during the 
drafting process of the 1946 Constitution by the Japanese government. See 3.2.1.2., “The GHQ Draft 
and 2 March Draft: The Disappeared Clause on Nationality”. 
444 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 8. 
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stateless persons.445 He added that the prevention of statelessness was “a common ideal of 
nationality legislation for each state”, as can be seen in the preamble of the 1930 
Convention.446 Thus, although the freedom to renounce one’s nationality was enshrined in 
the 1946 Constitution, the government’s interpretation prevented statelessness after 1950 
because the prevention of statelessness was regarded as a principle in the nationality 
legislation. 447  In other words, while Japan was not a contracting party to the 1930 
Convention, and the convention did not legally bind Japan, Murakami referred to the 
preamble of the 1930 Convention, which stated that the prevention of statelessness was an 
ideal for international society.448 This indicates that the principles in the 1930 Convention, 
including that of prevention of statelessness, were considered when interpreting the 1946 
Constitution.449 In this context, Murakami stated that it was possible for Japan to be a 
contracting party to the 1930 Convention.450 
It must be noted that academics also argued that statelessness should be prevented. 
Kenta Hiraga, a government official of the Legal Office,451 argued that a provision on the 
freedom to renounce nationality in the 1946 Constitution implied in principle the freedom 
to change nationality.452 Thus, the freedom to renounce nationality historically meant that 
individuals could renounce their nationality in order to acquire another nationality.453 Hiraga 
 
445 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 8. 
446 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 20, 5 April 1950) p. 3. 
447 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 8. 
448 He stated that the prevention of multiple nationalities was also provided for in the 1930 Convention. 
DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 8. 
449 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 30, 24 April 1950) p. 1. 
450 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 30, 24 April 1950) p. 1. 
451 The Legal Office was a predecessor of the MOJ, in existence from 1949 to 1952. 
452 KENTA HIRAGA, KOKUSEKI HOU GE [NATIONALITY ACT II] 409-410 (1951). 
453 Id, at 409-410. 
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also argued that statelessness was beneficial neither for an individual nor for states.454 
Therefore, he argued, the acquisition or possession of another nationality was conditional on 
the renunciation of one’s former nationality pursuant to Article 22(2) of the 1946 
Constitution.455 This position on the necessity of preventing statelessness was shared by 
constitutional scholars such as Toshiyoshi Miyazawa and Tatsukichi Minobe.456  In this 
context, in referring to the 1930 Convention, the government interpreted statelessness as 
something that should be prevented. 
The GHQ’s involvement in the drafting process of the 1946 Constitution indicates 
the unique status of Japan in international law soon after the end of WWII. In modern states, 
their constitutions provide for the fundamental principles of the state,457 and this influences 
matters of nationality. Although Article 10 on nationality did not provide for a substantial 
determination of who qualified as Japanese, Article 22(2) provided for the freedom to 
renounce one’s nationality, and the GHQ proposed the inclusion of a similar provision to 
Article 22(2), with the text amended. This influence of the GHQ is notable from the 
perspective of international law. Determination of nationals was regarded as a matter for 
each state.458  While the 1946 Constitution was discussed and adopted by the Japanese 
Imperial Diet, the GHQ significantly influenced the drafting process of the 1946 
Constitution. It can be argued that the GHQ also partly determined the nationality policy 
after WWII, while the main methods of acquisition and loss of Japanese nationality were 
 
454 Id, at 409-410. 
455 Id, at 409-410. 
456 Soon after the 1946 Constitution entered into force, Miyazawa stated that Japanese nationals had the 
freedom to renounce their Japanese nationality if they acquired another nationality. TOSHIYOSHI 
MIYAZAWA, KEMPOU TAII [OUTLINE OF CONSTITUTION] 105, 107 (1949). Minobe stated that Japanese 
nationals were not allowed to be persons without status (museki jin) as a result of renouncing their 
nationality. TATSUKICHI MINOBE, NIHON KOKU KEMPOU GENRON [PRINCIPLES OF THE JAPANESE 
CONSTITUTION] 198-199 (1948). Interestingly, Miyazawa and Minobe recognised the need to prevent 
statelessness even before the Japanese government had signalled the need to prevent statelessness as a 
result of the renunciation of nationality. 
457 ASHIBE, supra note 395, at 6. 
458 See “Introduction”. 
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determined by the Japanese government, particularly when the 1950 Nationality Act was 
drafted. 
 
3.3. The 1950 Nationality Act 
Although some articles in the 1950 Nationality Act covered the prevention of 
statelessness, the norm of preventing statelessness in international law did not affect the 
1950 Nationality Act. International law was not mentioned during the drafting process of the 
1950 Nationality Act, except in relation to cases of people from the former colonies. 
Since some provisions of the 1899 Nationality Act were not compatible with the 
1946 Constitution, the 1950 Nationality Act was enacted to make a nationality act that was 
compatible with the constitution. Although it is often said that Article 10 of the 1946 
Constitution triggered the enactment of the 1950 Nationality Act,459 this does not seem to be 
accurate. The administrative document prepared by the Legal Office at the time stated that 
the 1899 Nationality Act should be amended because some of its provisions were 
incompatible with the 1946 Constitution, but Article 10 of the 1946 Constitution was not 
mentioned. 460  Thus, it should be said that it was not an article on nationality in the 
constitution, but rather provisions in the 1946 Constitution that might have conflicted with 
the 1899 Nationality Act that triggered the amendment to the nationality act. For instance, 
the household system, which was one principle of the 1899 Nationality Act,461 was banned 
in the 1946 Constitution.462  Thus, the provisions of the nationality act relevant to the 
 
459 KIDANA, supra note 8, at 37. 
460 National Archives of Japan, SHOUWA 25 NEN KOKUSEKI NI KANSURU HOUREI NO KISOUBUN SHORUI 
[PREPARATORY DOCUMENTS ON LAWS ON NATIONALITY IN 1950], National Archives of Japan. Ref. Hei 23 
Houmu 00078100 (1950). 
461 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
462 Article 13 of the 1946 Constitution provided that “All nationals shall be respected as individuals”, 
and Article 14 stated that “All nationals are equal under the law.” The Japanese Law Translation 
Database uses the word “people”, not “nationals”, in English, but the Japanese version of the 
constitution uses the word “nationals”, so this dissertation uses “nationals (kokumin)”. 
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household system were amended in 1950.463 This section begins with an exploration of the 
principle in the 1950 Nationality Act in order to understand the scope of the prevention of 
statelessness in the Act. 
A basic principle in drafting the 1950 Nationality Act was that only articles that 
conflicted with the 1946 Constitution should be amended.464 First, it must be noted that jus 
sanguinis through the paternal line in the 1899 Nationality Act remained as the main method 
of conferring nationality in the 1950 Nationality Act. If jus sanguinis through the paternal 
line was retained, children born to a Japanese mother and foreign father in Japan could be 
stateless if the father was unable to transmit his nationality to the child, so jus sanguinis 
through the paternal line could cause a problem from the perspective of preventing 
statelessness.465 However, statelessness was not mentioned during the drafting process of 
the 1950 Nationality Act. The government justified jus sanguinis through the paternal line 
 
463 Even before 1950, there was an attempt to amend the 1899 Nationality Act after the enactment of the 
1946 Constitution, but this attempt failed because the relationship between the amendment of the 
Nationality Act and a peace treaty was taken into consideration. The Interior Ministry prepared a draft 
to amend the 1899 Nationality Act, stating in 1947 that an amendment was necessary for gender 
equality and the promotion of the rights and freedoms of Japanese nationals provided for in the 1946 
Constitution. National Archives of Japan, Kokuseki Hou oyobi “Gaikokujin wo Youshi mataha Nyuufuto 
Nasuno Houritsu” no Ichibu wo Kaisei suru Houritsuan nitsuite [Draft to Amend a Part of the 
Nationality Act and “Act to Adopt Aliens”] (National Archives of Japan Digital Archive). Ref. San 
03121100 (1947). However, this draft was not passed to the Diet in 1947. Kenta Hiraga, an officer of 
the Legal Office who dealt with nationality at the time, has stated that this was because it was assumed 
that the 1899 Nationality Act would be amended after the conclusion of the peace treaty, which could 
have had an influence on nationality matters, and the peace treaty was under negotiation at the time. 
Kenta Hiraga, Shin Kokuseki Hou no Kaisetsu [Commentary on a New Nationality Act], 22(7) 
HOURITSU JIHO 25, 25 (1950). He added that since the 1899 Nationality Act employed “a new way of 
thinking”, such as the prevention of positive and negative conflicts of nationality, there was no urgent 
necessity to amend the nationality act. Yoshito Aoki, Kenta Hiraga, Hideo Ii, Kijuro Omata, Minoru 
Yokoyama, Yashuhisa Tanaka, Masaharu Miura, Hiroko Shimano & Shozo Sawada, “Zadankai” 
Genkou Koseki Hou no ayumi: Dai 1 Kai [Round-table Talk: Current Household Registration Act I], 
457 KOSEKI 29, 38 (1982). However, since it took time to conclude the peace treaty, it was necessary to 
amend the nationality act from the perspective of the consistency of the legal order, and the 1950 
Nationality Act was enacted before the conclusion of the peace treaty in 1951. KENTA HIRAGA, 
KOKUSEKI HOU JOU [NATIONALITY ACT I] 140 (1950). It is interesting to note that Hiraga, who worked 
on the amendment of the nationality act, mentioned the prevention of positive and negative conflicts of 
the nationality laws. 
464 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 20, 5 April 1950) 
p. 1. HIRAGA, supra note 463, at 140. 
465 See also 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
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for several reasons. First, it prevented a positive conflict of nationality. Tomokazu Murakami, 
a representative of the government, stated that majority of states that adopted jus sanguinis 
did so through the paternal line, and only few states adopted it through both the paternal and 
maternal lines.466 In such circumstances, he added, adoption of jus sanguinis through both 
paternal and maternal lines could increase the number of persons with multiple 
nationalities.467 In order to prevent persons from having multiple nationalities, he concluded, 
a new nationality act would also have to adopt jus sanguinis through the paternal line.468 
Note that the reason why multiple nationalities was regarded as an issue was not explained 
when the 1950 Nationality Act was discussed.469 Second,  jus sanguinis through the paternal 
line was not regarded as problematic from the perspective of the equality of men and women, 
which was provided for in the 1946 Constitution. Murakami stated that since the adoption 
of jus sanguinis through the paternal line did not constitute discrimination against women, 
it was not against the principle of the “fundamental equality” of men and women guaranteed 
in the 1946 Constitution.470 Hiraga, an official from the Legal Office, also stated that jus 
sanguinis through the paternal line was not problematic from the perspective of equality of 
men and women because it did not discriminate in “the legal status” of the father and the 
 
466 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 6. 
467 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 6. If the 
state of which the mother is a national adopts jus sanguinis through both the paternal and maternal lines 
and the state of which the father is a national adopts jus sanguinis through the paternal line or through 
both the paternal and maternal lines, the children would acquire the nationalities of both the father and 
the mother. 
468 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 6. 
469 When the 1899 Nationality Act was adopted, the Japanese government mentioned the need to 
prevent conflicts of nationality, including multiple nationalities, by referring to the resolution of the IDI. 
See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
470 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 6. See 
note 462 for the provisions on equality in the 1946 Constitution. 
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mother.471 Thus, jus sanguinis through the paternal line was not regarded as problematic. 
Neither the norm of preventing statelessness nor international law was explicitly mentioned 
during the discussion on jus sanguinis through the paternal line. 
The 1950 Nationality Act was different from the 1899 Nationality Act in two 
respects, 472  both of which are relevant to the prevention of statelessness, whereas 
international law was not relevant to the amendment. First, renunciation of nationality was 
made easier in order to make the nationality act compatible with Article 22(2) of the 1946 
Constitution.473 Article 20-2 of the 1899 Nationality Act provided that the Interior Minister 
could approve the loss of Japanese nationality of Japanese individuals who were born abroad 
and acquired another nationality. It was at the Interior Minister’s discretion to allow the loss 
of Japanese nationality. However, Article 9 of the 1950 Nationality Act determined that 
Japanese individuals who were born abroad and acquired another nationality would 
“retroactively” lose their Japanese nationality unless they indicated an intention to retain 
their Japanese nationality. Thus, loss of nationality was not at the discretion of the Interior 
Minister any longer but an automatic function of the 1950 Nationality Act. It is important to 
emphasise that only those Japanese individuals who possessed another nationality could lose 
their Japanese nationality as a result of this article.474 Since Japanese people without another 
nationality were not allowed to renounce their nationality, statelessness was prevented.475 
 
471 Translated by the author. HIRAGA, supra note 452, at 213-214. It is interesting to compare this 
understanding with the understanding of international law, which regarded nationality as a matter of 
human rights. 
472 For the provisions of the 1950 Nationality Act, see the following. KIDANA, supra note 8, at 487-501. 
473 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 19, 4 April 1950) 
pp. 9-10. 
474 However, this article can be regarded as a problem because Japanese individuals who did not 
indicate their willingness to retain their nationality if they were born abroad and acquired another 
nationality lost their Japanese nationality. In other words, it was possible for the children of Japanese 
men under the 1950 Nationality Act born abroad to lose their Japanese nationality without anyone 
realising that they had done so. 
475 Note that the need to prevent statelessness was mentioned when interpretation of Article 22(2) of the 
1946 Constitution was considered during discussions on the 1950 Nationality Act that referred to the 
1930 Convention. See 3.2.2., “Article 22(2): Freedom to Renounce a Nationality”. 
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Second, Article 5 of the 1899 Nationality Act, which determined that foreigners 
would acquire Japanese nationality when they became the wife of a Japanese man or through 
adoption by Japanese, was eliminated because it followed the household system476  and 
conflicted with the gender equality and individual dignity of the 1946 Constitution.477 As a 
result, the nationality of wives and children was not dependent on the nationality of their 
Japanese husband or father except in cases where the child acquired nationality by birth 
under the 1950 Nationality Act. Articles 18, 19 and 21 of the 1899 Nationality Act were 
eliminated in the 1950 Nationality Act because they were not necessary to prevent 
statelessness since nationality was no longer conferred on the basis of the household system. 
Except for the provisions that related to the above-mentioned matters, the 1950 Nationality 
Act basically followed the 1899 Nationality Act.478 
The provisions in the 1899 Nationality Act to prevent statelessness were retained in 
the 1950 Nationality Act except for articles relating to the household system. Articles 3 
(application of jus sanguinis through the maternal line) and 4 (jus soli) in the 1899 
Nationality Act became Articles 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the 1950 Nationality Act without 
substantial changes. Article 20 (loss of nationality upon acquisition of another nationality by 
choice) of the 1899 Nationality Act became Article 8 of the 1950 Nationality Act. Articles 
18, 19 and 21 of the 1899 Nationality Act were omitted because they related to the household 
system.479 Since Article 5 of the 1899 Nationality Act, which conferred nationality on the 
 
476 For the household system, see 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
477 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 19, 4 April 1950) 
p. 10. 
478 Clauses on the rights of naturalised persons and the acquisition of Japanese nationality by children 
born to Japanese abroad were also amended. HIRAGA, supra note 463, at 143-145. Hiraga, supra note 
463, at 25. 
479 Article 18 had stated that a Japanese woman would lose her nationality when she married a foreign 
man and did not acquire his nationality. This was amended in 1916 to prevent statelessness. See 2.4., 
“The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act”. Article 19 provided that individuals who acquired 
Japanese nationality by marriage or adoption would lose their Japanese nationality in cases of 
dissolution of marriage or adoption only when they acquired another nationality. Article 21 stated that 
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basis of the household principle, was eliminated, Articles 18, 19 and 21 were not necessary 
to prevent statelessness. As a result, the scope of the prevention of statelessness in the 1899 
Nationality Act was retained in the 1950 Nationality Act. 
There were possibilities that statelessness could occur under the 1950 Nationality 
Act as under the 1899 Nationality Act.480 First, children born in Japan to parents of another 
nationality could be stateless. Second, children born in Japan to a Japanese mother and 
foreign father could be stateless if the father could not transmit his nationality to the child. 
However, no available sources indicate that there was any discussion to deal with 
statelessness during the drafting process of the 1950 Nationality Act.481 
The status of people from the former colonies was briefly discussed in the Diet, and 
the role of international law was recognised but the need to prevent statelessness was not 
discussed. Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, which Japan accepted at the end of WWII, 
stated that “Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, 
Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands”, and Japanese sovereignty over its colonies ceased 
at that time. Thus, the status of those in the former colonies became a topic of discussion. 
Murakami, a representative of the government, stated that the nationality of Koreans and 
Taiwanese would be determined by the peace treaty, but they were assumed to possess 
Japanese nationality until then.482 However, he stated that Koreans and Taiwanese should be 
treated as foreigners in light of the Potsdam Declaration because they were regarded as 
 
the wife and children of a man who lost his Japanese nationality would lose their Japanese nationality if 
they acquired his new nationality.  
480 There were three forms that statelessness could take place under the 1899 Nationality Act, but one 
possibility was eliminated in 1916 as a result of amendment. See 2.4., “The 1916 Amendment of the 
1899 Nationality Act”. 
481 The second possibility of statelessness was discussed from the perspective of the equality of men and 
women. See the argument on jus sanguinis through the paternal line when the 1950 Nationality Act was 
discussed in this section. 
482 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 7. 
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foreigners in the Ordinance on Alien Registration enforced in 1947.483 Thus, their status was 
complicated because they were regarded as foreigners in the Ordinance on Alien 
Registration while they possessed Japanese nationality from the perspective of the 
nationality act.484 It must be noted that people from the former colonies were regarded as 
foreigners in certain respects, but statelessness was not mentioned during the drafting 
process of the 1950 Nationality Act.485 In principle, the nationality of people from the former 
colonies was assumed to be covered by the peace treaty. 
 
3.4. The 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and 1952 Circular of the MOJ 
3.4.1. The 1951 Treaty of San Francisco 
 The Japanese government believed that statelessness would not arise as a result of 
the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and 1952 Circular of the MOJ, and the norm of preventing 
statelessness did not play a significant role in either. In the Treaty of San Francisco, the issue 
of nationality was not covered at all, whereas Japan immediately recognised the role of 
international law in nationality matters when the Japanese government considered its stance 
towards the treaty to be concluded. The Treaty of San Francisco, which was signed on 8 
September 1951 and entered into force on 28 April 1952, officially ended the rule of the 
GHQ over Japan. Article 2(a) of the treaty provided that “Japan, recognizing the 
independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands 
of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet”, and Article 2(b) stated that “Japan renounces all 
right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores”.486 However, the treaty did not include 
 
483 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 7. 
484 DAI 7 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 7TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 27, 19 April 1950) p. 7. 
485 See 3.4.2., “The 1952 Circular of the MOJ”. 
486 In a middle of WWII, the South Pacific Mandate was occupied by the US, and it became a trust 
territory of the US after the end of WWII. With regard to the nationality of the inhabitants of the South 
Pacific Mandate, see note 499. 
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clauses on the nationality of the Korean and Taiwanese peoples. During the drafting process 
of the Treaty of San Francisco, nationality was not discussed since the Allied Powers 
believed that such matters should be solved by the Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese 
peoples.487 Therefore, the Allied Powers did not connect Articles 2(a) and 2(b) of the Treaty 
of San Francisco with matters of nationality. 488  In other words, neither the norm of 
preventing statelessness nor international law was considered by the Allied Powers.489 
When Japan prepared for negotiations for a peace treaty with the Allied Powers, it 
referred to international law and found it necessary to prevent statelessness because it 
believed that the Allied Powers would ask the Japanese government to recognise the right 
of Korean and Taiwanese people to choose their nationality although this stance changed 
later. Before discussions with the Allied Powers, Japan prepared its stance towards the peace 
treaty.490 In 1946, the Legal Affairs Bureau of the MOFA listed some issues that Japan 
needed to consider, and these included the prevention of multiple nationalities but not the 
prevention of statelessness.491 It then considered the peace treaties of the Sino-Japanese and 
Russo-Japanese Wars and the Treaty of Versailles, a peace treaty made after WWI, to 
examine examples of nationality matters after wars; it determined that in those treaties, 
 
487 This understanding is stated by Yasuaki Onuma, an international legal scholar, and this argument is 
based on his interview with officials who were drafting the treaty. Yasuaki Onuma, Zainichi Chousen 
Jin no Houteki Chii nikansuru Ichi Kousatsu (4) [Legal Status of Koreans in Japan: With Special 
Reference to Nationality (4)], 97(2) J. OF THE JURISPRUDENCE ASS’N, THE UNIV. OF TOKYO 192, 253 
(1980). 
488 However, the Japanese government referred to these articles to deny the Japanese nationality of 
Koreans and Taiwanese at a later stage. Id, at 253. 
489 However, it must be noted that the preamble to the Treaty of San Francisco states that “Japan for its 
part declares its intention […] to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.” The expression “objectives of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” is vague and 
difficult to implement, but it must be noted that Article 15 of the UHDR states that “Everyone has the 
right to a nationality.” 
490 Japan discussed the peace treaty with the Allied Powers after 1947. MOFA, Nihon Gaikou Bunsho 
San Furashisuko Heiwa Jouyaku Jumbi Taisaku [Preparation of the Treaty of San Francisco; 
Documents on Japanese Foreign Policy], available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/shiryo/bunsho/h17.html (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
491 MOFA, NIHON GAIKOU BUNSHO SANFURANSHISUKO HEIWA JOUYAKU JUNBI TAISAKU [DOCUMENTS 
ON JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY, TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN, PREPARATORY WORK] 52-53 (2006). 
    108 
people acquired their nationality on the basis of residence.492 Therefore, people living in 
Korea were assumed to acquire Korean nationality, and people living in Taiwan were 
regarded as acquiring Chinese nationality. The Japanese government regarded the principle 
based on residence as a general principle of international law.493 In the case of Korea, the 
Legal Affairs Bureau proposed that, in principle, Japanese subjects, both mainland Japanese 
and Koreans, residing in a Korean territory should acquire Korean nationality and lose their 
Japanese nationality.494 In addition, two types of right to choose a nationality were proposed. 
First, mainland Japanese above the age of eighteen and residing in a Korean territory had the 
right to choose Japanese nationality within two years of the peace treaty entering into 
force.495 Second, Koreans above the age of eighteen and residing in Japan had the right to 
choose Japanese nationality.496 In the case of Taiwan, it was planned that Japanese nationals 
residing in Taiwan would be able to acquire Chinese nationality since Taiwan had been 
returned to China. As in the Korean case, it was proposed that mainland Japanese above the 
age of eighteen and residing in Taiwan would have the right to choose their nationality while 
Taiwanese above the age of eighteen residing in Japan would also be able to choose.497 These 
ideas were based on the Treaty of Versailles. 498  Although the norm of preventing 
statelessness was not mentioned, recognition of the right to choose one’s nationality had the 
 
492 Id, at 53. 
493 The Legal Affairs Bureau had prepared a document titled “Nationality Issues in the Peace Treaty” on 
13 December 1946 (translated by the author). It stated that under the general principles in international 
law, residents in the territories that ceased to be Japanese would lose their Japanese nationality and 
acquire a new nationality based on residence. Kunihiko Matsumoto, Zainichi Chousen Jin no Nihon 
Kokuseki Hakudatsu: Nihon Seifu niyoru Heiwa Jouyaku Taisaku Kenkyuu no Kentou [The 
Deprivation of Japanese Nationality from Koreans in Japan: A Study of the Counterplan for the ‘Peace 
Treaty with Japan’ by the Japanese Government], 52(4) THE J. OF L. AND POLITICAL SCI. (HOGAKU) 
111, 129 (1988). 
494 MOFA, supra note 491, at 53-54. 
495 Id, at 54. 
496 Id, at 54. 
497 Id, at 55. 
498 Id, at 55. 
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effect of preventing statelessness since choice of nationality meant that Japanese, Korean or 
Chinese nationality had to be chosen.499 
There are some implications from this analysis. First, the Japanese government 
referred to international law to consider the nationalities of those in former colonies. At the 
time, international law was referred to in order to anticipate the possible position of the 
Allied Powers so that the Japanese government could consider its stance towards the peace 
treaty. 500  Second, although the norm of preventing statelessness was not explicitly 
mentioned, statelessness could be avoided because the right of Korean and Taiwanese people 
to choose their nationality was assumed. The right of Koreans and Taiwanese to choose their 
nationality assumed that Koreans would choose either Korean or Japanese, and that 
Taiwanese people would choose either Chinese or Japanese; thus, the Japanese government 
assumed that statelessness could not take place. 
 However, this stance changed, and the Japanese government ceased to recognise the 
right of Koreans and Taiwanese people to choose their nationality when it learnt that the 
Allied Powers did not intend to include nationality matters in the peace treaty.501 This shift 
of stance can be seen after 1950. “An Outline of an Expected Peace Treaty with Japan”, 
prepared by the MOFA in September 1950, stated that Korean people would recover their 
Korean nationality as a result of Korean independence, referring to the case of Alsace-
Larraine after WWII, and this principle was also applied to Taiwanese people.502 Although 
 
499 The Legal Affairs Bureau mentioned the South Pacific Mandate, and it proposed that inhabitants of 
the South Pacific Mandate should lose their Japanese nationality. It added that inhabitants of the South 
Pacific Mandate would have the right to be protected by the government that possessed the mandate 
over the territory. This provision was proposed by reference to Article 127 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
Id, at 57. However, the South Pacific Mandate became a trust territory of the US after the end of WWII, 
so Japanese policy did not affect the South Pacific Mandate. 
500 Id, at 52. 
501 Onuma, supra note 487, at 255. Matsumoto also seems to follow this interpretation. Matsumoto, 
supra note 493, at 138. 
502 Translated by the author. Matsumoto, supra note 493, at 138. There are several versions of the 
Outline, but the version from September 1950 is the last one, according to Matsumoto. Matsumoto, 
supra note 493, at 134. 
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the right to choose Japanese nationality was not explicitly denied, the Outline does not seem 
to have recognised the right to choose nationality because the provisions on Alsace-Lorraine 
in the Treaty of Versailles did not recognise the right to choose nationality. 503  After 
preparation of the Outline, Japan adopted this stance.504 This change of stance seems to have 
taken place because the GHQ did not ask Japan to include the right to choose nationality in 
the peace treaty. Japan seems to have wanted to have discretion over the nationality of 
Koreans, as noted by Yasuaki Onuma, a scholar on international law who researched the 
history of Koreans’ Japanese nationality after the end of WWII.505 As a result, the right of 
Koreans and Taiwanese people to choose Japanese nationality was not recognised, and 
Koreans had to be naturalised as Japanese if they wanted to be Japanese. Since naturalisation 
was regarded as being at the discretion of each state, this process allowed the Japanese 
government to select who would be naturalised as Japanese.506 In this context, the 1951 
Treaty of San Francisco was signed, and nationality was not covered by the treaty. 
 
3.4.2. The 1952 Circular of the MOJ 
 Since the nationality of people from the former colonies was not covered by the 1951 
Treaty of San Francisco, the 1952 Circular of the MOJ covered it. The Japanese stance on 
the nationality of people from the former colonies did not change from the last stage of the 
drafting process of the Treaty of San Francisco. The norm of preventing statelessness did 
not affect the 1952 Circular, but the Japanese government believed that the circular would 
not create statelessness. The Treaty of Versailles was referred to when the Treaty of San 
Francisco was being considered, and this can be recognised as constituting the impact of 
 
503 Id, at 138. 
504 For detail, see the following. Id, at 139-144. 
505 Onuma, supra note 487, at 257. 
506 Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida stated that there are both “good and bad” Koreans, and this 
indicates the perception that Japan needed to select Koreans who would be Japanese (translated by the 
author). See the following. Matsumoto, supra note 493, at 142-144. 
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international law on the 1952 Circular although there is no evidence of the direct impact of 
the Treaty of Versailles.507 
As a result of the discussion with the ROK and ROC governments, the Japanese 
government determined that Koreans and Taiwanese people were either Korean or Chinese 
nationals after the end of WWII. After the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco was signed, the 
Japanese government discussed the issue of nationality with the ROK representatives.508 The 
ROK stated that Koreans’ Japanese nationality was nullified when Japan accepted the 
Potsdam Declaration, and that Koreans acquired Korean nationality on 15 August 1948, 
when the ROK was established. 509  The Japanese government shared this view. 510  The 
Chinese government, the ROC at the time, enforced a law to recover the Chinese nationality 
of Taiwanese people on 25 October 1945.511 Thus, it was generally assumed that Taiwanese 
people recovered their Chinese nationality.512  As a result, Japan regarded Koreans and 
Taiwanese as having acquired or recovered their Korean and Chinese nationalities after the 
end of WWII. In other words, for governments of Japan, ROK and ROC, statelessness was 
not an issue. 
 
507 See 3.4.1. “The 1951 Treaty of San Francisco”. 
508 The meeting took place soon after the Treaty of San Francisco was signed. Yuuichi Tobita, San 
Furanshisuko Heiwa Jouyaku to Zainichi Chousenjin [The Peace Treaty and Korean Residents in 
Japan], 6 ZAINICHI CHOUSENJIN SHI KENKYUU [HISTORY OF KOREAN RESIDENTS IN JAPAN] 1, 4 (1980). 
509 Id, at 5. 
510 Id, at 4-5. Since the government of the ROK treated the household registration, or koseki, which 
Japan had introduced into Korea during the colonial era, as a standard for defining Korean nationals, 
those who were listed in the Korean household registration lost their Japanese nationality and acquired 
Korean nationality. See the following. GyongSu Mun, “Zainichi”, “Kokumin” no Hazama wo Ikite [The 
“Zainichi” Korean Minority in Japan, Living between Two Nations], 20(3) RITSUMEIKAN STUDIES IN 
LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 145, 147 (2009). 
511 The law was enforced in 22 June 1951. HIROSHI TANAKA, AJIA JIN TONO DEAI: KOKUSAI KOURYUU 
TOHA NANIKA [ENCOUNTER WITH ASIANS: WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION?] 203-204 
(1976). 
512 HIDEBUMI EGAWA & RYOICHI YAMADA, KOKUSEKI HOU [NATIONALITY ACT] 118 (1973). However, 
it must be pointed out that Taiwanese people could refuse to recover their Chinese nationality by 
application to the consul. Id, at 203-204. It must be also noted that the definition of “Taiwanese” people 
by the Chinese government was not clear. If they were people who were listed in the Taiwan household 
registration that Japan had introduced during the colonial era, Taiwanese people who had lost their 
Japanese nationality acquired Chinese nationality. However, if “Taiwanese” people were determined 
independently of the Taiwanese household registration, there could have been be stateless persons who 
possessed neither Japanese nor Chinese nationalities. 
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On the basis of this background, the MOJ issued a circular on Korean and Taiwanese 
nationality on 19 April 1952, nine days before the Treaty of San Francisco entered into force. 
The circular stated that “Korea and Taiwan will be separated from the territory of Japan after 
the treaty enters into force. As a result, Korean and Taiwanese people, including those living 
in mainland, will lose Japanese nationality.”513 The household registration, or koseki, which 
functioned to register Japanese nationals and was introduced during the colonial period, 
played an important role in distinguishing mainland Japanese and people from the former 
colonies, such as Koreans and Taiwanese. A separate household registration from the 
mainland one was prepared in Korea and Taiwan. In the circular, Korean and Taiwanese 
people referred to those registered in the household registrations of Korea and Taiwan.514 
Thus, people listed in the Korean and Taiwanese household registrations lost their Japanese 
nationality. Since this dissertation focuses on the views of governments,515  it does not 
discuss the situation of those who lost Japanese nationality in detail, but merely notes that 
some scholars claimed that people from the former colonies were in a similar situation to 
statelessness.516 
 
513 Translated by the author. For the text of the circular, see the following. Yong-hwan Chong, 
Shokuminchi no Dokuritsu to Jinken: Zainichi Chousenjin no “Kokuseki Sentaku Ken” wo megutte 
[Colonial Independence and Human Rights: Focusing on the Rights of Nationality Choice for Koreans 
in Japan], 36 PRIME: INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST. MEIJI GAKUIN UNIV. 49, 49 (2013). 
514 No. 1(2) of the 1952 Circular of the MOJ. It must be noted that the ethnic origins of individuals did 
not necessarily determine their nationality under the 1952 Circular. For instance, if a woman who was 
listed in the Korean household registration was married to a man who was listed in the mainland 
household registration, the woman was listed in the mainland household registration and vice versa. 
This principle derived from the concept of the household, which assumed that a family was composed 
of one household and headed normally by a father or husband. Koreans and Taiwanese people who 
were married to or adopted by mainland Japanese did not lose their Japanese nationality because they 
were registered in the mainland household registration. On the other hand, mainland Japanese who were 
married to or adopted by Korean or Taiwanese people lost their Japanese nationality because they were 
registered in the Korean or Taiwanese household registration. See No. 1(3) of the 1952 Circular of the 
MOJ. 
515 See “Scope and Terminology of this Dissertation” in the “Introduction”. 
516 See the following. Yasuaki Onuma, Zainichi Chousen Jin no Houteki Chii nikansuru Ichi Kousatsu 
(1) [Legal Status of Koreans in Japan: With Special Reference to Nationality (1)], 96(3) J. OF THE 
JURISPRUDENCE ASS’N, THE UNIV. OF TOKYO 266, 274 (1980). For the issue of the status of people 
from the former colonies, see 4.3.1., “The Impact of Stateless Persons in Japan”. 
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Although the detail of the background to the 1952 Circular is not known, the 
background of the Treaty of San Francisco indicates that the Treaty of Versailles was the 
basis of the Japanese government’s decision on the loss of Japanese nationality of people 
from the former colonies. Although the norm of preventing statelessness does not seem to 
have been considered, the circular functioned to prevent statelessness, at least in theory, by 
confirming that Korean and Taiwanese people possessed Korean and Taiwanese 
nationalities, respectively. 
 
3.5. The 1957 Convention 
 Japan neither signed nor acceded to the 1957 Convention, and the Convention did 
not influence Japanese nationality law. 517  However, it is worth noting that the 1950 
Nationality Act was in line with the norm of preventing statelessness in the 1957 Convention. 
The 1957 Convention was sometimes discussed in the Diet around the time that Japan was 
considering accession to the CEDAW but was not discussed before then.518 In the late 1970s, 
the Japanese government indicated its willingness to be a contracting party to the 1957 
Convention, but it hesitated to accede to the 1957 Convention in 1985. In 1979, around the 
time that the CEDAW was adopted, a member of the Diet asked about the Japanese attitude 
to human rights treaties. Harunori Kaya, the Director-General of the United Nations Bureau 
of the MOFA at the time, mentioned the 1957 Convention, and stated that Japan could 
 
517 For the 1957 Convention, see 1.3.3., “The 1957 Convention: Married Women’s Human Rights”. 
518 From the available sources, it is fair to say that Japan considered neither signing nor ratifying the 
1957 Convention until the late 1970s. The MOFA stated that Japan was not really relevant to issues of 
stateless persons in 1957. MOFA, (Gidai Gojuuyon) Mukokusekisha no Jokyo to Genshou ni kansuru 
Jouyaku An [(Agenda 54) Draft Conventions on the Elimination and Reduction of Stateless Persons], in 
Kokusai Rengou Soukai Kankei Ikken Dai Juuikkai Soukai Kankei Dai Ikkan [The 11th Session of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan. B’-2-1-0-1-11 (1957). This may be why Japan considered neither signing nor 
ratifying the 1957 Convention. No documents on the 1957 Convention were retrieved from the request 
for disclosure of administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru 
Kettei ni tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01496 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 15 Nichi (15 August 2016). 
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consider the possibility of acceding to the 1957 Convention.519 However, this stance changed 
in 1985, when Japan became a contracting party to the CEDAW. A new Director-General 
of the United Nations Bureau, Chusei Yamada, stated that Japan would not accede to the 
1957 Convention because the Convention was problematic.520 He explained that the 1957 
Convention prioritised the naturalisation of women over that of men, and this was 
problematic, whereas the CEDAW provided for gender equality.521 Article 3 of the 1957 
Convention allowed for married women’s naturalisation in the nationality of their husbands, 
whereas married men’s naturalisation in the nationality of their wives was not included.522 
Yamada seems to be referring to this article, which conflicts with gender equality. Japan 
regarded the 1957 Convention as incompatible with the CEDAW, which Japan considered 
acceding to at the time, so Japan has neither signed nor acceded to the 1957 Convention thus 
far. 
 However, Japan was in line with the norm of preventing statelessness in the 1957 
Convention. The 1957 Convention provided that marriages to aliens or the dissolution of 
marriages to aliens did not affect the nationality of a wife (Article 1) and a husband’s 
acquisition of another nationality or renunciation of his original nationality did not prevent 
 
519 DAI 87 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 87TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 8, 27 April 
1979) p. 26. DAI 87 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 87TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 13, 28 May 
1979) p. 14. 
520 DAI 102 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 102ND SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 15, 24 May 
1985) p. 3. DAI 102 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 102ND SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 18, 4 June 
1985) p. 3. DAI 102 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 102ND SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 17, 18 June 
1985) pp. 27-28. 
521 DAI 102 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 102ND SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 15, 24 May 
1985) p. 3. 
522 Article 3 of the 1957 Convention reads as follows: “Each Contracting State agrees that the alien wife 
of one of its nationals may, at her request, acquire the nationality of her husband through specially 
privileged naturalization procedures.” 
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his wife’s retention of her nationality (Article 2). In the 1950 Nationality Act, there were 
neither provisions requiring women to lose their nationality in cases of marriage or 
dissolution of marriage, nor in cases of a change in her husband’s nationality. Interestingly, 
even the 1899 Nationality Act and the 1916 Amendment were already in line with the norm 
of preventing statelessness in the 1957 Convention. Article 18 of the 1899 Nationality Act 
provided for the loss of women’s nationality in cases of marriage, but as a result of the 1916 
Amendment, a woman’s nationality was not lost unless she acquired her husband’s 
nationality. Article 21 of the 1899 Nationality Act provided that a woman would lose her 
Japanese nationality only when her husband acquired a new nationality and she also acquired 
that nationality.523 These articles were problematic from the perspective of women’s equal 
status with men but they both prevented statelessness. This relationship between the 1957 
Convention and the Japanese nationality law indicates that Japan was in line with the norm 
of preventing statelessness in the 1957 Convention.524 
 
3.6. The 1961 Convention 
 Although the Japanese government indicated its commitment to preventing 
statelessness, it did not amend the 1950 Nationality Act to bring it in line with the 1961 
Convention; rather, it attempted to bring the 1961 Convention in line with the 1950 
Nationality Act during the drafting process of the 1961 Convention.525 Japan was involved 
in the drafting process of the 1961 Convention and participated in the UN Conference on the 
Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, which was held in 1959 and 1961, but it 
neither signed nor acceded to the Convention. 
 
523 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act” and 2.4., “The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act”. 
524 Note tht Articles 18 and 21 of the 1899 Nationality Act were omitted in the 1950 Nationality Act 
since the provisions based on the household system were amended. See 3.3., “The 1950 Nationality 
Act”. 
525 See also 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
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Before the conference, the UNSG requested that member states comment on two 
draft Conventions: the Draft Conventions on Elimination and Reduction.526 The Japanese 
comments submitted to the UNSG indicate that Japan preferred the Draft Convention on 
Elimination, which was more ambitious in preventing statelessness than was the Draft 
Convention on Reduction. They stated that it was necessary to eliminate or reduce 
statelessness by international law. 527  First, the Japanese comment explained the 1950 
Nationality Act. It stated that although the principle of the nationality act was jus sanguinis, 
jus soli was also applied to some extent.528 It continued that no person could be deprived of 
his or her Japanese nationality.529 It compared the Draft Conventions on Elimination and 
Reduction and stated that most of the provisions of both drafts were already complied with 
in Japanese law.530 Since both drafts seemed to prioritise the jus soli principle, and jus 
sanguinis was regarded as an exception, Japan hoped that the draft would be based on jus 
sanguinis.531 However, Japan recognised that it should not be the case that each state adhered 
to its own principle.532 After that, it regarded the Draft Convention on Elimination as more 
acceptable because it did not “contain provisions regarding the system of conditional 
acquisition of nationality”.533 This indicates that Japan believed that no condition should be 
required for individuals to acquire a nationality according to its official statement. 
 
526 UN, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessnessin SO 
261/411 (1) PART A INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES TO CONCLUDE A 
CONVENTION ON THE REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF FUTURE STATELESSNESS - REPRESENTATION 
AND PARTICIPATION - GOVERNMENTS, 1956.01-1958.12 (FILE). Holding of the UN Library and 
Archives in Geneva. SO 261/411(1) Govts (Aug. 11, 1958). For these two draft conventions, see 1.3.4. 
“The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
527 Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, New York, Comments of the Japanese Government on the 
revised draft Conventions on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness (SC/59/75) in SO 
261/9 (4) CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF FUTURE STATELESSNESS AND CONVENTION ON THE 
REDUCTION OF FUTURE STATELESSNESS, 1956.11-1959.3 (FILE). Holding of the UN Library and 
Archives in Geneva (Mar. 18, 1959). 
528 Id. 
529 Id. 
530 Id. 
531 Id. 
532 Id. 
533 Id. 
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 The document submitted to the UNSG went on to comment on some draft provisions, 
and it desired to make the Convention compatible with the 1950 Nationality Act. With regard 
to Article 1, which applied the jus soli principle in cases where a child acquired no other 
nationality, Japan preferred the Draft Convention on Elimination.534 Article 1 of the Draft 
Convention on Elimination was composed of only one paragraph which provided that the 
jus soli principle be applied in cases where the child acquired no other nationality, but the 
Draft Convention on Reduction included some paragraphs that allowed states to add 
conditions in terms of the parents’ residence in the territory.535 However, Japan expressed 
the hope that “an amendment will be made limiting the application of the Article to persons 
whose parents are both not known or are stateless”.536 This indicates that Japan desired to 
make the 1961 Convention compatible with Article 2(iv) of the 1950 Nationality Act, which 
provided for the application of the jus soli principle in cases where a child’s parents were 
not known or were stateless. It is interesting to note that Japan preferred the Draft 
Convention on Elimination over the Draft Convention on Reduction. Since Japan hoped to 
make conditions to the application of the jus soli principle, it could have preferred the Draft 
Convention on Reduction and proposed a condition on parents. However, it preferred the 
Draft Convention on Elimination and proposed a condition on parents instead. 
Article 4 of the Draft Conventions on Elimination and Reduction provided for the 
application of the jus sanguinis principle in cases where other nationalities were not 
conferred on a child. 537  The article of the Draft Convention on Reduction set normal 
residence in the territory of the parents’ nationality as a condition, while this condition was 
not set in the Draft Convention on Elimination.538 With regard to Article 4, Japan again 
 
534 Id. 
535 See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
536 Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, New York, supra note 527. 
537 The article in both drafts also states that “The nationality of the father shall prevail over that of the 
mother.” This part of the article seems to prevent multiple nationality. UNGA, supra note 131, at 3-4. 
538 Id, at 3-4. 
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preferred the Draft Convention on Elimination.539 This provision of the Draft Convention on 
Elimination seems to be compatible with Article 2(i) of the 1950 Nationality Act, which 
adopted jus sanguinis through the paternal line without applying the condition of 
residence.540 Japan also preferred Articles 5 to 9 of the Draft Convention on Elimination, 
which did not conflict with the 1950 Nationality Act.541 This indicates the Japanese stance 
to make the new Convention on statelessness compatible with the 1950 Nationality Act. 
However, it must be emphasised that Japan preferred the Draft Convention on Elimination, 
which placed harsher obligations on states.542 
 Although the Japanese stance was not strongly stated in the UN Conference on the 
Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness in 1959 and 1961, Japan desired to make 
the new Convention compatible with the existing Japanese laws recognising the significance 
of preventing statelessness. Although Japan did not express its view verbally in the 
conference, there are some resources which indicate the Japanese stance to make any new 
treaty compatible with the 1950 Nationality Act.543 At the conference, Japan commented on 
 
539 The Japanese government declared it desirable that “this Article be amended to make it applicable 
irrespective of the place of birth”. Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, New York, supra note 527. 
Although the Draft Convention on Elimination did not include a condition on the place of birth, this 
Japanese statement indicates the Japanese commitment to jus sanguinis. 
540 Note that jus sanguinis through the maternal line was adopted in the 1950 Nationality Act in cases 
where a father was not known or was stateless. Article 2(iii) of the 1950 Nationality Act. 
541 Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, New York, supra note 527. 
542 It is possible that Japan had a strong commitment to the norm of preventing statelessness. Since the 
commitment to preventing statelessness in the Draft Convention on Elimination was stronger than that 
in the Draft Convention on Reduction, Japan might have supported the Draft Convention on 
Elimination. However, it must be noted that Japan opposed the establishment of a tribunal regarding this 
convention. Article 11 of both drafts proposed the establishment of a tribunal to interpret and apply the 
Convention on statelessness. UNGA, supra note 131, at 6. Japan stated that the dispute relevant to this 
Convention would be between a state and an agency working for the individual. It continued that such 
issues “should be settled as domestic matters by the Governments concerned […]”. Consequently, Japan 
said, “such disputes should not be settled by an international tribunal empowered to give decisions 
which will be legally binding upon the parties; they may well be settled by an international investigation 
or mediation committee empowered to give recommendations to the parties”. Permanent Mission of 
Japan to the UN, New York, supra note 527. From this stance, it can be said that Japan was not eager to 
solve issues of statelessness by legally binding interpretations of the court. 
543 Japan expressed its view on a limited number of occasions in verbal communications and votes taken 
by roll-call. Usually, the voting attitude of each state is not available in the summary records. However, 
when any state requests votes to be taken by roll-call, each state’s attitude is observable in the summary 
records. 
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Article 1 of the Convention. After the Draft Convention on Reduction became the basis of 
the Convention,544 Japan stated that although Japanese nationality was conferred on the basis 
of the jus sanguinis principle, it could be conferred by the jus soli principle as well.545 It then 
supported paragraph 1 of Article 1, which provided that the jus soli principle applied in cases 
where a child acquired no other nationality, but suggested the deletion of paragraphs 2 and 
3, which limited the cases where the jus soli principle was to be applied.546 However, since 
there was a serious disagreement between states about the position of paragraphs 2 and 3, 
new drafts were introduced, and Article 1 became a compromised provision. When the 
current paragraph 1 of Article 1 was adopted, Japan abstained because “its expression 
differed in some respects from existing Japanese law”, although Japan “was not opposed to 
the substance”.547 Although Japan did not explain how paragraph 1 of Article 1 was different 
from Japanese law, this explanation indicates that Japan was trying to make the new 
Convention compatible with the existing Japanese laws.548 
Except for this occasion, Japan did not actively participate in any discussion in the 
conference. However, the Japanese voting stance is observable from available sources, and 
this analysis indicates that Japan desired to make clauses on the deprivation of nationality 
compatible with the 1950 Nationality Act. When Japan submitted its comments on the two 
Draft Conventions to the UNSG before the conference, Japan preferred to have a provision 
included in the Draft Convention on Elimination prohibiting the deprivation of nationality if 
 
544 UNGA, supra note 137, at 10. See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
545 UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 
Summary Record of the Fourth Plenary Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 
26 March 1959, at 10.05 a.m., A/CONF.9/SR.4, 6 (Apr. 24, 1961). 
546 Id, at 6. For the provisions in these paragraphs, see note 134. 
547 UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 
Summary Record of the Eighth Plenary Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 
15 April 1959, at 10.50 a.m., A/CONF.9/SR.8, 5 (Apr. 24, 1961). 
548 Paragraph 1 of Article 1 provides that the jus soli principle be adopted if a child acquires no other 
nationality. The 1950 Nationality Act did not contain such a provision, so this seems to have been 
regarded as the difference between this paragraph and the 1950 Nationality Act. 
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it caused statelessness. 549  Since the Draft Convention on Reduction allowed for the 
deprivation of nationality in some cases, 550  the Japanese stance can be interpreted as 
preferring an unconditional prohibition on the deprivation of nationality. 
However, the Japanese stance at a later stage does not indicate the same enthusiasm 
regarding the unconditional prohibition on the deprivation of nationality. After the Draft 
Convention on Reduction was adopted as the basis of the Convention in the conference, a 
draft on the current Article 8, on deprivation of nationality, was modified, and a new draft 
proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany allowed states the right to deprive a person 
of their nationality if the state declared the right to do so at the time of signature, ratification 
or accession.551 Since states had more discretion in depriving someone of their nationality 
in the original Article 8 of the Draft Convention on Reduction, the proposal of the Federal 
Republic of Germany to limit the discretion of the states in depriving nationality was deemed 
a significant proposal. However, Japan opposed this proposal.552 Since Japan did not explain 
why it opposed this proposal, the reason remains unclear. However, the previous Japanese 
position implies that Japan opposed to allowing deprivation of nationality because Japanese 
law did not allow any form of deprivation of nationality. Subsequently, Japan stated that 
“there [was] no ground for deprivation of nationality which the Government of Japan, for its 
part, deems it essential to retain”.553 
 
549 It also introduced a clause on a prohibition on deprivation of nationality in the 1950 Nationality Act. 
Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, New York, supra note 527. 
550 When nationals served for a foreign country, deprivation of nationality was allowed. UNGA, supra 
note 131, at 5. 
551 See the following. UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future 
Statelessness: Text of Article 8 Adopted by the Committee of the Whole and Revised by the Drafting 
Committee, A/CONF.9/L.40/Add.3 (Apr. 14, 1959). For the original Article 8, see the following. 
UNGA, supra note 131, at 5. 
552 UNGA, United Nations Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 
Summary Record of the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on 
Thursday, 17 April 1959, at 3.10 p.m., A/CONF.9/SR.13, 5-6 (Apr. 24, 1961). 
553 Permanent Mission of Japan to the UN, New York, SC/61/196 in SO 261/413 Part A Question of 
Reconvening the International Conference of Plenipotentiaries to Conclude a Convention on the 
Reduction or Elimination of Future Statelessness, 1961.03-1961.07 (File). Holding of the UN Library 
and Archives in Geneva (June 22, 1961). In order to examine the Japanese position at the UN 
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This indicates that Japan did not actively support unconditional allowance of the 
deprivation of nationality while this was in line with the Japanese law. At the end of the 
conference, Japan did not sign the 1961 Convention, 554  and it has not acceded to the 
Convention to date.555 
After the 1961 Convention was signed, the Convention was discussed in the Diet 
several times.556 Although the Japanese government recognised the gap between the 1961 
Convention and the 1950 and 1984 Nationality Acts,557 it did not find it necessity to make 
the nationality acts compatible with the 1961 Convention. When the government was asked 
in 1981 why Japan was not a party to the 1961 Convention, Shoichi Kuriyama, an Assistant 
Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, replied that Japan had adopted jus sanguinis through the 
paternal line, and this principle was not in line with the jus soli principle of the 1961 
Convention.558 In 1984, Taisuke Biwata, the Director-General of the Civil Affairs Bureau of 
the MOJ, stated that Japan had a difficulty meeting Article 1 of the 1961 Convention, which 
 
Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, administrative documents of the 
MOFA need to be explored. However, the author did not find any documents indicating the Japanese 
position at the conference in the Diplomatic Archives of the MOFA, even though the staff at the 
Archives have also explored the available sources. The author has also requested that the MOFA 
disclose any relevant administrative documents indicating communication between Tokyo and Geneva, 
but such documents did not exist as of 2016. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru 
Kettei ni tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01498 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 15 Nichi (15 August 2016). 
554 Since no administrative documents are available, the reason why Japan did not sign the 1961 
Convention is not clear. See note 553. 
555 As of January 2015, Japan has no plans to accede to the 1961 Convention. ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 
22. 
556 Although it was not a substantial discussion, Harunori Kaya, the Director-General of the United 
Nations Bureau of the MOFA, stated in 1979 that it was valuable to consider the possibility of ratifying 
or acceding to the 1954 and 1961 Conventions if “conditions are met”. DAI 87 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN 
GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, THE 87TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 8, 27 April 1979) p. 26. On a different 
occasion, Kaya expressed a similar view on the possibility of considering accession to the 1961 
Convention. DAI 87 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE 
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 87TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 13, 28 May 
1979) p. 14. 
557 For the 1984 Nationality Act, see 3.8., “The CEDAW and the 1984 Nationality Act”. 
558 DAI 94 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN GAIMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 94TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 10, 17 April 
1981) pp. 13-14. See also Article 1 of the 1961 Convention. See also the following. ARAKAKI, supra 
note 8, at 29. 
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provided for automatic acquisition of nationality by the jus soli principle.559 This indicates 
that Japan did not intend to amend the 1950 Nationality Act. Rather, it desired to bring the 
1961 Convention in line with the 1950 Nationality Act, which it failed to do. 
 
3.7. The ICCPR 
 Japan did not find it necessary to amend the 1950 Nationality Act to make it 
compatible with the provision in the ICCPR on children’s right to acquire a nationality. It 
must be noted that the ICCPR was not interpreted as aiming to prevent statelessness even 
though the prevention of statelessness was the main theme during its drafting process.560 
Before the discussion on the draft of the ICCPR took place in the sixteenth session of the 
UNGA in 1961, the MOFA prepared an instruction for the delegation. The instruction stated 
that drafts of the ICCPR and ICESCR were in line with the provisions and spirit of the 1946 
Constitution and laws, so Japan should take a positive attitude towards the negotiation.561 
The instruction also stated that if any new legislation or budget needed to be prepared, 
representatives should not indicate the Japanese commitment to implementing such 
legislation or preparing of any budget even if the Japanese representatives voted in favour 
of the draft.562 On the basis of this instruction, Japan participated in the sixteenth session of 
the UNGA. Japan voted in favour of Article 24(3), which provided for the rights of children 
 
559 DAI 101 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 101ST SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 6, 10 May 1984) p. 
23. For more detail, see the following. ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 29. 
560 See 1.3.5., “ICCPR: Children’s Right to Acquire a Nationality”. 
561 The ICESCR was negotiated in the UNGA with the ICCPR. However, it was also stated that the 
delegation should request modification or clarification where necessary. MOFA, Kunrei Dai 30 Gou 
[Instruction No. 30], in KOKUSAI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3193 (1961). 
562 MOFA, Kunrei Dai 30 Gou [Instruction No. 30], in KOKUSEI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan. 2010-3193 (1961). This is interesting because this instruction implies that the Japanese 
government could have voted in favour of a provision even if Japan did not want to implement it. 
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to acquire a nationality.563 After the text of the ICCPR, including an article on children’s 
right to acquire a nationality, was finalised, the MOFA circulated drafts of the ICCPR in 
1966 to the ministries of Japan to ask for comments.564 The MOJ made comments on the 
draft, but it did not mention nationality matters, 565  so the MOJ did not regard the 
compatibility between children’s right to acquire a nationality in the ICCPR and the 1950 
Nationality Act, which adopted jus sanguinis through the paternal line, to be an issue at the 
time.566 
 When the MOJ examined the relationship between Article 24(3) and the 1950 
Nationality Act, it paid attention to statelessness. It believed that issues of statelessness could 
be solved by facilitated naturalisation. One document explained the 1950 Nationality Act, 
and stated that a possible “issue” arose in cases of legitimate children of foreign fathers and 
Japanese mothers where the nationality of the father could not be conferred.567 This “issue” 
 
563 MOFA, Kokuren Dai San I niokeru B Kiyaku An Shingi Kekka to Wagakuni no Taido [Result of the 
Deliberation of the Draft of the ICCPR in the Third Committee of the UN and Japan’s Stance], p. 10, in 
KOKUSEI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the Diplomatic 
Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3193 (n.d.). 
564 The ICCPR was scheduled to be adopted in 1966. Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Koku Sha Dai 
7243 Gou [Koku Sha No. 7243], in KOKUSEI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3193 
(1966). 
565 The MOJ considered the status of foreigners relevant to the ICCPR. Vice-Minister for Justice, 
Kokusai Jinken Kiyaku An ni tsuite (Kaitou) [Reply: Regarding Drafts of International Covenants on 
Human Rights], Houmushou Hi Ren Dai 634 Gou [MOJ, Hi Ren No. 643], in KOKUSEI JINKEN KIYAKU 
[INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3193 (1966). 
566 Just before Japan ratified the ICESCR and ICCPR, Japan considered the provisions of the two 
covenants in the ministries, and in December 1977, it identified eight issues, but Article 24(3) on 
nationality was not included among them. Article 7(a)(i) (women’s equal conditions of work with men), 
Article 7(d) (remuneration for public holidays), Article 8(1)(d) (the right to strike), Article 8(2) 
(limitations on basic labour rights), Article 9 (the right to social security), Article 13(2)(a) (free and 
compulsory primary education), Article 13(2)(b), (c) (progressive introduction of free secondary and 
higher education) of the ICESCR and Article 20 of the ICCPR (a provision on propaganda) were 
regarded as problematic. United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Kokusai Jinken 
Kiyaku no Shuyou Mondaiten, Kaishaku oyobi Shori Houshin [Main Issues, Interpretation and Policies 
of the International Covenants of Human Rights], in KOKUSAI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan. 2010-3210 (1977). 
567 Translated by the author. The heading of the document stated “MOJ”, and this document is filed in 
the section of the “Civil Affairs Bureau”, so it is assumed that the document was prepared by the Civil 
Affairs Bureau of the MOJ. KOKUSAI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN 
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refers to statelessness because the legitimate children of foreign fathers and Japanese 
mothers became stateless if the nationality of the father could not be conferred under the 
1950 Nationality Act, in operation at the time. However, the MOJ added that such cases 
were rather exceptional. 568  Even in such cases, it stated that the requirement for 
naturalisation was loosened.569 In other words, the legitimate children of foreign fathers and 
Japanese mothers were easier to naturalise as Japanese. The document concluded that the 
ICCPR did not conflict with the 1950 Nationality Act.570 This statement indicates that the 
Japanese government believed that the facilitated naturalisation guaranteed the right of the 
children to acquire Japanese nationality. 571  On the basis of this understanding of the 
compatibility of the ICCPR and the 1950 Nationality Act, Japan became a party to the 
ICCPR after the discussions in 1979, and the ICCPR did not trigger an amendment to the 
1950 Nationality Act. 
 From the perspective of the prevention of statelessness, there are two points to be 
discussed. First, the Japanese government believed that the ICCPR did not place a legal 
 
RIGHTS]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3215 
(1978). 
568 KOKUSAI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the 
Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3215 (1978). 
569 KOKUSAI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the 
Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3215 (1978). This is called 
facilitated naturalisation. MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun 
kara Dai Nijuichi Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child I (Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p.183. This document was disclosed as a result of a 
request to disclose administrative documents (MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru 
Kettei ni tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) 
Jouhou Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 
2016-00162. 
570 KOKUSAI JINKEN KIYAKU [INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS]. Holding of the 
Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3215 (1978). 
571 A similar view was expressed by the Minister for Justice. DAI 87 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN GAIMU IINKAI 
GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
THE 87TH SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 8, 27 April 1979) p. 19. See also DAI 91 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN 
OKINAWA OYOBI HOPPOU MONDAI NI KANSURU TOKUBETSU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE 
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR OKINAWA AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 91ST 
SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 3, 7 March 1980) p. 14.  
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obligation on states to confer nationality.572 This explains why the Japanese government 
regarded the 1950 Nationality Act as compatible with Article 24(3) of the ICCPR even 
though there were two major ways in which stateless children could be born in Japan: 
children born in Japan to parents with another nationality and children born in Japan to 
Japanese mothers and foreign fathers. Second, statelessness could not be prevented by 
facilitated naturalisation. In order to naturalise as Japanese, “permission of the Minister of 
Justice” was necessary.573 In other words, naturalisation was at the discretion of the Minister 
for Justice. Even under facilitated naturalisation, this principle remained the same as for 
normal naturalisation. While a condition on residence in Japan was loosened and some 
conditions were not required,574 children younger than three years of age were unable to 
apply for facilitated naturalisation.575  In other words, those who applied for facilitated 
naturalisation might have to be stateless for three years or more. This was problematic from 
the perspective of the prevention of statelessness. 
 
 
572 The MOJ expressed this view in the deliberations of the Diet. DAI 91 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN OKINAWA 
OYOBI HOPPOU MONDAI NI KANSURU TOKUBETSU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU [MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL 
COMMITTEE FOR OKINAWA AND NORTHERN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 91ST SESSION 
OF THE DIET] (No. 3, 7 March 1980) p. 14. On a different occasion, the MOJ interpreted Article 24(3) of 
the ICCPR as providing that children should acquire a nationality when they are born, but it does not 
specify which nationality they acquire. DAI 101 KAI KOKKAI SANGIIN HOUMU IINKAI GIJI SOKKIROKU 
[MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS, THE 101ST SESSION OF 
THE DIET] (No. 6, 10 May 1984) p. 5. This Japanese interpretation of Article 23(4) of the ICCPR seems 
to be problematic when Article 2 of the ICCPR, which provide for the ensurance of rights in the ICCPR 
to “all individuals within its territory”, is considered. By applying Article 2 in interpreting Article 24(3), 
Japan needs to ensure all children’s right to acquire a nationality within the Japanese territory. Since 
stateless children’s right to acquire a nationality does not seem to be ensured, the Japanese government 
needs to ensure the children’s right to acquire a nationality pursuant to Articles 2 and 24(3) of the 
ICCPR. Hajime Akiyama, Jiyuuken Kiyaku niokeru Kodomo no Kokuseki Shutokuken to Kokka no 
Gimu: Jiyuuken Kiyaku Dai 2 Jou no Kanten kara [Children’s Right to Acquire a Nationality and 
States’ Obligation under the ICCPR: The Perspective from Article 2 of the ICCPR], 30 HUMAN RIGHTS 
INTERNATIONAL 115 (2019). 
573 Article 5 of the 1950 Nationality Act. 
574 The following conditions are not required for facilitated naturalisation but they are required for a 
normal naturalisation: having the capacity to act according to his or her national law, and being able to 
make a living. Article 5 of the 1950 Nationality Act. 
575 Having an address in Japan for three or more years is a condition for application for facilitated 
naturalisation. Article 5 of the 1950 Nationality Act. 
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3.8. The CEDAW and the 1984 Nationality Act 
The CEDAW triggered the enactment of the 1984 Nationality Act.576 Although the 
norm of preventing statelessness was not the basis of the enactment of the 1984 Nationality 
Act, the act had the effect of preventing statelessness. It must also be noted that the previous 
nationality acts had been in line with the provision on the norm of preventing statelessness 
in the CEDAW. With regard to statelessness, Article 9(1) provided that women did not 
become stateless as a result of marrying a foreigner or a change in their husband’s nationality. 
Article 9(2) added that women have “equal rights with men with respect to the nationality 
of their children”. Article 9(2) assisted in the enactment of the 1984 Nationality Act. This 
section begins with an explanation of the basic principle of the 1984 Nationality Act. 
The 1984 Nationality Act adopted jus sanguinis through both the paternal and 
maternal lines. The MOFA regarded the principle of jus sanguinis through the paternal line 
in the 1950 Nationality Act as an issue, in light of Article 9(2) of the CEDAW,577 and the 
nationality act needed to be amended to jus sanguinis through both the paternal and maternal 
lines.578 Since 1981, the Legislative Council of the MOJ has discussed a possible amendment 
of the 1950 Nationality Act in order to ratify the CEDAW.579 In an Intermediate Draft on 
 
576 KIDANA, supra note 8, at 40. For CEDAW, see 1.3.6., “CEDAW: Women’s Right to a Nationality”. 
577 United Nations Planning and Administration Division, MOFA, Fujin Sabetsu Teppai Jouyaku no 
Kentou Joukyou [Status of Study of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women] (29 September 1980). This view was also observable in the following. United Nations 
Planning and Administration Division, MOFA, Shiryou 81-7 Fujin Sabetsu Teppai Jouyaku to 
Kokuseki Hou tono Kankei nitsuite (Shiryou) [Document 81-7: The Relationship between the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Nationality Act] 
(26 June 1981). These documents were disclosed as a result of a request to disclose administrative 
documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni tsuite (Tsuuchi) 
[Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou Koukai Dai 
01655 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 9 Gatsu 12 Nichi (12 September 2016) Request number: 2016-00163. 
578 The MOFA also stated that methods to prevent multiple nationalities and the treatment of children 
born abroad needed to be considered. Id. 
579 Japan signed the CEDAW in 1980. The special ceremony to sign the CEDAW took place on 17 July 
1980 (UN, Short History of CEDAW Convention, at 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm (viewed Jan. 17, 2019).), and Japan signed the 
CEDAW at the ceremony. Nobuko Takahashi, the ambassador to Denmark at the time, stated that it was 
not certain whether Japan would sign the CEDAW until just before the actual signature. Many 
stakeholders pressed the Japanese government to sign, and signature was decided at the cabinet meeting 
on 15 July, a day after the opening ceremony of the special ceremony. Yasuko Yamashita, Josei Sabetsu 
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Amendment of the Nationality Act, announced on 1 February 1983, jus sanguinis through 
both the paternal and maternal lines was introduced.580 After consultation for stakeholders’ 
opinions, the 1984 Nationality Act applied jus sanguinis through both the paternal and 
maternal lines.581 Japan ratified the CEDAW in 1985, a year after the enactment of the 1984 
Nationality Act. 
Enactment of the 1984 Nationality Act contributed to preventing statelessness while 
the norm of preventing statelessness in the CEDAW itself did not influence the Nationality 
Act. Since Japanese women began to be able to transmit nationality, children of Japanese 
women and foreign men acquired Japanese nationality under the 1984 Nationality Act 
although such children became stateless under the 1950 Nationality Act. This contributed to 
preventing statelessness among children born to Japanese mothers and foreign fathers, one 
of the causes of statelessness in previous nationality acts. As a result of the enactment of the 
1984 Nationality Act, for instance, statelessness in Okinawa could be prevented. The 
children of American men, mainly those who worked for the military, and Japanese women 
tended to be stateless, and a number of children had become stateless in Okinawa since the 
1960s.582 In the Diet, issues of statelessness were discussed, and one member of the Diet 
stated that it was necessary to amend jus sanguinis through the paternal line.583 Although the 
gender equality enshrined in the CEDAW was a major reason for enactment of the 1984 
 
Teppai Joyaku to Nihon [CEDAW and Japan], 9 J. OF BUNKYO GAKUIN UNIV. DEP’T OF FOREIGN 
LANGUAGES AND BUNKYO GAKUIN COLL. 13 13-33 (2009). Based on this background, the 
compatibility between the CEDAW and Japanese laws began to be examined to ratify the CEDAW. 
580 Kiyoshi Hosokawa, Kokuseki Hou Kaisei Chuukan Shian no Gaiyou [Outline of the Intermediate 
Draft on Amendment of the Nationality Act], 788 JURISUTO 34, 35 (1983). 
581 KIDANA, supra note 8, at 42. 
582 Junko Kobayashi, 1985 Nen Kokuseki Hou to Okinawa no “Mukokuseki Ji” Mondai: “Haijo” to 
“Housetsu” no Hazama de [The 1985 Japanese Nationality Law and “Stateless Children” in Okinawa: 
Between Exclusion and Inclusion], 11 J. OF THE GRADUATE SCH. OF HUMANITIES AND SCI., 
OCHANOMIZU UNIV. 441, 443 (2008). Okinawa was under the administration of the US until 1972. 
Since many US bases remained in Okinawa, there were many US people there. For more detail, see 
4.3.1., “The Impact of Stateless Persons in Japan”. 
583 Dai 93 Kai Kokkai Sangiin Houmu Iinkai Giji Sokkiroku [Minutes of the Legal Committee, House of 
Councillors, the 93rd Session of the Diet] (No. 3, 20 November 1982) p. 9. 
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Nationality Act, stateless children in Okinawa were referred to in order to discuss the need 
to amend the 1950 Nationality Act. Under these circumstances, the 1984 Nationality Act 
prevented statelessness among the children of Japanese women. 
The norm of preventing statelessness in the CEDAW is evident in Article 9(1), and 
the 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act already complied with the article. Article 
9(1) of the CEDAW provided that a woman would not become stateless as a result of 
marriage to a foreigner or a change in her husband’s nationality. As a result of the 1916 
Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act, a woman’s loss of Japanese nationality as a result 
of marriage or a change in her husband’s nationality was conditional on her acquisition of a 
new nationality.584 In the 1950 Nationality Act, a woman would not lose her nationality as a 
result of marriage or a change in her husband’s nationality,585 and this principle did not 
change in the 1984 Nationality Act. Thus, the previous nationality acts were in line with 
Article 9(1) of the CEDAW. 
As a result of the enactment of the 1984 Nationality Act, which was influenced by 
the CEDAW, the children of Japanese women and foreign men ceased to become stateless. 
However, the possibility of statelessness remained. Children born to parents of foreign 
nationality in Japan became stateless if their parents’ nationalities were not transmitted. 
 
3.9. The CRC 
 Although the Japanese government recognised that the norm of preventing 
statelessness was the driving force behind the CRC’s inclusion of children’s right to acquire 
a nationality, it did not interpret Article 7 of the CRC as placing an obligation on states.586 
This stance can be seen from the anticipated questions and answers prepared by the MOFA 
 
584 See 2.4., “The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act”. 
585 See 3.3., “The 1950 Nationality Act”. 
586 For CRC, see 1.3.7., “CRC: The Commitment to Preventing Statelessness among Children”. 
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and MOJ. In answer to the question about whether Article 7 of the CRC placed an obligation 
on states to confer nationality on all children born in the territory,587 the MOFA and MOJ 
responded as follows.588 
 
Article 7(1) of this convention provides the principle that contracting parties 
acknowledge children’s right to acquire a nationality in light of the unstable status of 
children without a nationality in the current international society. Thus, it does not 
place an obligation on contracting parties to confer their nationality on all children in 
the state, including cases where children are born in the state. 
Article 7(2) also provides that contracting parties shall ensure the implementation of 
rights enshrined in paragraph 1 in accordance with their national law and their 
obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field. Thus, it does not 
place an obligation on contracting parties to prevent all children in the state from 
becoming stateless, including cases where children are born in the state. 
 
There are two features of note in this document. On the one hand, the document 
recognised the issues concerning stateless children. When Article 7(1) was introduced, “the 
unstable status of children without a nationality” was mentioned in reference to the status of 
 
587 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi 
Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child I 
(Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 181. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. 
588 Translated by the author. MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) 
(Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child I (Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 182. This document was disclosed as a 
result of a request to disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni 
kakawaru Kettei ni tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative 
Documents] (2016) Jouhou Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) 
Request number: 2016-00162. 
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stateless children.589 This illustrates the background to the development of Article 7(1). 
Statelessness was also mentioned to explain Article 7(2) in the anticipated questions and 
answers. These facts indicate that the Japanese government was aware that statelessness was 
a key concept of Article 7 of the CRC. On the other hand, this document stated that Article 
7 of the CRC did not place an obligation on states. It asserted that the application of jus soli 
was not required because it was assumed that there were two methods of conferring a 
nationality: the jus soli and jus sanguinis principles.590 This understanding was similar to the 
Japanese government’s understanding of the ICCPR.591 
The document asserted that statelessness could be prevented by the application of the 
jus soli principle if children were born in Japan to unknown parents or did not have a 
nationality pursuant to Article 2 of the 1984 Nationality Act.592 However, it acknowledged 
that it was possible that statelessness would take place to a limited extent.593 Even in such 
 
589 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi 
Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child I 
(Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 182. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. 
590 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi 
Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child I 
(Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 182. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. 
591 See 3.7., “The ICCPR”. 
592 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi 
Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child I 
(Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 182. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. 
593 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi 
Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child I 
(Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 183. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. 
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cases, it recognised that stateless persons born in Japan could acquire Japanese nationality 
through naturalisation, referring to Article 8(4), which provided for facilitated 
naturalisation.594 However, it must be noted that facilitated naturalisation cannot be regarded 
as a guaranteed way of preventing statelessness because such naturalisation was regarded as 
being at the discretion of the Minister for Justice.595 
A statement of explanation prepared by the MOFA before discussion of the CRC in 
the Diet explained that the obligation the CRC placed on Japan could be implemented by 
existing Japanese law, and thus, new domestic legislation was not necessary. 596  This 
indicates that although the Japanese government was aware of the prevention of statelessness 
as a central concern for the CRC, it did not interpret the CRC as placing an obligation on 
states. After the CRC was discussed in the Diet, Japan ratified it in 1994. 
 Although the norm of preventing statelessness was recognised, Japan did not adopt 
the jus soli principle in cases where children who were born in Japan would be stateless, so 
the possibility remained that children born in Japan to parents of a foreign nationality would 
be stateless when their parents’ nationalities could not be transmitted. 
 
 
594 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku Gimon Gitou (Sono Ichi) (Zembun kara Dai Nijuichi 
Jou) [Anticipated Questions and Answers regarding the Convention on the Rights of the Child I 
(Preamble to Article 21)] (July 1994), p. 183. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. For facilitated naturalisation, see note 574. 
595 See also 3.7., “The ICCPR”. 
596 MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku no Setsumeisho [Explanation of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child] (November 1993), p. 9. This document was disclosed as a result of a request to 
disclose administrative documents. MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni kakawaru Kettei ni 
tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative Documents] (2016) Jouhou 
Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) Request number: 2016-
00162. 
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3.10. Conclusion on the Prevention of Statelessness under the 1946 
Constitution 
This chapter has shown that the norm of preventing statelessness in international law 
played a limited role under the 1946 Constitution. The features of the Japanese position after 
WWII are clear when it is compared to that before WWII. First, the Japanese stance on the 
UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, which adopted the 
1961 Convention, can be compared with that on the Codification Conference, which adopted 
the 1930 Convention. Japan did not seem to be passionate about promoting the norm of 
preventing statelessness at the UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future 
Statelessness, while it had a strong commitment to preventing statelessness in the 
Codification Conference. In the Codification Conference, Japan stated its willingness to 
follow the new treaty to be adopted even if this required amendment of its nationality act.597 
However, in the UN Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness, 
Japan hoped to bring the new treaty in line with the 1950 Nationality Act.598 This indicates 
that Japan was less committed to preventing statelessness by international law at the UN 
Conference on the Elimination or Reduction of Future Statelessness than it was at the 
Codification Conference. 
Second, the discussion on the obligations that the CRC placed on states can be 
compared with the Japanese position on the resolution of the IDI. On the one hand, the 
drafters of the 1899 Nationality Act referred to the resolution of the IDI because the 
resolution was regarded as being “highly influential”,599 even though the resolution did not 
place any legal obligations on Japan. The norm of preventing statelessness was included in 
the resolution, and the 1899 Nationality Act contained some articles to prevent statelessness. 
 
597 See 2.5.3., “The Japanese Position in the Codification Conference (1930)”. 
598 See 3.6., “The 1961 Convention”. 
599 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 207, at 19. 
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On the other hand, it was argued that the CRC did not place an obligation on states to confer 
a nationality on children, and the need to prevent statelessness by conferring nationality was 
not considered when the compatibility between the CRC and Japanese laws was 
examined.600 Although Japan followed the norm of preventing statelessness, which was not 
legally binding at the end of the nineteenth century, it did not adopt additional measures to 
prevent statelessness after WWII, stating that the treaty did not place an obligation on it to 
confer nationality even though the prevention of statelessness was a significant theme of 
discussion in the CRC during the drafting process concerning children’s right to acquire a 
nationality.601 These two examples indicate that the Japanese commitment to the norm of 
preventing statelessness weakened after WWII. 
 
  
 
600 See 3.9., “The CRC”. An article on children’s right to acquire nationality in the ICCPR was also 
interpreted as not placing an obligation on states. See 3.7., “The ICCPR”. 
601 See 1.3.7., “CRC: The Commitment to Preventing Statelessness among Children”. 
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS 
4.1. Summary of the Chapter and Answer to the First Research Question 
Based on the answer to the first research question as found in Chapters One to Three, 
this chapter answers the second research question: What determined whether the norm of 
preventing statelessness in international law influenced Japanese nationality laws? It argues 
that a combination of international and national factors determined the Japanese reaction to 
the norm of preventing statelessness in international law. When there was a certain level of 
either international or national necessity to follow the prevention of statelessness in 
international law, Japan followed the principle of preventing statelessness. Japan has not 
found it necessary to do so recently, and it is not passionate about preventing statelessness 
at the moment. 
This chapter begins with the answer to the first research question by examining the 
results of Chapters One to Three. The first research question was: To what extent has the 
norm of preventing statelessness in international law influenced Japanese nationality law? 
The answers are that under the 1889 Constitution, the norm of preventing statelessness in a 
resolution of the IDI from 1895 influenced the 1899 Nationality Act, but under the 1946 
Constitution, the norm had a limited impact. 
After Chapter One indicated that there was international law which intended to 
prevent statelessness, Chapters Two and Three examined international law’s influence on 
the Japanese laws. Under the 1889 Constitution, the influence of prevention of statelessness 
in international law is observable. The drafters of the 1889 Constitution learnt from foreign 
advisors that international law could cover nationality from foreign advisors, so they decided 
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to legislate a specific law on nationality. In addition, the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law influenced the 1899 Nationality Act. In the drafting process of the Act, the 
IDI resolution which called for preventing statelessness was referred to, and the Act 
contained some provisions to prevent statelessness. 
However, the norm of preventing statelessness in international law did not influence 
Japanese laws under the 1946 Constitution much. It must be pointed out that the norm of 
preventing statelessness in international law influenced the interpretation of the freedom to 
renounce one’s nationality under the 1946 Constitution. On the one hand, the Japanese 
government interpreted that the constitution did not allow Japanese nationals to renounce 
their nationality when this resulted in statelessness, referring to the preamble of the 1930 
Convention. On the other hand, the norm of preventing statelessness in other treaties did not 
influence Japanese nationality law. Japan participated in the conferences which adopted the 
1961 Convention, the ICCPR and CRC which concerned prevention of statelessness, but no 
treaty triggered the argument of the necessity to prevent statelessness in the Japanese 
government. An analysis of international law’s influence on Japanese laws under the 1946 
Constitution indicates that Japan followed the 1930 Convention partly while they do not 
legally bind Japan. This is a case wherein a state follows international law to which it is not 
legally bound.602 
 
 
602 It must also be noted that Japan followed the resolution of the IDI, which Japan regarded very 
important document in international law, while it was not a legally binding document. See 2.3., “The 
1899 Nationality Act”. This chapter is not concerned with the prevention of statelessness in the former 
colonies during the colonial period because the Japanese position on the prevention of statelessness in 
the former colonies seems to have been driven by a completely different logic from that driving its 
position on the mainland of Japan. Instead, this chapter focuses on the mainland of Japan. For an 
analysis of the former colonies, see 2.7., “Conclusion on the Prevention of Statelessness under the 1889 
Constitution”. 
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4.2. International Factors 
4.2.1. The Status of Japan in International Society 
In order to answer the second research question to analyse the answer of the first 
research question, this chapter claims that international and national factors determined 
whether Japan followed the norm of preventing statelessness. This section examines two 
international factors: the status of Japan in international society and the status of the norm 
of preventing statelessness in international society. These factors can be explained by an 
understanding of the English School of international relations, which claims that states share 
“certain common interests and common values” and “conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules” even though there is no centralised government.603 Manning, an early 
scholar from the English School, believes that states tend to comply with international law 
because they seek to meet the expectations of a desirable “reference group”.604 An analysis 
of international factors clarifies whether or not each state seeks to be a member of a desirable 
reference group, and what the desirable reference group’s behaviour is. 
First, the status of Japan in international society determines the degree to which it 
follows international law. On the one hand, at the end of the nineteenth century, Japan felt it 
necessary to catch up with the West because it was a newcomer to international society. On 
the other hand, Japan currently feels that it is recognised as one of the developed states. This 
indicates that Japan’s status in international society has changed over time, resulting in a 
different stance towards international norms, including the prevention of statelessness, in the 
late nineteenth century and currently. 
 
603 BULL, supra note 6, at 13. 
604 C. A. W. Manning, The Legal Framework in a World of Change, in THE ABERYSTWYTH PAPERS: 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1919-69 301, 323 (Brian Porter ed., 1972). 
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This finding can be explained by research claiming that “novice agents with few 
cognitive priors will be relatively open to persuasion” to a new norm.605 Checkel refers to 
the impact of the principle of inclusive citizenship, such as tolerance of dual citizenship, 
developed by the Council of Europe, on German and Ukrainian policies. He states that 
Germany, which has been recognised as a member of Europe for a long time, complied with 
the norm through social sanctioning and instrumental choice whereas Ukraine, a new 
member of Europe, did so by social learning and argumentative persuasion.606 This suggests 
that traditional members of international society calculate the benefits of complying with a 
norm, and act to maximise the benefits, whereas newcomers to international society, who do 
not have much prior knowledge, tend to learn international norms, including international 
law, and such norms determine the way to behave. They tend to follow international norms 
because they tend to believe that it is necessary for members of international society to 
follow the norms. This theory is based on constructivism, which claims that state interests 
are formed as a result of social interaction.607 
 
605 Jeffrey T. Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, 55(3) INT’L ORG. 
553, 563 (2005). 
606 Id, at 554-555, 567, 572-573. 
607 Jutta Brunnée & Stephan J. Toope, Constructivism and International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF ART 119, 121 
(Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013). Note that constructivism is similar to the approach of 
the English School, another theoretical framework in this dissertation, in that both theories concern 
intersubjectivity, focusing on the “logics of appropriateness” among states. Christian Reus-Smit, 
Constructivism and the English School, in THEORISING INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: ENGLISH SCHOOL 
METHODS 58, 58 (Cornelia Nevari ed., 2009). It must be noted that these are various criticisms to use 
the norm as a framework of analysis from realism, feminism and postcolonialism perspectives. See the 
following. Scott N. Romaniuk & Francis Grice, Norms, Norm Violations, and IR Theory, E-
International Relations, at https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/15/norms-norm-violations-and-ir-theory/ 
(visited Nov. 30, 2019). Birgit Locher & Elisabeth Prügl, Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart 
or Sharing the Middle Ground?, 45 INT’L STUDIES QUARTERLY 111 (2001). Naeem Inayatullah & 
David L. Blaney, Constructivism and the Normative: Dangerous Liaisons?, in AGAINST 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS NORMS: POSTCOLONIAL PERSPECTIVES 23 (Charlotte Epstein ed., 2017). 
However, as this dissertation points out, Japan followed the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law because it felt the necessary to do so as a member of international society. In other 
words, this dissertation indicates the validity to use the norm as a framework of analysis. Thus, this 
dissertation examines the role of the norm in international society. 
    138 
In the late nineteenth century, Japan tended to follow international law as a rule in 
order to be recognised as a “civilized nation” by the West.608  Since the middle of the 
seventeenth century, Japan had adopted an isolationist policy,609 and did not have many 
exchanges with other states.610 This situation changed when the black ships of the US arrived 
in Japan in 1853 and the US put pressure on Japan to end its isolationist policy.611 In the 
following year, Japan concluded the first treaty with the West: the Convention of Kanagawa, 
or the Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity.612 In 1858, Japan concluded Treaties of Amity 
and Commerce with five states: the US, the Netherlands, Russia, the UK and France.613 
These treaties can be regarded as the first step in Japan being recognised as a member of 
international society, but the West did not regard Japan as an equal member of international 
society. Each treaty provided advantages to the West with regard to consular courts.614 The 
consul from each state was entitled to hold the court if one of its nationals was involved in 
any legal issue in Japan.615 In other words, Japanese laws were not applied to foreigners 
living and staying in Japan, implying that Japan was not considered a ‘civilized nation’.616 
At the time, “civility” was one significant criterion required to be regarded as an equal entity 
 
608 Matsui, supra note 27, at 9. 
609 For a brief history of Japan’s isolationist policy, see the following. MAYUMI ITOH, GLOBALIZATION 
OF JAPAN: JAPANESE SAKOKU MENTALITY AND U.S. EFFORTS TO OPEN JAPAN 23-25 (1998). 
610 Exceptions were Japan’s contact with China, the Netherlands and Korea. Matsui, supra note 27, at 8. 
611 Masamichi Ogawara, Nichi Bei Washin Jouyaku (1853-54 Nen): Peri Raikou to Nihon no Kaikoku 
[Japan-US Treaty of Peace and Amity (1853-1854): Arrival of Perry and the Opening of Japan], in 
HANDOBUKKU KINDAI NIHON GAIKOUSHI: KUROFUNE RAIKOUKARA SENRYOUKI MADE [HANDBOOK OF 
MODERN JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLACK SHIPS TO THE OCCUPIED 
ERA] 4, 4 (Toshihiro Minohara and Souchi Naraoka eds., 2016). 
612 Id, at 4. 
613 Kaoru Iokibe, Ansei Gokakoku Jouyaku (1858 Nen): Kindai Nihon no Shuppatsu [1858 Treaties: 
The Departure of Modern Japan], in HANDOBUKKU KINDAI NIHON GAIKOUSHI: KUROFUNE RAIKOUKARA 
SENRYOUKI MADE [HANDBOOK OF MODERN JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: FROM THE ARRIVAL OF 
THE BLACK SHIPS TO THE OCCUPIED ERA] 10, 13 (Toshihiro Minohara and Souchi Naraoka eds., 2016). 
614 Kaoru Iokibe, Jouyaku Kaisei Koushou (1871-1994 Nen): Kindai Nihon Gaikou no Zoukei 
[Negotiation on Amendment of the Treaties: Formation of the Modern Japanese Diplomacy], in 
HANDOBUKKU KINDAI NIHON GAIKOUSHI: KUROFUNE RAIKOUKARA SENRYOUKI MADE [HANDBOOK OF 
MODERN JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLACK SHIPS TO THE OCCUPIED 
ERA] 20, 20 (Toshihiro Minohara and Souchi Naraoka eds., 2016). 
615 Id, at 20. 
616 Matsui, supra note 27, at 9. 
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in international society. 617  Under such circumstances, amendment of unequal treaties, 
including the abolition of the consular court, was the most significant issue for the Japanese 
government.618 
In order to amend unequal treaties and survive in international society, Japan adopted 
some approaches. One was to catch up with the Western administrative system in order to 
be regarded as a civilised state by the West.619 This was a particularly significant step 
towards the amendment of unequal treaties with the West. Following international law was 
one criterion for Japanese civility, so Japan did it.620 For example, it followed the laws of 
war. Some Japanese legal counsellors taught the laws of war to the military, and Japan 
complied with those laws, which provided for the treatment of enemies and neutrals, in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95.621 As a result, Thomas Erskine Holland, the Western scholar, 
judged that Japan had acted “in a manner worthy of the most civilized nations of Western 
Europe”.622 A second example is provided by Japan’s accession to the Paris and Berne 
Conventions. The Paris Convention concerned the copyright of industrial property and the 
Berne Convention concerned the copyright of literary and artistic works.623 Japan acceded 
 
617 ROBERT JACKSON, GLOBAL COVENANT: HUMAN CONDUCT IN A WORLD OF STATES 121-122 (2003). 
618 Matsui, supra note 27, at 10. 
619 The other approach was to develop the military to save Japan from external invasion. As a result of 
the development of the military, Japan won the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. More surprisingly, 
Japan won the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05. Since Russia was regarded as a “white power”, 
Japanese victory over Russia was a major surprise for international society. Japan began to be regarded 
as a member of international society after this victory from the perspective of military power. GLENN D. 
HOOK, JULIE GILSON, CHRISTOPHER W. HUGHES & HUGO DOBSON, JAPAN’S INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND SECURITY 26 (3rd ed., 2012). 
620 The development of municipal law was also significant in Japan being regarded as a civilised state. 
Japan adopted two ways of learning about the municipal and international legal systems of the West. 
First, Japan hired foreign advisers. Gustave Boissonade, Hermann Roesler, and Albert Mosse taught law 
to Japanese government officials. Second, Japanese delegates visited Europe. On the basis of its studies 
of Western states, Japan developed laws, including the 1889 Constitution, the first constitution in Japan. 
Asonuma, supra note 195, at 34-35. 
621Akashi, supra note 27, at 738. 
622 THOMAS ERSKINE HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 128 (1898). 
623 The Paris Convention was signed in 1883 and entered into force in 1884. See the following. Library 
of Congress, Protection of Industrial Property available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-
treaties/bevans/m-ust000001-0080.pdf (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). The Berne Convention was signed in 
1886 and entered into effect in 1887. 
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to these conventions in 1899. Accession was necessary because treaties of commerce and 
navigation with Western states required it.624 Japan also began recognising rights related to 
copyright, and it developed a municipal copyright law to make municipal law compatible 
with international law.625 Following international law helped in improving Japan’s position 
in international society, and unequal treaties began to be amended. In 1894, the Anglo-
Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was concluded, and this treaty eliminated the 
clause on consular courts that was advantageous to the UK. 626  The UK was greatly 
impressed by Japan’s development of its laws, and this persuaded the UK to eliminate the 
clause.627 While these cases of the laws of war and the Paris and Berne Conventions are 
different from the prevention of statelessness,628 they imply that Japan had learnt to follow 
international law in order to be regarded as a member of international society. 
In this context, international law played a role in the late nineteenth century in the 
issue of nationality in Japan too. The 1889 Constitution did not specify who Japanese 
subjects or nationals were because the foreign advisers had said that international law could 
have an influence on nationality issues, and the scope of nationals should be covered by a 
nationality act separate from the constitution.629 In the 1899 Nationality Act, the norm of 
preventing statelessness was included. During the drafting process of the 1899 Nationality 
Act, the resolution of the IDI, which included the prevention of statelessness adopted in 1895, 
 
624 FUMIO SAKKA, CHUUKAI CHOSAKUKEN HOU [COPYRIGHT LAW] 53-54 (3rd ed., 2004). Satoshi 
Tsuruoka, Kindai Nihon no Sangyou Zaisan Ken Seisaku: Pari Jouyaku Kamei wo meguru Nichi Ei Bei 
no Seiji Katei no Bunseki [Modern Japanese Policy on Industrial Property Rights: Analysis of the 
Political Processes of Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States when Japan Became a Party 
to the Paris Convention], 21 IIP BULLETIN (INST. OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) 22-3 (2012). 
625 SAKKA, supra note 624, at 54. Tsuruoka, supra note 624, at 22-5. 
626 Asonuma, supra note 195, at 34-35. 
627 Id, at 34-35. 
628 The first example, the laws of war, concerns an area regarded traditionally as a matter of 
international law, whereas nationality matters used to be regarded as a domestic matter, so they are 
different in nature. The second example, accession to the Paris and Berne Conventions, was requested 
by other states, whereas such a request seems to have been absent in the cases of nationality and 
statelessness issues. 
629 See 2.2., “Nationality in the 1889 Constitution”. 
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was mentioned.630 It is notable that Japan referred to the resolution of the IDI, which was 
not even legally binding. Since the Japanese government believed that international law 
should be followed, it referred to a “highly influential” document in international law, the 
resolution of the IDI.631 This implies that the norm of preventing statelessness began to be 
regarded as a principle in international society, and that Japan learnt this principle, even 
though nationality matters had traditionally been regarded as a matter for each state. 
However, this stance seems to have changed since the middle of the 1930s. Japan 
attempted to leave international society, and consequently the Japanese desire to be a 
member of international society weakened. 632  As a result, following international law 
became a less important issue for Japan. In the middle of the 1930s, Japan began to leave 
the international arena as a result of the rise of the ultra-nationalists, and the Japanese 
commitment to principles in international society, including international law, weakened.633 
One example is the Japanese reaction to the 1930 Convention. Japan signed the 1930 
Convention, and it indicated its commitment to the Convention but did not ratify it. It is said 
that Japan was isolating itself from international society at the time, which explains why the 
Japanese government did not ratify the Convention, even though it began the procedure to 
amend the 1899 Nationality Act to bring it in line with the Convention soon after signing 
 
630 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
631 MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 207, at 19. 
632 Note that members of international society share “certain common interests and common values” 
and feel that they are “bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in 
the working of common institutions”. BULL, supra note 6, at 13. In other words, Japan opted not to 
share the common values of international society in the 1930s. 
633 Some scholars argue that the ultra-nationalists became powerful in Japan because the Japanese 
people felt that Japan was not treated well by international society even after it had been one of the 
victorious states in WWI. For instance, Japan had proposed to include the prohibition of racial 
discrimination in the LN Covenant, fearing that non-White people, including Japanese people, would 
become the victims of racial discrimination, but this proposal was not realised. See note 295. In 
addition, the Washington Naval Treaty was adopted in 1922, according to which the US and the UK 
were allowed to possess bigger capital ships than Japan was. Thus, the US and UK were militarily in a 
more advantageous position than Japan was. HOOK, GILSON, HUGHES & DOBSON, supra note 619, at 
27-28. It is said that these experiences frustrated Japan. 
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it.634 The Japanese withdrawal from the LN in 1933 after the Mukden Incident also indicates 
the Japanese stance of isolating itself from international society at the time.635 
This limited commitment to international law, compared to at the end of the 
nineteenth century, remained even after the end of WWII although for different reasons from 
the 1930s. As a result of the defeat in WWII, Japan needed to recover from devastation, and 
it decided to build a political alliance with the US and to pursue a rapid economic recovery 
based on the Yoshida Doctrine.636 Following international law was not necessarily the tactic 
which Japan took to be back to international society.637 The first element of analysis is a 
political one. It must be noted that it was not only Japan but also the US that intended to 
make Japan a part of the West.638 In 1951, the Security Treaty between the US and Japan 
was signed, and it was determined that the US military would be stationed in Japan.639 This 
 
634 See 2.5.3., “The Japanese Position in the Codification Conference (1930)”. 
635 Officially, Japan withdrew from the LN two years after the notification of withdrawal pursuant to 
Article 1 of the LN Covenant. See the following. Tomoaki Murakami, Ritton Houkoku Sho, Kokusai 
Renmei Dattai (1931-33 Nen): “Kyouchou” kara “Koritsu” heno Tenkanten [Lytton Report and 
Withdrawal from the League of Nations (1931-1933): Turning Point from “Cooperation” to 
“Isolation”], in HANDOBUKKU KINDAI NIHON GAIKOUSHI: KUROFUNE RAIKOUKARA SENRYOUKI MADE 
[HANDBOOK OF MODERN JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: FROM THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLACK SHIPS 
TO THE OCCUPIED ERA] 216, 217 (Toshihiro Minohara and Souchi Naraoka eds., 2016). For the 
relationship between Japan and the LN, see the following. THOMAS W. BURKMAN, JAPAN AND THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS: EMPIRE AND WORLD ORDER, 1914-1938 (2008). 
636 The Yoshida Doctrine was proposed by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida after WWII. It claims that 
security issues should be entrusted to the US so that Japan can focus on its economic recovery. Japan 
built an alliance with the US during the Cold War era pursuant to this doctrine. Since this doctrine 
allowed the Japanese government not to spend much money on its military, it is considered to be one 
reason for the economic development of Japan after the end of WWII. HOOK, GILSON, HUGHES & 
DOBSON, supra note 619, at 29. 
637 This does not mean that Japan did not comply with legally binding international law. Rather, this 
means that the relationship with the US was the focus for Japan to recover from WWII. As seen in the 
example of the CEDAW, Japan amended its municipal law to comply with legally binding international 
law. See 3.8., “The CEDAW and the 1984 Nationality Act”. As mentioned in “Scope and Terminology 
of the Dissertation” in the “Introduction”, “following” international law in this dissertation means 
making municipal law compatible with international treaties regardless of their legally binding nature 
for the state. 
638 HOOK, GILSON, HUGHES & DOBSON, supra note 619, at 89. 
639 AKITOSHI MIYASHITA, HANDOBUKKU SENGO NIHON GAIKOU SHI: TAINICHI KOUWA KARA MITSUYAKU 
MONDAI MADE [HANDBOOK OF POST-WAR JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC HISTORY: FROM THE PEACE TREATY  
WITH JAPAN TO THE SECRET PROMISE] 17 (2017). From the commitment to the Security Treaty between 
the US and Japan, one can argue that Japan had a commitment to international law. However, Japan did 
not unconditionally follow the norms of international law, in contrast to its approach at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
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indicates that Japan had become a strategic partner of the US in the context of the Cold War, 
and this elevated Japan’s status in international society.640 Japanese international relations 
with the Eastern bloc also contributed to the elevation of Japan’s status in international 
society. In 1956, the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration was signed, and the USSR and Japan 
restored diplomatic relations. After this, Japan became a member of the UN. 641  This 
historical background shows how Japan began to be recognised as a member of international 
society around the 1960s.642 
The second element is an economic one. Soon after the end of WWII, the Korean 
War took place, and the UN, headed by the US, needed arms. In these circumstances, the 
UN established a “direct procurement” programme, and Japan supplied arms to the UN.643 
This helped Japan’s economic recovery after WWII.644 Japan has expanded economically 
since then, and in 1956, the gross national product per capita was higher than the standard 
in the pre-war period.645 Japan became a member of the OECD in 1964, indicating that Japan 
was beginning to be regarded as a developed state.646 Since Japan needed to recover from 
the devastation of WWII, it focused on political and economic matters, and following 
international law does not seem to have been a priority for Japan at the time. In this context, 
Japan came to be able to calculate the costs and benefits of following international law from 
 
640 Id, at 17. 
641 Id, at 51. 
642 Some scholars claim that Japan did not have a high political status until the 1960s, and that one 
reason why Japan became a member of human rights treaties was to signal Japan’s legitimacy. John M. 
Peek, Japan, the United Nations, and Human Rights, 32(3) ASIAN SURVEY 217, 217 (1992). 
643 Saburo Okita, Japan’s Economy and the Korean War, 20(14) FAR E. SURVEY 141, 141-142 (1951). 
644 HOOK, GILSON, HUGHES & DOBSON, supra note 619, at 29. 
645 The Economic Planning Agency of Japan at the time famously stated that “it is not ‘post-war’ 
anymore” (translated by the author). Economic Planning Agency, Shouwa 31 Nen Nenji Keizai 
Houkoku: Ketsugo [Conclusion: Annual Economic Report 1956] (1956), available at 
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-010501.html. This indicates that the Japanese 
economy had recovered and had even progressed beyond the standard of the pre-war period. 
646 HOOK, GILSON, HUGHES & DOBSON, supra note 619, at 3. It must be noted that the US in particular 
had a political incentive to invite Japan, an ally, to be a member of the OECD. MIYASHITA, supra note 
639. 
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the 1960s, and it began to follow international law when it found it in its interests to do so, 
as we shall see in the following subsection.647 
When the circumstances up to the 1930s and after the 1960s are compared, Japan’s 
status in international society determined its stance towards international law. Japan did its 
best to follow international law when it was a newcomer to international society, but it did 
not do so unless there were substantial benefits to be derived from doing so. The Japanese 
stance of not focusing on following international law from the 1930s to the 1960s derived 
from its unique political environment, such as its desire to leave international society and its 
recovery after the end of WWII. Thus, it is fair to say that Japan’s status in international 
society mainly determined its behaviour regarding international law, including the norm of 
preventing statelessness. 
 
4.2.2. Status of the Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International Society 
The status of the norm of preventing statelessness in international society is another 
international factor. If the norm is widely shared in international society, states are more 
likely to find it necessary to follow the norm. Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory about the life 
of norms in international society offers a useful basis for analysis. They argue that in a phase 
of “norm emergence”, norm entrepreneurs attempt to persuade states to comply with a 
norm.648 As a result, states that are persuaded to follow it tend to do so. When a “critical 
mass of states” adopts a new norm and the norm reaches a tipping point, a “norm cascade” 
takes place, and the norm is regarded as an international norm.649 Thus, when a certain 
number of states follow the norm, the norm tends to be observed by more and more states. 
 
647 When it appeared to be in Japan’s interest to follow a treaty, Japan became a contracting party to it. 
See 4.2.2., “Status of the Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International Society”. 
648 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 43, at 895. 
649 Id, at 895. For an explanation of this theory, see the following. Id, at 895-902. 
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The following examples of human rights treaties indicate that Japan follows human 
rights norms or at least has become a contracting party to human rights treaties if many other 
developed states are contracting parties to them. When Japan ratified the ICCPR, the MOFA 
stated that the “main developed countries” had ratified it.650 The document of the MOFA 
added that ratification of the ICCPR would mean that Japan guaranteed human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, and that this could improve Japan’s reputation in international 
society.651 In the case of the CRC, the MOFA noted that 153 states, including the UK, France 
and Italy, were contracting parties, and the need to respect and protect children’s rights was 
recognised in “international society”.652 These cases indicate that following the norm or 
being a contracting party to human rights treaties is justified if such an action is necessary 
to secure a better position in international society.653 In other words, the status of a norm in 
international society affects states’ decision about whether to follow it. 
States’ limited commitment to preventing statelessness is observable when it is 
compared with the commitment to refugee issues, which were treated similarly until soon 
after the end of WWII. After the end of WWII, the norm of preventing statelessness received 
attention in relation to the stabilisation of the status of refugees and stateless persons in 
 
650 Translated by the author. MOFA, Kokusai Jinken Kiyaku no Shuyou Mondaiten nitsuite [Regarding 
the Main Issues of the International Covenants of Human Rights], p. 3-4, in Kokusai Jinken Kiyaku 
[International Covenants of Human Rights]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-3199 (1978). 
651 MOFA, Kokusai Jinken Kiyaku no Shuyou Mondaiten nitsuite [Regarding the Main Issues of the 
International Covenants of Human Rights], p. 4, in Kokusai Jinken Kiyaku [International Covenants of 
Human Rights]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 2010-
3199 (1978). 
652 Translated by the author. MOFA, Jidou no Kenri ni kansuru Jouyaku no Setsumeisho [Explanation 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child] (November 1993), p. 2. This document was disclosed as a 
result of a request to disclose administrative documents (MOFA, Gyousei Bunsho no Kaiji Seikyuu ni 
kakawaru Kettei ni tsuite (Tsuuchi) [Notification: A Decision of Disclosure of Administrative 
Documents] (2016) Jouhou Koukai Dai 01619 Gou. Heisei 28 Nen 8 Gatsu 29 Nichi (29 August 2016) 
Request number: 2016-00162. 
653 See also 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. The role of non-governmental 
organisations when Japan becomes a contracting party to human rights treaties also needs to be 
recognised. It is said that non-governmental organisations criticised the Japanese government in the 
CHR in the late 1970s, and this led the Japanese government to recognise the need to show its 
commitment to human rights. See the following. IWASAWA, supra note 8, at 6. 
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international society.654  However, it was forgotten in international politics, and refugee 
issues were prioritised given the nature of the Cold War. Although the 1954 Convention was 
intended for adoption with the Refugee Convention as a protocol, the Protocol on stateless 
persons was not adopted with the Refugee Convention; instead, the Convention relating to 
the Status of Stateless Persons was adopted in 1954, three years after the adoption of the 
Refugee Convention.655 The Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was adopted 
even later than the 1954 Convention. Although the ILC has adopted the Draft Conventions 
on Elimination and Reduction in 1953, it took another six years to hold a meeting to discuss 
the draft.656 In addition to the length of time to adopt each convention, the number of 
contracting parties to these conventions also indicates a different political commitment to 
the stabilisation of the status of refugees and stateless persons and the prevention of 
statelessness. At the end of 1989, when the Cold War was over, for instance, the number of 
contracting parties to the Refugee Convention was 100, while the 1954 Convention had 35 
contracting parties, and the 1961 Convention had only 15 contracting parties.657 The year 
that each convention was adopted and the numbers of contracting parties indicate that the 
 
654 See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. Since then, the prevention of 
statelessness has been regarded as a “humanitarian” matter related to refugees and migration. Author’s 
interview with Ms. Michelle Prodromou, Program Specialist, Humanitarian Affairs, US Permanent 
Mission to the UN, Geneva, 1 December 2016. See the following. Hajime Akiyama, UNHCR niyoru 
Mukokuseki no Yobou to Sakugen nimuketa Torikumi: Sono Kouka to Kadai [UNHCR’s Role in 
Preventing and Reducing Statelessness: Its Effects and Challenges], 19 THE UNITED NATIONS STUDIES 
191, 200 (2018). It must also be noted that, traditionally, the norm of preventing statelessness received 
attention from the perspectives of maintenance of international order and the hardships faced by 
stateless married women at the beginning of the twentieth century. See 1.3.2., “The 1930 Convention: 
The Emphasis on Married Women and Children”. Thus, the background to considering statelessness has 
shifted over time. 
655 ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 21. See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
656 For the historical relationship between the status of refugees, status of stateless persons, and the 
prevention of statelessness, see 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
657 For contracting parties to the Refugee Convention, see the following. UN Treaty Collection, 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, at  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=V-
2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en (visited Jan.17, 2019). For contracting parties to the 1954 
Convention, see the following. UN Treaty Collection, Convention relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
3&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&clang=_en (visited Jan. 17, 2019). For the contracting parties to the 1961 
Convention, see the following. UN Treaty Collection, supra note 145. 
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norm of preventing statelessness did not attract states’ attention relative to the stabilisation 
of the status of refugees.658 
One reason for states’ limited commitment is the limited political significance of 
preventing statelessness. The protection of refugees was attractive for the West for political 
reasons during the Cold War, while the prevention of statelessness was not necessarily so. 
On the one hand, US foreign policy during the Cold War was intended to challenge the 
legitimacy of communist states by accepting refugees.659 Persecution based on political 
grounds was regarded as one of the causes of refugeehood,660  so the West showed its 
legitimacy by accepting refugees who were persecuted by communist governments. On the 
other hand, statelessness was not politically significant for the West because it did not help 
the West to demonstrate its legitimacy all that much.661 Thus, international society did not 
pay significant attention to statelessness for a long time.662 
 In this international political situation, Japan also prioritised the stabilisation of the 
status of refugees over that of stateless persons and the prevention of statelessness. In the 
1970s, it accepted Indochinese refugees, and there are several reasons why. Firstly, there 
was pressure from other states, such as the US, for Japan to accept refugees.663 After Japan 
 
658 Given the years of adoption and the number of contracting parties to each treaty, it could be argued 
that the status of refugees was most important of the three issues to states, the stabilisation of the status 
of stateless persons came next in the order of priority, and the prevention of statelessness was regarded 
as the least important of the three issues. 
659 Cited in Julie Metus, The State and the Post-Cold War Refugee Regime: New Models, New 
Questions, 20(1) MICHIGAN J. OF INT’L L. 59, 65 (1998). Arakaki, supra note 114, at 71. 
660 A refugee is a person who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” 
pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (emphasis added). 
661 See the following. Paul Weis, The Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 10 INT’L & 
COMPARATIVE L. QUARTERLY 255, 263 (1961). 
662 Arakaki, supra note 114, at 70. 
663 HIROSHI HONMA, NANMIN MONDAI TOHA NANIKA [WHAT ARE REFUGEE ISSUES?] 31 (1990). PETRICE 
R. FLOWERS, REFUGEES, WOMEN, AND WEAPONS: INTERNATIONAL NORM ADOPTION AND 
COMPLIANCE IN JAPAN 43 (2009). It must be emphasised that the arrival of the boat people in the late 
1970s received attention in Japan, and refugees became a social issue. See HONMA, supra note 663, at 
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began accepting the Indochinese refugees, it ratified the Refugee Convention in 1981.664 
This suggests that pressure from other states was one reason why Japan ratified the Refugee 
Convention.665 Secondly, Japan’s identity as a “developed” state encouraged it to follow the 
principle of accepting refugees.666  This implies that the Japanese government regarded 
acceptance of refugees and the Refugee Convention as principles that developed states 
needed to follow. Since the Western states found it in their interest to accept refugees, the 
principle of accepting refugees was regarded as a norm that developed states should follow. 
This indicates that the stabilisation of the status of refugees received a certain amount of 
attention in international society. In comparison, the norm of preventing statelessness seems 
to have been less influential in international society and there seems to have been less 
pressure for the Japanese government to be a contracting party to the 1961 Convention. As 
a result, Japan has not followed the norm of preventing statelessness recently.667 
 
 
3. Japanese commitment to the status of refugees can be explained by the impact of refugees in Japan as 
well. See also 4.3.1., “The Impact of Stateless Persons in Japan”. 
664 For the evaluation of Japanese ratification of the Refugee Convention, see the following. OSAMU 
ARAKAKI, REFUGEE LAW AND PRACTICE IN JAPAN 16-18 (2008). 
665 Flowers also introduces the argument that non-governmental organisations played a significant role 
in the Japanese government’s decision to become a contracting party to the Refugee Convention 
although she is critical to this argument. Petrice Flowers, International Human Rights Norms in Japan, 
38(1) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 85, 97-98 (2016). 
666 Id, at 98. 
667 The status of the norm of preventing statelessness in international society before WWII is not clear. 
For instance, there were not many topics that international law covered around 1930 but prevention of 
conflicts of nationality, including statelessness, was included in the 1930 Convention, which was the 
only convention that was adopted at the Codification Conference. See 1.3.1., “Awareness of the Issue of 
Statelessness as a Challenge to the International Order”. This implies the possibility that the norm of 
preventing statelessness was a significant principle in international society around 1930 although this is 
not clear. Rather, it is more probable that Japan wanted to improve its status in international society, and 
it followed any international principles at the time. The norm of preventing statelessness seems to have 
been one of them. See also 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
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4.3. National Factors 
4.3.1. The Impact of Stateless Persons in Japan 
Although international factors mainly determine whether Japan follows prevention 
of statelessness in international law, national factors are also relevant to the Japanese 
decision to follow international law. There are two circumstances that international factors 
do not explain the states’ action. First, the 1961 Convention was adopted and initiated by 
European states in 1961. However, there was no necessity to prevent statelessness from the 
international factors argued above in Europe. European states were dominant in international 
society, so they did not necessarily pay attention to their status in international society unlike 
Japan.668 Furthermore, the norm of preventing statelessness did not receive much attention 
from states compared to the norm on refugees because of the limited political interest.669 
Thus, international factors do not explain the European states’ commitment to prevent 
statelessness. The second circumstance is observable in Japan. Since the 1899 Nationality 
Act, the first nationality act, the Japanese law has not allowed the deprivation of Japanese 
nationality although international law was not mentioned in this context. 670  Since the 
prohibition of deprivation of nationality contributes to the prevention of statelessness, this 
case indicates that a national norm which contributes to prevent statelessness is observable 
in Japan. These two circumstances indicate that there is a need to examine national factors 
as well as international ones. This section argues that the impact of stateless persons in Japan 
and Japanese national identity are national factors. This subsection deals with the impact of 
stateless persons in Japan. 
Stateless persons were not of much concern in Japan. Even if international factors 
were not in effect, Japan might have followed the norm of preventing statelessness if the 
 
668 See 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
669 See 4.2.2., “Status of the Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International Society”. 
670 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
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impact of stateless persons in Japan had been strong. Such an impact does not equate to the 
actual number of stateless persons in Japan because even a small number of stateless persons 
could have raised awareness of statelessness.671 However, as will be discussed, the Japanese 
government did not seem to recognise the impact of stateless persons, so the national 
situation did not help Japan to follow the norm of preventing statelessness. This is 
comparable with the conditions in Europe soon after the end of WWII. 
The driving force to adopting the 1961 Convention, the holistic convention to prevent 
statelessness, was the fact that the European states recognised stateless persons after the end 
of WWII.672 It was reported that 2.7 million stateless refugees were identified after the end 
of WWII,673 and solutions for refugees and statelessness were explored in this context.674 In 
other words, statelessness was regarded as an issue, coupled with the issue of refugees, 
because there were many stateless refugees in Europe in the 1950s.675 In response to the 
massive number of stateless refugees, the 1961 Convention was adopted.676 This context 
indicates that the commitment to preventing statelessness in international law was triggered 
by the real issue of stateless persons.677 
By contrast, the Japanese government did not recognise any major statelessness 
problems in Japan. For instance, the MOFA stated that Japan was not really relevant to issues 
 
671 For instance, the 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act was triggered by a small number of 
stateless women. With regard to the number of stateless persons the Japanese government has 
identified, as of June 2017, the MOJ recognises 588 stateless persons in Japan. Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Zairyuu Gaikokujin Toukei (Kyuu Touroku 
Gaikokujin Toukei) [Statistics on Foreign National Residents (former Statistics on Registered Foreign 
Nationals)] (June 2017), https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-
search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&lid=000001196143. It is said that these statistics do not reflect the 
reality. See the following. STUDY GROUP ON STATELESSNESS IN JAPAN, supra note 20, at 30-32. 
672 See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
673 UN, supra note 110, at 7-8. 
674 See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
675 See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
676 See 1.3.4., “The 1961 Convention: Link with Refugee Issues”. 
677 For instance, as a result of the dissolution of the former USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
statelessness was a matter of concern, and international organisations worked on stateless persons at the 
time. ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 26. This also indicates that the existence of stateless person issues 
encourages states and international organisations to work on issues of statelessness. 
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of stateless persons in 1957.678  Although Japan faced refugee issues when Indochinese 
refugees fled to Japan in the late 1970s and 1980s,679 statelessness did not receive much 
attention at the time. One early exception was the 1916 Amendment. In the early twentieth 
century, the Japanese government recognised stateless women who became stateless as a 
result of marriage to Canadian men. While the number of these women may have been small, 
the issue received attention in the Imperial Diet, and Japanese women who were married to 
foreign men ceased to lose their Japanese nationality unless they acquired the nationality of 
their husband.680 This was a case where the reality of statelessness encouraged the Japanese 
government to consider preventing statelessness. However, similar cases are not observable 
on other occasions in Japan. 
There was another issue that could have helped the Japanese government to regard 
statelessness as a problem in Japan: the status of persons from the former colonies. For 
instance, Koreans lost their Japanese nationality after the end of WWII.681 However, the 
Japanese government did not perceive their situation as an issue because it assumed that the 
Korean people acquired the nationality of the ROK.682 This view was supported by Korean 
ethnic groups in Japan. The Korean Residents Union in Japan, a major Korean ethnic society 
that followed the policies of the ROK, supported the loss of Japanese nationality because it 
believed that the Korean people did not want to possess Japanese nationality after the end of 
Japanese colonial rule.683 It must be noted that people from the colonies residing in Japan 
 
678 MOFA, (Gidai Gojuuyon) Mukokusekisha no Jokyo to Genshou ni kansuru Jouyaku An [(Agenda 
54) Draft Conventions on the Elimination and Reduction of Stateless Persons], in Kokusei Rengou 
Soukai Kankei Ikken Dai Juuikkai Soukai Kankei Dai Ikkan [The 11th Session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations]. Holding of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
B’-2-1-0-1-11 (1957). 
679 HONMA, supra note 663, at 31. 
680 See 2.4., “The 1916 Amendment of the 1899 Nationality Act”. 
681 See 3.4.2., “The 1952 Circular of the MOJ”. 
682 See 3.4.2., “The 1952 Circular of the MOJ”. Note that Japan does not have diplomatic relations with 
the DPRK. 
683 The General Association of Korean Residents, which has strong connections with the DPRK, also 
supported loss of Japanese nationality. Onuma, supra note 516, at 270. 
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were able to stay in Japan even if they did not possess the normal resident status generally 
needed for foreigners to stay legally in Japan at the time. When the Treaty of San Francisco 
came into effect,684 Law No. 126 of 1952 was enacted, which provided that people who lost 
their Japanese nationality and who had been living in Japan before 2 September 1945 could 
stay in Japan without residential status.685 As a result, Korean residents residing in Japan 
were not subject to deportation to Korea.686 Thus, Korean people whose daily lives were 
based in Japan were not deported. As a result, neither the governments of Japan and the ROK 
nor major Korean ethnic societies regarded the nationality of Korean residents in Japan as 
an issue. 
However, it must be pointed out that there were people from the colonies who felt 
that their status in Japan was an issue. Since Korean residents in Japan became foreigners, 
they could not receive the social services available to Japanese nationals, and this was a 
problem for some of those who were based in Japan.687 One scholar argues that the status of 
Korean residents in Japan was that of stateless persons.688 This indicates that the status of 
some Koreans was similar to that of stateless persons even though no major power regarded 
the status and nationality of Koreans in Japan as an issue. 
The year 1972 saw another occasion when statelessness could have been perceived 
as an issue. Japan used to recognise the ROC as the legitimate government of China, but this 
policy changed, and in 1972, Japan began recognising the PRC as the Chinese 
government.689 Some Chinese people living in Japan, in particular those who supported the 
Kuomintang in Taiwan, faced a problem. If they continued to possess the nationality of the 
 
684 For the Treaty of San Francisco, see 3.4.1., “The 1951 Treaty of San Francisco”. 
685 Onuma, supra note 487, at 248-249. 
686 Currently, people from the former colonies who lost their Japanese nationality in 1952 and their 
descendants possess the residential status of “Special Permanent Resident”.  
687 Onuma, supra note 516, at 272. 
688 See the following. Onuma, supra note 516, at 274. See also 3.4.2., “The 1952 Circular of the MOJ”. 
689 TIEN-SHI CHEN, MUKOKUSEKI [STATELESSNESS] 20 (2005). 
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ROC, they would be nationals of a state with which Japan did not have diplomatic ties.690 
They could also have acquired the nationality of the PRC or Japan by naturalisation, but 
some of them did not want to take either option because they did not have any commitment 
to either state.691 It was possible for them to remain a national of the ROC and for the 
nationality of “China” to be displayed in their Alien Registration Card in Japan because the 
Japanese government decided to display the nationality of both the ROC and PRC as 
“China”.692 However, there was rumour among some Chinese people in Japan that it was not 
clear how those ROC nationals whose Alien Registration Card in Japan mentioned “China” 
as a nationality would be treated by the PRC, which had diplomatic ties with Japan.693 Under 
these circumstances, there were people who decided to renounce their ROC nationality, 
including the family of Tien-shi Chen (Lara), a well-known former stateless person and a 
scholar on statelessness in Japan.694 As a result, these people became stateless. The Japanese 
government estimated that approximately 10,000 people became stateless as a result of 
renouncing their ROC nationality.695 However, the available documents do not indicate that 
the Japanese government regarded this mass renunciation of ROC nationality in Japan as an 
issue relevant to statelessness at the time. Although the reasons behind this are not clear, one 
possible reason is that former nationals of the ROC could naturalise as Japanese easily if 
they so wished. When renunciation of ROC nationality and statelessness were discussed in 
the Diet, it was said that the process of naturalisation as Japanese would not take much time 
for former nationals of the ROC because the Japanese government was concerned about their 
 
690 Id, at 21. 
691 Id, at 21. Note that supporters of the Kuomintang do not have a commitment to Japan because they 
fought against Japan during WWII. They also fought against the Chinese Communist Party, the ruling 
party of the PRC, so they did not have any commitment to the PRC either. 
692 CHEN, supra note 689, at 21. 
693 Id, at 22. 
694 For her life-story, see the following. Id. 
695 DAI 72 KAI KOKKAI SHUUGIIN HOUMU IINKAIGIROKU[MINUTES OF THE COMMITTEE FOR LEGAL 
AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE 72ND SESSION OF THE DIET] (No. 26, 24 April 1974) p. 7. 
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situation.696 In other words, those who wanted to acquire Japanese nationality seem to have 
been able to do so without much difficulty. A measure to prevent statelessness among former 
nationals of the ROC was thus provided by the Japanese government, so statelessness among 
nationals of the ROC was not regarded as a major issue in Japanese society. 
In one exceptional case, statelessness received public attention in the 1960s. There 
were a number of stateless children born to US fathers and Japanese mothers in Okinawa in 
the 1980s.697 However, the norm of preventing statelessness did not directly influence the 
legislation. Rather, the Japanese women’s right on the nationality of their children was at 
issue. 698  This indicates that although statelessness in Okinawa was recognised by the 
Japanese government and Japanese society, the issue of statelessness was solved by 
recognising the Japanese women’s right on the nationality of their children in the 1984 
Nationality Act, not by recognising the norm of preventing statelessness.699 The above cases 
explain that stateless persons did not receive much attention socially in Japan, and even when 
they did, other principles than the norm of preventing statelessness influenced Japanese law. 
 
4.3.2. Japanese National Identity 
Japanese national identity also explains the Japanese attitude to the norm of 
preventing statelessness.700 After the end of WWII, Japanese national identity, which had 
become particularly strong after the late nineteenth century, prevented the state from 
 
696 CHEN, supra note 689, at 21. 
697 See 3.8., “The CEDAW and the 1984 Nationality Act”. Note that Kobayashi argues that the issue of 
stateless persons in Okinawa was one trigger for the adoption of the 1984 Nationality Act. Kobayashi, 
supra note 582, at 444-445. 
698 See 3.8., “The CEDAW and the 1984 Nationality Act”. 
699 Recognising Japanese women’s right to transmit their nationality is theoretically different from the 
norm of preventing statelessness because statelessness can be prevented by the acquisition of nationality 
and prevention of the loss of nationality. The 1984 Nationality Act focused on the transmission of 
nationality, not the acquisition of nationality, which is conceptually different from the prevention of 
statelessness. 
700 National identity here means a collective identity as a political unit. This emotional attachment to the 
nation is called nationalism. See 1.2., “The Emergence of Nationality and the Nation-State Principle” 
for a conceptual history of nationality, national identity, and nationalism. 
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following the norm of preventing statelessness in international law. It particularly became 
an obstacle to preventing statelessness among persons who were born to foreign parents. As 
a result of the development of Japan’s status in international society, Japanese national 
identity prevailed over the need to follow the norm of preventing statelessness in 
international law.701 
A strong Japanese national identity began to be formed in the late nineteenth century 
as a result of the nation-building process mobilised by the Japanese elites. State Shintoism, 
which developed in the late nineteenth century, assisted in the formation of the modern 
Japanese national identity. Traditional Shintoism, which became the basis of State Shintoism, 
emerged in Japan in the first century and involved the worship of many gods in nature.702 
Since the eighth century, the Emperor had been positioned as one of the gods, and shrines 
worshipped the Emperor as well as other gods.703 However, it must be noted that many 
Japanese people were not aware of the authority of the Emperor at the time.704 By contrast, 
State Shintoism regarded the Emperor as the only object of worship.705 In 1871, three years 
after the establishment of the modern Japanese government, the government ordered shrines 
to sermonise the new instruction that the Emperor needed to be respected.706 Article 3 of the 
1889 Constitution states that “The Emperor is sacred.”707 This shows that from the late 
 
701 For the relationship between Japan’s status in international society and the need to follow 
international law, see 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
702 SHIGEYOSHI MURAKAMI, KOKKA SHINTOU [STATE SHINTOISM] 17, 26 (1979). This background 
indicates that “the Meiji [i.e. late-nineteenth-century] elites rediscovered, reinterpreted and regenerated 
Japan’s identity under the Tennō (Emperor) system” (emphasis in original). GIORGIO SHANI, RELIGION, 
IDENTITY AND HUMAN SECURITY 158 (2014). This means that State Shintoism was neither totally 
invented by the elites of the late nineteenth century nor exactly the same type of the Shintoism as that 
before the late nineteenth century. 
703 MURAKAMI, supra note 702, at 29. 
704 AKIRA FUJIWARA, YUTAKA YOSHIDA, SATORU ITO & TOSHIRO KUNUGI, TENNO NO SHOUWA SHI 
[THE SHOWA HISTORY OF THE EMPEROR] 13 (special ed., 2007). 
705 MURAKAMI, supra note 702, at 107. 
706 Id, at 107. 
707 This translation derives from the following. ITO, supra note 176, at 6. 
    156 
nineteenth century, when Japan abolished its policy of isolationism, the Emperor was 
regarded as the only God in Japan. 
The unique emphasis on blood in the relationship between the Emperor and Japanese 
nationals is observable from the explanation provided by the Japanese government, and it 
was substantiated in the 1899 Nationality Act.708 The Japanese government stated that while 
the relationship between the Emperor and Japanese subjects was that of master and subjects, 
the attachment was deeper than the relationship between master and subjects; it was a 
relationship between father and children.709 It was explained that this relationship between 
the Emperor and his subjects in Japan was unique; in the West, by contrast, individuals were 
emphasised.710 Japan was then defined as “a great family state”.711 This understanding of the 
relationship between the Emperor and Japanese subjects was taught in schools.712 Students 
learnt that, historically, Japan had been ruled over by the Emperors and that the Emperor 
and Japanese subjects were a family. This emotional parent-child relationship and family 
system seems to have influenced the “assumed nationality law”, which justified the jus 
sanguinis through the paternal line, as well as the idea of the household that was dominant 
in the Japanese nationality.713 
 
708 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
709 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE, KOKUTAI NO HONGI [THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF 
THE NATIONAL POLITY] 36 (1937). It was said that the Emperor loved his Japanese subjects as if they 
were “babies”. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE, supra note 709, at 47. 
710 Id, at 37. 
711 Translated by the author. Id, at 38. There is a view that this concept of the Emperor and his Japanese 
subjects as family developed between 1921 and 1939. SUSUMU SHIMAZONO, KOKKA SHINTOU TO NIHON 
JIN [STATE SHINTOISM AND THE JAPANESE] 68 (2010). However, as can be seen in the adoption of jus 
sanguinis through the paternal line, the emphasis on the family seems to have been observable since the 
beginning of the late nineteenth century although the concept could have been emphasised between 
1921 and 1939. 
712 In Year 1, students learnt how much the Emperor loved his Japanese subjects. In Year 4, students 
learnt the line of unbroken Emperors who had ruled over Japan down the centuries, and they were 
taught to love Japan. Id, at 157. This reminds the author of the role of school education in nation-
building, as pointed out by Gellner. GELLNER, supra note 55, at 65. See also SHANI, supra note 702, at 
159. 
713 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
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After the end of WWII, the GHQ, which ruled Japan after its defeat, abolished State 
Shintoism,714 but the Japanese national identity that developed after the late nineteenth 
century seems to have remained. In December 1945, the GHQ published a command to 
abolish State Shintoism.715 By abolishing State Shintoism, the GHQ meant to cut the link 
between the institutional system of Japan and Shintoism.716 From 1900, shrines had been 
administered by the Shrine Bureau of the Home Ministry, not by the Bureau of Religion, 
which administered other religions.717 This indicates that at that time, Shintoism had a 
special status in Japan, and this was not one among several religions, but the religion of 
Japan.718 The GHQ believed that this institutional link between the state and Shintoism was 
problematic because such a link allowed Shintoism to be an “ideology” that was “militaristic 
and ultranationalistic”.719 Thus, it assumed that when the institutional link between the state 
and Shintoism was cut, the State Shintoism would be abolished.720 It must be emphasised 
that the GHQ did not abolish the ritual activities of the imperial family,721 and the system of 
the imperial family, including the Emperor, remained.722 As a result, the Japanese national 
identity based on Shintoism remained even after WWII.723 
 
714 For the role of GHQ after the end of WWII in Japan, see also 3.2., “The 1946 Constitution”. 
715 SHIMAZONO, supra note 711, at 184. 
716 Id, at 79. 
717 Id, at 80. 
718 Id, at 80. 
719 Translated by the author. Id, at 77. 
720 Id, at 77. 
721 Id, at 79. 
722 There are two reasons why the GHQ did not abolish the Emperor system. The first is that the GHQ 
felt the need to secure freedom of religion by maintaining the Emperor system. Although State 
Shintoism, which connected the state and Shintoism, was abolished, the GHQ did not abolish Shintoism 
as a whole, because it intended to preserve religious freedom. Freedom of religion was provided for in 
Article 20 of the 1946 Constitution, which the GHQ had drafted. Although the GHQ regarded State 
Shintoism as an issue, it did not find a direct link between Shintoism in general and State Shintoism. Id, 
at 186. The other possible reason is political. General MacArthur, the SCAP, thought that the Emperor 
system should be maintained to make governance of Japan easier for the GHQ. Id, at 187-188. 
723 The above stories concern national identity as facilitated by the Japanese government. However, 
there is a case indicating that Japanese national identity is strong for (former) Japanese nationals 
although the relationship with the Emperor is not necessarily clear. Some Japanese acquired other 
nationalities for business purposes, and their Japanese nationality was denied pursuant to Article 11(1) 
of the 1984 Nationality Act, which provided that the voluntary acquisition of another nationality would 
result in the loss of Japanese nationality. However, those involved did not make the decision to 
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 This background became obstacles to the Japanese government following the norm 
of preventing statelessness in cases where children were born to foreign parents. It must be 
emphasised that the norm of preventing statelessness played a role in the 1899 Nationality 
Act.724 A possible reason for this is that following international law was regarded as a more 
significant matter for Japan than reflecting its collective national identity in the nationality 
law at the time since Japan sought to be a member of international society.725 As a result, the 
1899 Nationality Act included the norm of preventing statelessness derived from 
international law even though the prevention of statelessness was not necessarily in line with 
the view of the Japanese nation based on the principles of State Shintoism. However, as 
Japan began to be regarded as a member of international society, the necessity to follow 
international law declined,726 and the principle of jus sanguinis and the Japanese national 
identity might have begun to prevail over the principle in international law after the end of 
WWII. 
 This emphasis on national identity among Japanese nationals can be explained by the 
principle of the nation-state. One feature of the nation-state principle developed in France 
was a horizontal relationship among nationals. This feature seems to have been different in 
Japan because, at least historically, a vertical relationship between the Emperor and Japanese 
nationals was emphasised when the Japanese national identity was under consideration. 
 
renounce their Japanese nationality voluntarily, and they filed a suit against the MOJ, claiming that 
Article 11(1) was unconstitutional from various perspectives, including the principle of the freedom to 
renounce one’s nationality in Article 22(2) of the 1946 Constitution. In a petition, the plaintiffs claimed 
that they were not treated as Japanese nationals even though they were Japanese. “For the plaintiffs, 
their Japanese nationality, transmitted from their ancestors and parents, has a special meaning” 
(translated by the author). Supporters for a Lawsuit to Request Confirmation of Nationality, Sojou 
Gaiyou [Summary of a Petition] (Sep. 12, 2019), at 
http://yumejitsu.net/%e8%a8%b4%e7%8a%b6%e6%a6%82%e8%a6%81/. Note that the Emperor was 
not mentioned as a source of their identity, and this case did not concern a collective identity, so this is 
not a precise example showing that the Japanese national identity is an obstacle to Japan following the 
norm of preventing statelessness in international law. However, it does indicate that at least some 
Japanese nationals had a commitment to a nationality that was transmitted by their family. 
724 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
725 See 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
726 See 4.2.1., “The Status of Japan in International Society”. 
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However, when the relationship among Japanese nationals is considered, there is a shared 
national identity among Japanese nationals, at least in theory, as developed by the 
government, as seen in the previous paragraphs. Under the 1889 Constitution, the Japanese 
government claimed that Japan was “a great family state”, and this was a distinctive feature 
of Japan. 727  Although such an understanding seems to have changed when the 1946 
Constitution was enforced since the Emperor was not sovereign under the new constitution, 
the Emperor remained in place under the new constitution. This indicates the possibility that 
Japanese national identity based on the Emperor system has remained in Japan, as well as 
the applicability of the nation-state principle. In other words, although it has a distinctive 
Japanese character, the nation-state principle was developed in Japan as it was in France. 
When Japan desired to become a member of international society, the nation-state principle 
was compromised with the norm of preventing statelessness. However, recently, after Japan 
had achieved recognition as a member of international society, the Japanese nation-state 
principle seems to have strengthened, and it has prevailed over the norm of preventing 
statelessness. 
 The strength of Japanese national identity does not merely cause statelessness, 
however. It also seems to assist in the prevention of statelessness by preventing deprivation 
of nationality. Since the 1899 Nationality Act, the Japanese government has not recognised 
its right to deprive Japanese nationals of their nationality.728 Voluntary acquisition of another 
nationality has been a condition of loss of Japanese nationality.729 One understanding is that 
possession of Japanese nationality is a right that Japanese nationals have,730 even though this 
has not been explicitly discussed in the Diet. The motivation for avoiding the deprivation of 
nationality in the 1899 Nationality Act was different from the motivation to prepare clauses 
 
727 Translated by the author. MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE, supra note 709, at 38. 
728 See the following. MOJ, Civil Affairs Bureau, The Fifth Division, supra note 217, at 20. 
729 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
730 MINOBE, supra note 225, at 148. 
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on the prevention of statelessness by conferring nationality in the same Act. On the one hand, 
the prevention of statelessness by conferring nationality was included in the 1899 Nationality 
Act by referring to the resolution of the IDI.731 On the other hand, international law does not 
seem to have been the reason for avoiding the deprivation of nationality since it was not 
mentioned in the drafting process of the 1899 Nationality Act. Rather, Japanese national 
identity might have contributed to the avoidance of deprivation of nationality. The 
relationship between Japanese national identity and avoidance of deprivation of nationality 
was neither discussed in the Diet nor in the academic literature because it seems to have been 
assumed by the Japanese at the time. This assumption is clarified when the basic principle 
of Japanese nationality is examined. Nationality acts have adopted the jus sanguinis 
principle, and this is related to the Japanese household system and the notion of the Japanese 
as a family state.732 This identity as a family state seems to be why the deprivation of 
Japanese nationality was not permitted. The logic seems to have been that it did not make 
sense for the Japanese government to deprive a Japanese national of their nationality if that 
person did not renounce it voluntarily. Thus, no authority could deprive someone of their 
Japanese nationality without their consent.  
This is interesting when compared to the current practice of deprivation of nationality 
in other states. There are practices that allow for the deprivation of nationality.733 One reason 
for deprivation of nationality is a security concern.734 Although many states do not deprive 
 
731 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. 
732 See 2.3., “The 1899 Nationality Act”. Article 5 of the 1899 Nationality Act indicated that the 
Japanese household was the basis of Japanese nationality. A substantial example indicating the 
relationship between Japanese nationality and Japanese household is the koseki or household 
registration system. For the relationship between nationality and koseki, see the following. Karl Jakob 
Krogness, Jus Koseki: Household Registration and Japanese Citizenship, in JAPAN’S HOUSEHOLD 
REGISTRATION SYSTEM AND CITIZENSHIP: KOSEKI, IDENTIFICATION AND DOCUMENTATION 145, 145-
165 (David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness eds., 2014). 
733 See the following, Osamu Arakaki, Kokuseki no Hakudatsu to Anzenhoshouka [Deprivation and 
Securitisation of Nationality], 40 PRIME: INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST. MEIJI GAKUIN UNIV. 3, 3-13 
(2017). 
734 Id, at 3-13. 
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nationality if it results in statelessness, the UK reserves the right to deprive someone of 
British nationality even if this results in statelessness. Since 2014, British nationality can be 
deprived even when this results in statelessness if the person acquired it through 
naturalisation and the deprivation is considered to be beneficial to the public welfare.735 
When the Japanese case is compared with the UK case, it is interesting to note that security 
issues do not trigger deprivation of Japanese nationality. This implies that Japanese national 
identity is stronger than the concern for security in the context of deprivation of nationality. 
The above examples indicate that the strong Japanese national identity both allows and 
prevents statelessness.736 
 
4.4. Conclusion of the Analysis 
 This analysis helps to explain why Japanese laws do not provide for the complete 
prevention of statelessness today. For example, children born in Japan to persons with other 
nationalities do not automatically acquire Japanese nationality under the 1984 Nationality 
Act, and this can result in statelessness. This is regarded as a gap between the current 
Japanese laws and the 1961 Convention, which is a comprehensive treaty to prevent 
 
735 Terry McGuinness & Melanie Gower, Deprivation of British Citizenship and Withdrawal of 
Passport Facilities, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY BRIEFING PAPER NUMBER 06820 8 (2017). Id, at 6-
7. 
736 However, even if deprivation of nationality is avoided, Japanese nationality can be denied, and this 
could result in statelessness because of denial of a parent-child relationship. There is one such case. A (a 
male) was born in the 1970s to B, a Korean mother, in Japan, and A was regarded as a child of B and C, 
B’s husband, who was Japanese. At the time, the 1950 Nationality Act employed jus sanguinis through 
the paternal line, and C transmitted Japanese nationality to A. However, A’s biological father was D, 
another Japanese male. In order to bring the legal parent-children relationship in line with the biological 
relationship, a lawsuit to deny the parent-child relationship between A and C was filed, and A and C’s 
relationship was denied. As a result, there was no basis for A to acquire Japanese nationality, and 
Japanese nationality was denied, resulting in statelessness. Although D, A’s biological father, was 
Japanese, he could not transmit his nationality as the father of A because the clause on nationality does 
not have a retroactive effect. For A, his Japanese nationality was “denied”, and the situation is similar to 
deprivation of nationality. However, for the Japanese government, this action is not deprivation because 
the basis of acquisition of Japanese nationality was denied. For details on the case, see the following. 
STUDY GROUP ON STATELESSNESS IN JAPAN, supra note 20, at 78-83. 
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statelessness.737 If one or several international or national factors mentioned above arise, 
Japan may find it necessary to prevent statelessness by conferring nationality on those who 
are born in Japan. However, since no conditions seem to have arisen, Japan has neither 
become a contracting party to the 1961 Convention nor taken further steps to prevent 
statelessness. Japan is now regarded as a developed state in international society, so it is not 
necessary for Japan to follow international law, in contrast to the situation at the end of the 
nineteenth century. The prevention of statelessness does not seem to be regarded as a norm 
that needs to be followed in international society, so Japan does not follow it. As a national 
phenomenon, statelessness is not regarded as a pressing matter by the Japanese government. 
In addition, the Japanese national identity seems to be an obstacle to Japan following the 
norm of preventing statelessness, but it also seems to assist in the prohibition of deprivation 
of statelessness among Japanese, thus preventing statelessness. 
The above analysis indicates that there are cases where the Japanese government 
followed international norms when a certain factor or factors were present. However, at this 
moment, the absence of these factors explains why Japan has not fully followed the norm of 
preventing statelessness recently. 
  
 
737 For the gap between the current Japanese nationality act and the 1961 Convention, see the following. 
ARAKAKI, supra note 8, at 69-75. 
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CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation has examined the influence of the norm of preventing statelessness 
in international law on Japanese nationality law. On the basis of the empirical research in 
Chapters One to Three, Chapter Four explained, by referring to international and national 
factors, why Japan followed the norm of preventing statelessness in earlier times even 
though it is not necessarily influenced by the norm recently. The conclusion covers the 
implication of this dissertation and touches upon the possible future position of Japan in 
relation to the norm of preventing statelessness in international society. 
 This dissertation has two pieces of implication. The first piece related to international 
law is that the concept of nationality is heavily influenced by international law. As this 
dissertation proved, although the international law’s influence on Japanese nationality law 
has not been normally discussed except that on the CEDAW, the norm of preventing 
statelessness in international law influenced the Japanese nationality law. This indicates the 
significance of international law in nationality matters. It is commonly stated that a 
nationality is a domestic jurisdiction, and as a result, the role of international law in 
nationality law can be overlooked.738 However, this dissertation indicates that international 
law plays a role in nationality matters. Thus, the empirical study on the international law’s 
influence on nationality law needs to be conducted in other states to analyse the role of 
international law in nationality matters. 
 
738 Note that it is international law that determines a nationality is a domestic jurisdiction. See 
“Statement of the Problem” in the “Introduction”. 
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The second piece related to international relations is that newcomers to international 
society tend to follow international law even if there is possible domestic norm which can 
conflict with international law. For instance, Japan prioritised following international law 
over the Japanese national identity although a collective national identity is significant for 
each state. 739  This indicates the significance of international law for newcomers to 
international society. Interestingly, this dissertation indicates that the Japanese hesitation to 
follow international law on prevention of statelessness recently. Thus, the status of a state in 
international society changes the state’s attitude to international law. In order to understand 
the role of international law in international soicety well, variety of states’ attitudes to 
various topics needs to be examined.  
This dissertation concludes with the discussion of the possible future position of 
Japan. As discussed already, international society’s commitment to the norm of preventing 
statelessness is limited. 740  However, it must be noted that the norm of preventing 
statelessness has been receiving attention recently. In 2014, the UNHCR, which possesses a 
mandate on statelessness, launched the “#IBelong” campaign to end statelessness by 
2024.741  The UNHCR and some states, core members of the “Friends of the #IBelong 
campaign to end statelessness” in particular, are promoting the principle of preventing 
statelessness.742 On the initiative of the core members of the “Friends of the #IBelong 
campaign to end statelessness”, some resolutions of the Human Rights Council of the UN 
have covered statelessness.743 In addition, the number of contracting parties to the 1961 
 
739 See 4.3.2., “Japanese National Identity”. 
740 See 4.2.2., “Status of the Norm of Preventing Statelessness in International Society”. 
741 For the “#IBelong” campaign, see the following. UNHCR, IBELONG, at 
http://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/ (viewed Jan. 17, 2019). 
742 Likeminded states formed “Friends of the #IBelong campaign to end statelessness” in 2015. The US, 
Mexico, Australia, Thailand and Finland are also the core members of the “Friends.” Akiyama, supra 
note 654, at 200. 
743 See the following. UNGA, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 30 June 2016 32/7. 
The Right to a Nationality: Women’s Equal Nationality Rights in Law and in Practice, 
A/HRC/RES/32/7 (18 July 2016). UNGA, Resolution adopted by the Human Rights Council on 24 
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Convention has recently been increasing rapidly. In 2010, only 37 states were contracting 
parties to the 1961 Convention, but 73 states were contracting parties to the Convention as 
of August 2019.744 In the roughly 50 years from 1961 to 2010, 37 states became contracting 
parties, whereas 36 other states have become contacting parties in the past nine years. These 
examples indicate that the norm of preventing statelessness is becoming a significant theme 
for discussion in international society. 
One interesting point is that although some states promote the norm of preventing 
statelessness, they are not necessarily eager to prevent statelessness by conferring their own 
nationality. For instance, prevention and elimination of statelessness is one diplomatic policy 
agenda for the US and Mexico, core members of the “Friends of the #IBelong campaign to 
end statelessness”, but it does not seem to become a domestic policy agenda for these states. 
Although these states are eager to promote the norm of preventing and eliminating 
statelessness in international sphere, they do not take a special measure to prevent or 
eliminate statelessness within each state. 745  Although further and precise analysis is 
necessary, one possible effect of this practice is the containment of stateless persons.746 
Imagine a case in which a stateless person comes to a state that advocates the norm of 
preventing statelessness. If there is no state to deport the stateless person to, the state may 
need to admit entry to the stateless person. Some may argue that conferral of the state’s 
nationality is necessary to reduce statelessness. However, if the stateless person acquires the 
nationality of another state before coming to the state that advocates the norm of preventing 
statelessness, the state does not need to admit that individual because he or she can be 
 
March 2017 34/15. Birth Registration and the Right of Everyone to Recognition Everywhere as a 
Person before the Law, A/HRC/RES/34/15 (11 April 2017). Id, at 200. 
744 As of 19 August 2019. See the following. UN Treaty Collection, supra note 145. 
745 Akiyama, supra note 654, at 201-202. 
746 OSAMU ARAKAKI, GUROBARUKA JIDAI NO MUKOKUSEKISHA: OUSHUU NO NINTEI, HOGO SEIDO WO 
CHUUSIN NI [STATELESS PERSONS IN A GLOBAL AGE: DETERMINATION AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS IN 
EUROPE] 21 (2017). 
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deported to the state conferring nationality, at least in theory.747 In this case, there is no need 
for the state that advocates the norm of preventing statelessness to confer nationality on the 
individual. This indicates that although some states’ right to confer their nationality is 
affected by the international principle of the prevention of statelessness, other states’ right 
may not be challenged. Thus, it is possible that some states advocate the norm of preventing 
statelessness in order to contain stateless persons while they do not prevent statelessness by 
conferring their own nationality. 
In these circumstances, the following is a possible scenario. If an increasing number 
of states become contracting parties to the 1961 Convention and the commitment to 
preventing statelessness becomes stronger, the prevention of statelessness can come to be 
regarded as appropriate behaviour for states, and thus as a standard in international 
society.748 If more and more states follow the norm of preventing statelessness, states that 
promote the norm of preventing statelessness may need to follow that norm and to confer 
their nationality in order to legitimate themselves in international society.749  If such a 
situation arises, the response of states that promote the norm but do not commit to conferring 
their own nationality will be interesting to observe. 
At the moment, Japan does not exhibit any particular commitment to the norm of 
preventing statelessness. How Japan will react to a global commitment to the norm of 
preventing statelessness will need to be examined. It must be noted that the UNHCR is 
 
747 However, it must be noted that if someone fears persecution if he or she stays the state conferring 
nationality upon them, they cannot be deported to that state pursuant to the non-refoulement principle. 
748 For this theory, see the following. Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 43, at 895-902. 
749 There are also regional commitments to preventing statelessness. UNHCR, Brazil Declaration: A 
Framework for Cooperation and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of 
Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean (3 December 2014), 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/5487065b4.html (visited Jan.17, 2019). UNHCR & 
ECOWAS, Abidjan Declaration of Ministers of ECOWAS Member States on Eradication of Statelessness 
(25 February 2015),  available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/54f588df4.html (visited Jan.17, 2019). 
ReliefWeb, Abidjan Declaration on the Eradication of Statelessness: Adopted on February 2015 by the 
Member States of ECOWAS, the Declaration supports UNHCR’s Global Campaign to End Statelessness 
by 2024, Achievements of the Abidjan Declaration 2 Years After (2 March 2017), available at 
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/54536.pdf (visited Jan.17, 2019). 
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passionate about working on statelessness in Japan too.750 In order to think about the future 
role of Japan in preventing statelessness, the statement quoted earlier from Harukazu 
Nagaoka, a Japanese delegate to the Codification Conference and the first speaker in the 
substantial discussion of the conference, offers an interesting insight.751 
 
If, in this Conference, the various States of the world find that they can, by agreement, 
eliminate the conflict of laws on this subject, I beg to state here and now that my 
Government will be prepared to introduce into its nationality law such changes as may 
be deemed necessary. 
 
The government can change its policy, and the current Japanese policy is not bound by the 
policy of the 1930s. Since the maintenance of the international order seems to have been the 
main purpose of the norm of preventing statelessness,752 the reason behind the prevention of 
statelessness in the 1930s is different from the current one, which focuses on human rights. 
However, it is worth recalling that Japan is committed to the prevention of statelessness, and 
it indicated its willingness to amend its municipal law to make it compatible with any new 
convention. The Japanese reaction to the norm of preventing statelessness will reveal 
whether or not jus sanguinis based on the Japanese household will be influenced by the norm 
of preventing statelessness. This analysis has implications for analysing whether the norm 
of preventing statelessness will prevail over the nation-state principle in the future 
international order. 
 
750 The UNHCR Representation in Japan has commissioned two reports since 2014 to indicate that 
statelessness is an issue that Japan faces, even though statelessness does not receive much attention in 
Japan. In the foreword of each report, the UNHCR Representatives in Japan point out the need for Japan 
to be a contracting party to both the 1954 and 1961 Conventions. For the reports, see the following. 
ARAKAKI, supra note 8. STUDY GROUP ON STATELESSNESS IN JAPAN, supra note 20. 
751 LN, supra note 95, at 19. See 2.5.3., “The Japanese Position in the Codification Conference (1930)”. 
752 See 1.3.2., “The 1930 Convention: The Emphasis on Married Women and Children”. 
